The crime of international maritime fraud: a comparartive study between Iraqi and English law by Al-Azzawi, Ayah H.A.
The Crime of International Maritime Fraud: 
A Comparative Study between Iraqi and English Law. 
A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
to The School of Law, 
Faculty of Law and Financial Studies 
University of Glasgow. 
by 
Ayad H. A. AI-Azzawi (L. L. M., University of Baghdad) 
March 1998. 
© Ayad H. A. Al-Azzawi, 1998. 
In memory of my Mother and my brother Munther 
"Ye believers devour not each other's property among yourselves 
save that be trading by mutual consent. " 
Verse 29 of Surat Al nisa, The Holy Qur'an. 
"I said in my haste, All men are liars. " 
Psalms, 116-11. 
The Holy Bible. 
"The heart of man is deceitful above all things, and such as have 
been conversant in business and Courts of Justice, have found that cheats 
do amongst men multiply, and vary themselves into so many forms. " 
Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh. 
The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal. 
Edinburgh, 1677, p. 286 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank The Ministry of Higher Education in Iraq for giving me 
the scholarship and the opportunity to study in the University of Glasgow, 
although the scholarship has been suspended since the Gulf War as a result 
of the United Nations sanctions. 
I am very grateful to Mr Dyer, my Supervisor, who although suffering from ill 
health, has helped a great deal to overcome my crisis and gave me a lot of 
encouragement and support. Without his help I would not have been able to 
complete my studies. I am also indebted to Mr E Ellen, Director of the 
International Maritime Bureau, London who gave me useful advice and 
support and some publishing materials from his bureau at the beginning of 
my studies. Also I would like to thank The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development for sending me some of their publications. 
am deeply indebted to Anne Semple and June Maxwell who have helped 
me with the typing of the thesis. 
1 
SUMMARY 
This thesis is intended to deal with the crime of International Maritime Fraud 
a comparative study between the Iraqi and English law. The scheme of the 
thesis is as follows. Introduction and four parts, part one is an overview of 
Maritime Fraud and outlines the definition, reasons and features and 
classification of Maritime Fraud. Part two deals with the types of frauds and 
the modus operandi, with illustrative examples of each type of fraud. Part 
three of this study deals with the analysis of Maritime Fraud under criminal 
law in Iraqi and English law. Part four examines the jurisdiction over Maritime 
Fraud in Iraqi and English law, and in some International Conventions 
related to some international crimes. A review of findings, and 
recommendations for change, are contained in the conclusion. 
The main purposes of this thesis are: A study of the crime of International 
Maritime Fraud under criminal law in Iraq and England, serving to identify 
the problems and defects which justify the making of change. The study also 
investigates the feasibility and desirability of establishing greater 
jurisdictional capabilities of countries affected by designated act of Maritime 
Fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The shipping industry has advanced at an astonishing pace over the last 30 
years. Growing world trade and advancing technology have brought into 
economies progress in scale, unitisation, automation, satellite navigation, 
and ever nearer, the possibility of nuclear-powered vessels. (') 
Behind the scenes however, fraudsters for their part have been adept in 
exploiting commercial, industrial and technical change to perpetrate 
throughout the world ever more frauds of a gigantic nature; in the sphere of 
international trade transactions in connection with shipping so called 
"Maritime Fraud", the success of many of these frauds has depended upon 
the extraordinary degree of trust that is inherent in international trade. (2) 
Maritime Fraud has been described as "near perfect crime" (3) due to the 
minimum risk for the perpetrator, relative simplicity of operation, difficulty of 
detection and even if detected, the still greater difficulty of successful 
prosecution in court. 
Moreover, it is described as a secret crime on the basis that the victim is 
frequently reluctant to report the fraud to the law enforcement authorities. 
Due to the cloud of secrecy surrounding banks and insurance companies, 
many frauds remain difficult to detect and undisclosed. (4) 
In some fraud incidents, if the victim is able to identify the perpetrator, he 
prefers to negotiate with, rather than bring an action against him. (5 
Reported losses due to Maritime Fraud were estimated at $13 billion per 
annum. (6 We in the Arabic countries, had our own substantial share of such 
losses, especially our state trading organisations. (7) 
Maritime Fraud always connects with the movement of goods from country to 
country across the great oceans, with dishonesty in the use of ships to 
transport those cargoes; with offences against those who fund the business 
1 
interests involved, and with crimes against those who insure ships and 
cargoes. 
So, maritime fraud is a menace which concerns all who are directly or 
indirectly connected with international trade, such as bankers, exporters, 
importers, ship owners, charterers ..... and of course, 
insurers. 
Although Maritime Fraud losses constitute a relatively low percentage of the 
total value of international seaborne trade, the problem is still very serious 
and is growing, therefore needs to be scrutinised. (") 
There is a series of conferences and seminars, both at national and 
international levels, the basic objective of which is to lay down certain 
regulations for the prevention of Maritime Fraud. (9) There are also a large 
number of national and international organisations that have either a direct 
or indirect involvement in combating Maritime Fraud. In this respect it 
should be mentioned that, in 1981, the formation as an international 
organisation of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)'s International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB), which is situated in London had as its first objectives 
the prevention and containment of fraud and other suspect practices in 
international trade. (10) 
Despite the importance of this crime, it suffers a dearth of study according to 
criminal law. However, there are few studies which concentrate on civil 
liability in Maritime Fraud. (" While others concentrate on protection from 
this crime by examining the system of international trade to identify 
(12) weaknesses which lead to fraud. 
Also, other studies focus on some aspects of the subject such as describing 
typical frauds and reviews the organisations and institutions whose job it is 
to facilitate international trade, as well as those who are concerned with the 
control of Maritime crime. (13) 
Due to the lack of any research dealing with this subject from the criminal 
law point of view, the term "International Maritime Fraud" has been used with 
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the vaguest of meanings as referring to all sorts of operations that are not in 
every respect absolutely honest and clean according to the personal opinion 
of the writer or experts. (14) Thus, this subject has been chosen for its modern 
importance, in order to clarify the crime in question and examine it under 
Iraqi and English laws and make an attempt to solve the jurisdiction problem 
which may arise from the committing of this crime as some Maritime Fraud 
cases may involve up to five different states. The Iraqi and English laws 
have been chosen as a basis for this comparative study because both 
represent two different legal systems. The Iraqi Penal Code, like many Arab 
countries' Penal Codes, (15) is derived mainly from French origin which is 
Napoleonic Penal Law of 1810. (16) So it represents a legal system of Arab 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa who are from time to time 
victims of Maritime Fraud, while English Law represents another different 
legal system of the country which is regarded as the centre of the world 
trade and shipping industries. The scheme of the thesis is as follows. Part 
one is an overview of Maritime Fraud dealing with definition, reasons and 
features and classification of Maritime Fraud. Part two deals with the types 
of frauds and the modus operandi. In order to achieve understanding of this 
kind of fraud, it is necessary to review in relatively simple explanations firstly 
the means by which international trade is financed and then the laws which 
apply to such trade, and in general the type of charter parties, and the 
principle of Maritime insurance. Moreover, this part contains illustrative 
examples of each type of fraud. Some of these examples are reported law 
cases or incidents attracting the media. Because of the dearth of criminal 
cases about this subject, due to the jurisdiction problem, the majority of the 
law cases we used to illustrate the modus operandi are civil or commercial 
law cases involving mainly several innocent parties, each having claims 
against the other and although a court may resolve differences between 
them, there are going to be two parties remaining outside that settlement. 
One will be the criminal who has gained from the original crime, the other will 
be the innocent party upon whom the loss eventually falls. Part three of this 
study deals with the analysis of Maritime Fraud under criminal law in Iraqi 
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and English Law. In this part, some questions need to be answered. Are all 
types of Maritime Fraud regarded as crimes of fraud in both legal systems, 
or do they fall into combinations of other crimes such as theft and breach of 
trust, any other crimes or just civil fraud? The answers to these questions 
are very important because in the extradition treaties, states usually specify 
the precise grounds for which extradition may be granted, and they generally 
require granting extradition in a specific case, it must be determined that the 
act which is the basis of the extradition request is considered a crime under 
the law of both the requesting and custody states. Also the extradition 
treaties state a list of extraditable offences. 
Moreover, nationally Maritime Fraud may be classified in some cases as 
fraud, theft or breach of trust, and to decide which criminal characterisation 
applies to Maritime Fraud is very important in regard to the penalty. In Iraq 
for example, the penalty for some types of theft is the death penalty if the 
theft occurred during the war, while the penalty for fraud can extend to five 
years imprisonment only. 
Thus, to analyse Maritime Fraud according to Iraqi Law and English Law, we 
first deal with criminal fraud in Iraqi law in general and then scrutinise 
Maritime Fraud according to it. The same approach will be applied in 
scrutinising Maritime Fraud in English Law through this part we will see 
whether both laws give the same classification to Maritime Fraud or not. 
Part four deals with the jurisdiction over Maritime Fraud in Iraqi and English 
Law, taking into consideration the international character of Maritime Fraud, 
those states with at least an interest in prosecuting Maritime Fraud are likely 
to be, the state where the offence is committed, planned or set in motion; the 
flag state of the vessel, the state where the vessel docks with the offender 
on board immediately after the offence was committed; with the state of 
nationality of the offender, victim, the owner or charterers of the vessel; the 
state whose national interest is injured or the state having custody of the 
offender. Referring to the above list of possible states with a prosecuting 
interest. This part will examine the question of whether Iraq or England can 
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be accorded jurisdiction as one of the above states with a "prosecuting 
interest" over Maritime Fraud cases, according to the general principles of 
criminal jurisdiction in both laws. Moreover, in view of the difficulties 
experienced in obtaining jurisdiction over offenders or having them 
extradited to a country prepared to prosecute them, it would be necessary to 
investigate the feasibility and desirability of establishing greater jurisdictional 
capabilities of countries affected by designated acts of Maritime Fraud. The 
extension of the criminal jurisdiction in some international conventions 
related to some international crime will be studied as a model to possible 
solution for the jurisdiction problem over Maritime Fraud. 
The final part is the conclusion which contains the result and 
recommendations of this study. 
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PART ONE 1: OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME FRAUD 
1.1 Definition of International Maritime Fraud. 
To understand International Maritime Fraud, it is important to define fraud 
first in Iraqi and English laws then to search for the definition of International 
Maritime Fraud. 
1.1.1 The Definition of Fraud in Iraqi Law. 
The Iraqi Penal Law No. 111 of 1969 gives no definition for fraud even 
though it lays down this crime by article No. 456 & 457, instead the Iraqi 
jurisprudence gives some definitions to the crime of fraud. It is defined as: 
"the appropriation of other's property by fraudulent means which are 
determined by the law with ownership intention". (17) 
This definition does not give mention of the victim's role in parting with this 
property as a result of deception. 
Another definition is that "the Crime achieved through using fraudulent 
means which are determined by Law to deceive the victim in order to induce 
him to part with chattel which does not belong to the offender". (18 
This definition does not mention to whom the properties should be parted 
with, so it is better to mention that the property should pass to the offender 
himself or to another party defined by him without any legal right. By this 
way the definition will comply with Iraqi penal law. 
The definitions stated above are only preliminary ones which will lead to a 
more full and comprehensive treatment in the forthcoming chapters of this 
study. 
1.1.2 The Definition of Fraud in English Law. 
The shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "fraud" as a "criminal 
deception; the using of false representation to obtain an unjust advantage or 
to injure the rights or interest of another". 
(19) 
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The Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law gives the meaning of fraud as: 
"Advantage gained by unfair means; a false representation of fact 
made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, not caring 
whether it is true or false" then the dictionary adds that "It is 
impossible to lay down a definition completely comprehending fraud; 
fraud is infinite: Crescit in orbe dolus. (20) 
The difficulties of reaching any comprehensive definition for fraud were 
reflected in some cases in which courts have always avoided hampering 
themselves by laying down an exhaustive definition of fraud. (21), 
In Scott v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner., (22) Viscount Dilhorne has this 
to say: "I have not the temerity to attempt an exhaustive definition of the 
meaning of `defraud' ". 
The reason behind the refusal to give definition to the term fraud is lest men 
should find ways of committing it which might evade such a definition. (23) 
Still courts have from time to time defined fraud in various ways. In London 
and Globe Finance Corporation Limited Re. (24) Buckley J., Observed Orbiter: 
"To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by deceit to induce a man to 
act to his injury". 
In R. V. Sinclair and others , 
(25) it was said: "To cheat and defraud is to act 
with deliberate dishonesty to prejudice of another person's proprietary rights". 
In this case there is no support for the view that in order to defraud a person 
must be deceived. 
In Scott v. Metropolitan police commissioners , 
(26) Viscount Dilhorne explains- 
"... Words take colour from the context in which they are used, but the 
words fraudulent and defraud must ordinarily have a very similar 
meaning. If, as I think, and as the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
[(1966) Cmnd. 2977)] appears to have thought, fraudulently means 
dishonestly then to defraud ordinarily means in my opinion to deprive 
a person dishonestly of something which is his or of something to 
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which he is or would or might but for the perpetration of fraud, be 
entitled". 
Some writers have defined fraud in various ways. Hans Peter Michelet 
defines it as "a conscious act aiming at deceiving another party in order to 
enrich oneself' (27) 
Peter Kapoor defines fraud as: 
"a. An act of deliberate dishonesty, commonly by way of a statement 
made falsely, knowing it to be false or as to whether it be true or false, 
or 
b. The concealment or deliberate omission of those facts and 
circumstances, which one party is under some obligation to 
communicate; and which the other party has a right, not merely Toro 
concientioe, but juris et de jure, to know, or 
c. A breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, 
or 
d. A device by means of which one party takes undue or unconscientious 
advantage of another, or 
e. The assumption of obligations which the persons involved either have 
no intention of performing, or where they are reckless about them as 
they have no means of performing them, or 
f. any form of deception or artifice used to circumvent, cheat or deceive 
another, carried out with the intention of inducing the other party to 
enter into a contract and thus suffer pecuniary loss or damage to 
property or proprietary rights, except where the person deceived is a 
public official, deceit may secure an advantage for the deceiver 
without an intent to inflict a pecuniary or an economic injury to the 
person deceived. " (28) 
Kapoor's definition is very long and provides that fraud should be carried out 
with the intention of inducing the other party to enter into a contract which is 
not necessary in Criminal Fraud. 
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The Theft Act does not have a working definition of fraud even though it 
creates a number of deception offences. (29) 
1.1.3 Existing Definition of Maritime Fraud: 
No legal and convincing definition of Maritime Fraud is available, (30) although 
there are some proposed definitions of Maritime Fraud. 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in its publication No. 370 
(1980) defines Maritime Fraud as follows: 
"An international trade transaction involves several parties -buyer, 
seller, ship owner, charterer, ship's master or crew, insurer, banker, 
broker or agent. Maritime Fraud occurs when one of these parties 
succeeds, unjustly or illegally, in obtaining money or goods from 
another party to whom, on the face of it, he has undertaken specific 
trade, transport and financial obligations", 
(31) 
The problem with this definition is that it requires one to focus on notions of 
justice or legality - which differ from person to person - and rather misses the 
central feature which characterises all Maritime Fraud namely dishonesty or 
deceit 
. 
(32) 
The above point of view was taken into consideration in H. B Desai's 
definition which said: 
"Maritime Fraud occurs where any one of the various parties involved 
in an international trade transaction intentionally deceives another's as 
to some fact or circumstance in connection with maritime activities 
which enables him to obtain money or goods dishonestly. In some 
cases. several of the parties act in collusion to defraud another. (33) 
It has been said that Sarlis has produced the best definition of Maritime 
Fraud as follows: 
"shipping or Maritime Fraud is the commitment of one or more 
offences such as fraud, theft, larceny, embezzlement, forgery of 
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documents, barratry, etc. It is a layman's term and is used to describe 
these cases where through the commitment, often in a consecutive or 
cumulative way, of the aforesaid offences, a person with an interest in 
a ship or her cargo, suffers a loss. (34) 
This definition is not strictly accurate because the committing of any crime is 
considered a Maritime Fraud which does not comply with the identity of each 
crime in criminal law. So if theft or embezzlement is committed, why do we 
call them fraud and why not by their own name? 
Maritime Fraud has been defined by Kapoor in a greater detail, he points out 
(35) 
, 
"Maritime Fraud is a generic term commonly used to describe the 
obtaining of money, or property in the goods, or a pecuniary 
advantage by one or more parties to the detriment, loss or injury of 
the other party or parties by one of the following means. " Kapoor 
goes on to list 21 different ways in which Maritime Fraud could be 
committed, and adds that the list is not intended to be exhaustive. (36 
He has justified the inclusion of "pilferage by stevedores" and "theft" by 
pointing out that: 
"by common usage within the industry, and in the media, it sometimes 
includes certain acts and offences which are, strictly speaking not 
fraudulent according to the definition of fraud in general". (37) 
Despite this justification, legal writing should follow the law rather than the 
media. So the same writer amended and simplified his definition in 1985 to: 
"Maritime Fraud is a generic term commonly used to describe the 
obtaining of money, or services, or property in the goods, or a 
pecuniary advantage by one or more parties to a transaction from the 
other party or parties, by unjust or illegal means" . 
(38) 
10 
This definition does not mention the maritime environment in which the 
transaction should be connected let alone the obtaining by unjust or illegal 
means does not necessary mean fraudulent means. 
The term "the Crime of International Maritime Fraud" therefore, would appear 
to connote any species of fraudulent dealing arising out of International 
Commercial dealing transaction in, and intended to be carried out in a 
maritime environment. 
1.2 Maritime Fraud Reasons and Features. 
1.2.1 Reasons for Maritime Fraud. 
The main reason behind Maritime Fraud is profit, but quicker and with less 
effort than honest trade permits. (39 
There are several subsidiary matters that encourage fraud. In the late 
1970s, one of these was the severe depression faced by the shipping 
industry all over the world, resulting in many ships being laid up or scrapped. 
This together with low freight rates, meant not merely a fall in profit but 
heavy losses, with so much tonnage chasing limited cargoes. 
Times of political unrest in one part of the world or another, often offer 
opportunities and temptation to take advantage of local demands for goods 
by dishonest means and some shipowners and charterers were no doubt 
tempted to indulge in unlawful activities. (40) For instance, the disturbances in 
the Lebanon created not only a breakdown in law and order but a climate in 
which lawlessness flourished and a market rapidly grew for cargoes of any 
sort from ships of which no questions were asked and which preferred not be 
identified. (41 
The newly-wealthy oil producing countries in the Arabian Gulf and Nigeria 
created a tremendous demand for consumer and other goods. But these 
areas have poor port infrastructures and were unable to cope adequately 
with the vast numbers of ships arriving to deliver cargoes. All this led to port 
congestion and delays. The long queues of ships waiting to discharge were 
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turned to an advantage by the less scrupulous shipowners and charterers 
who took the opportunity for ships with their valuable cargoes to 
'disappear'. (42) 
Moreover, it has been repeatedly pointed out in various fora, that buyers of 
goods in international sales transactions, do not take sufficient precautions 
to avoid being the victims of fraud, by showing complete trust in their trading 
partners and the authenticity of documents, especially when they deal with 
vendors or intermediaries with whom they are not familiar. (43) 
International organisations who have considered the problem of Maritime 
Fraud, have often said that certain flags of convenience act as a contributory 
factor to the advantage of the culprits, (44) due to their lax rules on registration 
and effective control over offences. 
"Owners of open-registry ships are less accountable than owners of 
other ships, partly because they are often unidentifiable and can 
change their nominal identities, and partly because even when 
identified they, their managers and their key shipboard personnel, 
reside outside the jurisdiction of the flag state... " cos) 
And certain flag states do not require a Deletion Certificate from the previous 
registry. Hence, it is possible for a vessel to have two or more nationalities 
at the same time, even under different names. This issue is crucial where 
vessels deviate and the name and the flag are changed whilst at sea with 
complete ease. (46) 
In addition to all the above, this study will reveal that the fraudsters always 
seek advantages from loopholes and inadequacies in the existing legal 
structure in which international shipping and trade are carried on. 
1.2.2 Features of Maritime Fraud: 
a) it is a commercial crime. 
This means an activity of an unlawful or abusive nature which is perceived to 
be improper and is aimed directly or indirectly against the economic 
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infrastructure of the state. Many developing countries regard this as 
economic sabotage, (47) for instance, in the case of The Lord Byron, in which 
the Somalian Government lost 5-9 million US dollars, the Attorney General 
insisted that the fraudulent act was against the Somali people and the 
Somali economy. The decision in this case was issued by the security court 
at Mogadishu which reflected the political features of this case (48). This is an 
important concept because it is not often appreciated how close the aspect 
of economic crime is to political, economic and social stability of the state. 
b) A crime of international character. 
Here, we are not simply concerned with that limited category of international 
crime recognised by public international law, but rather, cases where the 
perpetration of the crime at any substantial stage involves more than a 
single jurisdiction. (49 
This kind of fraud occurs within international trade transactions in which the 
dealers, especially the buyer and the seller, are in different states. (50) Thus, 
the investigations into a case of Maritime Fraud may easily involve a dozen 
countries. First, there is the country in which the offence was planned and 
initiated; the country in which the offence was committed or completed; and 
the country where the vessel involved puts into port after the offence has 
been carried out. The complexities are compounded if the offender, the 
victim, the shipowner and the charterer are nationals of different countries 
and the vessel was registered elsewhere. (51) In each cases, investigation, 
extradition and prosecution can become very difficult. 
C) It is a non-violent crime. 
Such crimes usually require careful planning and clever manipulation of a 
global network system of financial services. (51) For this reason, the personal 
attributes required for pursuing each activity are intelligence, coupled with 
plausibility and charm - the traits common in all successful conmen! (53) 
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1.3 Classification of Maritime Fraud. 
Maritime Fraud has many guises, and its methods are open to infinite 
variation. (64) To facilitate their exposition, it is necessary to classify them. 
Maritime Fraud have been classified in a number of ways and these 
classifications are descriptive with a considerable amount of overlap among 
the various classes. Some of the ways in which these crimes have been 
classified are outlined below: 
In the Far East Investigation Team (FERT) report, Maritime Frauds are 
classified into hull frauds and cargo frauds. It can be said that the report 
used this simple classification because it was commissioned by the 
insurance market of the region with the support of the London market and as 
far as the underwriters are concerned these two classes would be 
satisfactory. 
(55). 
The ICC, in its publication No. 370 (1980)(56) states, inter alia, the kind of 
frauds that have come to the notice of the ICC were committed either: 
by a trader against another trader, shipowner, bank or insurer. 
by a charterer against a ship owner. 
by a ship owner or trader against insurers. 
by a charterer or trader against insurers. 
by a charterer or ship owner against a trader. 
In fact, the varied frauds and their ramifications have spread far and wide. 
So there are obvious difficulties, in the application of this classification where 
there is a multiplicity of victims in one single fraud, a situation which applies 
to a very large percentage. 
However, the ICC in its publication No. 420, has classified Maritime Fraud 
another way. This classification is: Documentary fraud; Scuttling; Arson; 
Charter Party Fraud and cargo Insurance Fraud. (57) 
Noticeable from this classification is that the ICC separates scuttling from 
cargo insurance fraud, although the same publication say that scuttling is 
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closely related to arson and both of them have been used by the fraudsters 
to claim against the insurer! 
E. ELLEN and D. CAMPBELL identify according to the type of fraud, four 
broad classifications as follows: Documentary Fraud; Fraud in connection 
with charters; Scuttling or 'rust-bucket' frauds; and cargo thefts. (58) Apart 
from the above main classification, the authors also discuss containerisation, 
baratry and piracy. (59) 
The UNCTAD Secretariat in its report about the International Maritime 
Legislation, Future Work, highlights three contexts in which Maritime Fraud 
frequently occurs: Documentary fraud involving Bills of Lading; Maritime 
Fraud involving charter parties; Maritime Fraud involving marine 
insurance. (60) The UNCTAD Secretariat in its report mentioned that it is 
difficult not only to analyse the term of 'Maritime Fraud' in any systematic 
manner, but also to consider in detail each different variation of dishonest 
act that can occur. But the report classified Maritime Fraud into six major 
categories: 
1. Documentary Frauds; 
2. Charter party frauds; 
3. Maritime insurance frauds; 
4. Deviation frauds; 
5. Miscellaneous frauds; 
6. Piracy. (61) 
J. ABHYANKAR classifies Maritime Frauds in two different ways as follows: 
Intentional and Unintentional frauds; Blue collar and white collar frauds. 
Then he lists seven types of frauds according to their modus Operandi. It is 
interesting to notice that he distinguishes between scuttling and 'rust-bucket' 
(62) frauds and he regards piracy and baratry as separate types of fraud. 
D. G. POWLES and S. J. HAZELWOOD classify Maritime Fraud into six 
types: 
1. Bill of Lading frauds; 
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2. Documentary credit frauds; 
3. Fraud and letters of indemnity; 
4. Charter party frauds; 
5. Maritime mortgage frauds; 
6. Marine insurance frauds. '633 
We see from this classification that the authors used the first three types of 
fraud to express one type called 'documentary fraud'. 
Mark SW HOYLE classifies Maritime Fraud into six types: 
1. Documentary fraud; 
2. Scuttling; 
3. Charter party fraud; 
4. Fraudulent insurance claims; 
5. Diversion of cargo; 
6. Counterfeiting. (64) 
P. KAPOOR classifies Maritime Fraud according to geographical area as 
follows: 
- Far East (scuttling 'rust-bucket' frauds); 
- Middle East (theft of cargo by dishonest /illegal sale); 
- West Africa (diversion of ships for selling off cargo/deliberate 
insolvency); 
- and worldwide documentary frauds. 
At the same time, Kapoor uses another classification by breaking down 
Maritime Fraud into two broad classes: Minor shipboard frauds and major 
frauds. (65) 
Kapoor also uses another classification. He classifies Maritime Fraud into six 
types: (66) 
1. Charter party fraud; 
2. Deviation fraud/illegal sale of cargo; 
3. Tariff manipulation and cube-cutting; 
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4. Marine insurance fraud; 
5. Documentary Maritime Fraud; 
6. Miscellaneous frauds. 
Barbara CONWAY classifies Maritime Fraud into three forms: Scuttling, 
Cargo fraud and Charter party fraud. (67 
In this study, the method employed is to use a broad classification of four 
types to cover the major forms of mainstream Maritime Fraud. (These will be 
examined according to the criminal law). These types are not exhaustive as 
the `fraudster' exceptional inventiveness constantly spurs them to discover 
new 'plots' to confound their victims. In many cases, there is an overlap 
between these types owing to the fraudsters using more than one type to 
commit his fraud. 
The broad classifications are: 
1. Documentary frauds 
2. Charter party fraud 
3. Marine insurance fraud 
4. Miscellaneous frauds: 
A. Mortgage fraud 
B. Partial conversion of cargoes of crude oil. 
C. Maritime agents fraud. 
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2: TYPES AND MODUS OPERANDI OF MARITIME FRAUD. 
2.1 DOCUMENTARY FRAUD 
INTRODUCTION 
In the world of international sea transportation, documentary fraud is an 
unfortunate fact of life. It involves fraud by one trader against another and/or 
against a bank. 
Documentary fraud is defined as the obtaining of money, property in the 
goods or a pecuniary advantage by the issuance of forged and/or falsified 
documents used in a transaction. In some cases the documents may be 
forged or fraudulently altered after execution, in others they may be genuine 
documents but with false information. (1) 
The above definition does not show the nature of the transaction nor the 
documents involved. 
The IMB defines documentary fraud by saying that `in the majority of 
international trade transactions, certain commercial documents are treated 
as if they were goods themselves. A documentary fraud occurs when one or 
more parties to these transactions are deprived of goods or the purchase 
price . 
(2) This definition does not clarify the role of the document in the 
Maritime Fraud committed. This role is showed better by the ICC publication 
No. 420 which states: "documentary fraud may occur when the sale and 
purchase of goods are made in documentary credit terms. Some or all of the 
documents specified by the buyer for presentation by the seller to the bank 
in order to receive payment are forged. The false documents are used to 
disguise the fact that goods either do not exist or that they are not of the 
quality or quantity ordered by the buyer. '43) But this definition restricts the 
scope of documenary fraud to the fraud committed by the seller only when 
the documentary credit is the method of payment. Although documentary 
fraud may be committed by the buyer as when the payment is in documents 
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against payment (D/P) basis, or by a conspiracy between the seller and the 
buyer. 
Thus documentary fraud in the maritime field happens when a party to the 
international trade transaction uses a forged and/or falsified document 
related to this transaction to obtain money, or goods or a pecuniary 
advantage unjustly from the other party. As has been reported, documentary 
fraud constitutes the greatest number of cases dealt with in the IMB. (4) 
The common features of this kind of fraud, subject to rare exceptions are as 
follows: 
1. The contract of sale is in cif or C&F terms. 
2. Payment is by means of irrevocable documentary credit. 
3. The shipowners and the crew are innocent. 
4. Victims tend to be from developing countries. 
5. Victims have no recourse against the underwriters or carriers. (5) 
From the above features, prior to analysing the ways of committing 
documentary fraud, it may be advisable to take a brief look at the most 
commonly used terms in the international sale of goods contracts used in the 
carriage of goods by sea, then to the payment system of this sale especially 
through the means of documentary credits. 
2.1.1 Terms of the international sale of goods contract 
Parties to an international sale of goods are well advised to make clear 
whatever arrangements they choose: over the years different types of 
contract have become so standardised that, even in the absence of express 
terms, parties know their rights and obligations. Despite this there are many 
potential difficulties and parties may choose for convenience to use 
internationally accepted standard contract forms such as the International 
Rules For The Interpretation of Trade Terms (INCOTERMS), whose purpose 
was to standardise trade terms through out the world . 
(6) 
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INCOTERMS were first published in 1953, revisions and additions were 
made in 1967,1976 and in the 1980 edition which is in use at present. (7) In 
order to simplify and illustrate the incoterms to the exporters/importers, 
bankers, insurers and transporters, the ICC published the Guide to 
incoterms No. 354. 
Exporters and importers who wish to use incoterms for an individual contract 
should specify that the contract is governed by the provisions of 
(INCOTERMS). In some countries such as Spain and Iraq Incoterms have 
been given statutory effect. (8) 
There are a considerable variety of international sale contracts used in 
carriage of goods by sea but the discussion here concentrates on the most 
commonly used, and in which the documents take on a much greater 
importance than in other types of contract. These are the free on board 
(FOB) and cost insurance and freight (CIF) and cost and freight (C & F). 
A) FOB Contract 
The seller when selling FOB undertakes placing goods according to the 
contract description on board a ship that has been named to him by the 
buyer and that is berthed at the agreed port of shipment, at the date or within 
the period stipulated, to bear all cost up to that time, and to obtain any 
necessary export licences. The buyer pays all the costs after the goods have 
passed the ship's rail (e. g. stowage) and is reponsible for the cost of the 
voyage itself (e. g. freight, insurance). (9) 
From the buyer's point of view the FOB contract reduces the risk of 
documentary fraud as the buyer himself selects the ship and enters into a 
contract of carriage by sea directly or through an agent. The bill of lading 
goes directly to the buyer in his name, usually through his agent in the port 
of shipment, such as a freight forwarder and does not pass through the 
ý1oý seller's hands. 
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In some type of FOB contract, such as FOB with services or similar, (11) 
where the seller does take the bill of lading in his own name or when he acts 
as an agent for the buyer, who has to rely on the seller's honesty, the risk of 
documentary fraud still exists. 
B) CIF Contract 
The term CIF is a type of contract which is more widely and more frequently 
ý12ý in use than any other contract used for purposes of seaborne trade. 
According to this contract the seller must pay the cost and freight necessary 
to bring the goods to the named destination and he has to procure marine 
insurance against the risk of loss of or damage to the goods during the 
carriage. 13) 
So the seller performs his obligations under this contract by delivery of the 
bill of lading (B/L) covering the goods contracted to be sold, insurance 
policy, and invoice. (14) Although a CIF sale is a sale of goods, the shipping 
documents are taken as their commercial equivalent, so that if the correct 
documents are tendered to the buyer the seller has completed his obligation 
and is entitled to be paid. In this contract the delivery of the documents is in 
law the equivalent of the goods. Many CIF contracts restrict the seller by 
stipulating dates of shipment that must be adhered to as part of the 
contractual terms, and in that case it is as wrong to ship goods early as it is 
to ship them late. (15) 
The CIF contracts are very flexible for the buyer as he can deal with the 
goods without ever having had them in his possession. He can achieve that 
by transferring the shipping documents to the new buyer as soon as he 
receives them from the seller. 
The three main documents which the seller is under duty to tender to the 
buyer under CIF contract are the B/L, marine insurance policy, and invoice 
which deserve looking at briefly. 
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1. The Bill of Lading 
The (B/L) is the principal document in the shipping goods, it is issued by or 
on behalf of the carrier and has three functions: 
A. It is evidence of a contract of carriage. 
B. It is a receipt for the goods shipped and contains certain admissions 
as to their quantity and condition when put on board the vessel. ý'sý 
C. It is a document of title to the goods without which delivery of the 
goods cannot normally be obtained. (") 
In the CIF contract it is usual for the buyer to require a clean negotiable bill 
of lading. This is an almost invariable practice when the buyer arranges 
payment through a letter of credit. (18) The seller has to procure, according to 
this requirement, i. e. a bill which must not contain a qualification of the 
statement that the goods are shipped in apparently good order and 
condition. 
If the credits are usually made subject to the ICC Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), the definition of article 32 of the 
(UCP) is applicable, it reads: 
" a- A clean transport document is one which bears no superimposed 
clause or notation which expressly declares a defective condition of 
the goods and/or the packaging. °; (19) 
A clean B/L has the advantage for the seller that it provides evidence that he 
has complied with the contract terms, and it assures the consignee (or 
buyer) that all was apparently in order at the time of shipment and that he 
can hold the carrier responsible for subsequent loss or damage. (20) 
The ICC recommend that parties to a contract of sale should in each case 
define specifically the conditions in which goods will be acceptable and B/L 
even though claused in certain terms will be in order. (21) 
Sometimes the seller may issue his own B/L or use the carrier's B/L, 
especially when the seller has a sufficient quantity of goods to fill a ship he 
27 
may charter or hire the ship for the voyage 
carriage is the charter party (C/P). (22) 
2. Marine Insurance Policy 
In such case the contract of 
The parties should in appropriate cases agree in the contract of sale on the 
nature of the insurance policy which the seller has to tender, (23) otherwise the 
seller has to tender a marine insurance policy to provide cover against the 
risks which in the particular trade is customary to cover with respect to the 
cargo and voyage in question. (24) 
The parties as well should agree about the value of the insurance cover 
which the seller has to obtain. 
The requirement that an effective insurance policy has to be obtained to 
cover the goods when in transit is an essential condition of the contract; and 
the buyer under a CIF contract would be entitled to refuse the acceptance of 
uninsured goods even when they arrived safely at the port of destination. (25) 
3. The Invoice 
The invoice must simply comply with the terms of the contract. It is usual to 
set out the cost of goods, freight, charges and insurance, and whether 
freight has been prepaid or not. (26) 
From the above explanation, it appears that the CIF contract is more open to 
abuse than the FOB contract as the invoice is made out by the seller himself, 
the insurance policy can be obtained with relative ease, upon payment of the 
premium. Perhaps the B/L is the only independent document, which, if the 
seller is the charterer, he can sign himself. Alternatively, the BIL can simply 
be forged. 
C) C&F Contract 
According to this contract the seller must pay the cost and freight necessary 
to bring the goods to the named destination, the same as in the CIF contract. 
But in this contract the risk of loss of or damage to the goods, as well as of 
any cost increases, is transferred from the seller to the buyer when the 
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goods pass the ship's rail in the port of shipment and this is the difference 
between the CIF contract and C&F. (27) 
2.1.2 Payment Systems of International Sales 
In the international sales of goods the buyers and sellers are separated by 
geographical, political and legal barriers. Sellers are naturally reluctant to 
part with their goods until they have been paid whilst buyers equally do not 
wish to part with their money until they are in receipt of the goods or at least 
know that they have been despatched to them. (2") There are therefore many 
varied systems of payment depending on what the parties agree. Any of the 
following methods of payment may be used: 
1. Cash with order. 
2. Open account. 
3. Documentary collection. 
4. Documentary credit. 
The first method is an unlikely method for large contracts but is often used 
for smaller ones. It involves a buyer sending money in advance of delivery. 
In the second method the seller sends goods in advance of payment. In this 
contract the seller must trust the buyer as the latter has his goods before 
payment. (29) In documentary collection (document against acceptance [D/A] 
or document against payment [D/P]), the method is mutually more 
satisfactory. 
In the D/A a bill of exchange drawn on the buyer, together with the 
documents of title to the goods, is handed by the seller to his bank with a 
collection order. The bank dispatches those documents to a correspondent 
bank in the buyer's country which releases the documents to the buyer when 
he has accepted the bill. The seller still has the risk that the price will not be 
paid on maturity of bill, and will have to rely on the trustworthiness of the 
buyer. While, when documents are remitted on a payment basis the 
correspondent bank does not release them until it has received the buyer's 
money. 
(30) 
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A seller or exporter contemplating fraud would certainly avoid being paid via 
either the "open account' or "the documentary collection" method of 
settlement as both favour the buyers, such an exporter would demand the 
issue of a letter of credit on cash advance which favours him. 
As it is common practice to use the documentary credit as a means of 
payment in the international maritime sale contracts, then it would be more 
helpful to consider the procedure of the documentary credit. 
DOCUMENTARY CREDIT 
Documentary credit, also called letter of credit (L/C) was developed in order 
to facilitate international trade and bridge the gap of distrust between buyers 
and sellers. (31) It is the most frequent method of payment for goods in 
international sales. (32) It has been described by English judges as "the life 
blood of international commerce ". (33) 
The banking practice relating to L/C is standardised by the Uniform Customs 
and Practice for documentary credits (UCP) (Publication no 500,1993 
Revision) which are sponsored by the ICC. (34) The (UCP) are used widely all 
over the world. (36) 
In English law, the (UCP) do not have the force of law or the status of a trade 
custom. They apply only if the parties have incorporated them into their 
contract. (36) While in Iraq, Iraqi trade law has adopted some of the (UCP) 
articles. 
(37) 
The ICC publication No. 500 defines the (L/C) as follows: 
"for the purpose of these Articles, the expressions `Documentary 
Credit(s)' and `Standby Letter(s) of credit' (hereinafter referred to as 
'credit(s)), mean any arrangement, however named or described, 
whereby a bank (the issuing bank), acting at the request and on the 
instructions of a customer "the applicant " or on its own behalf, 
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i is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party ("the 
beneficiary"), or is to accept and pay bills of exchange (draft(s)) drawn 
by the beneficiary, or 
ii authorizes another bank to effect such payment, or to accept and pay 
such bills of exchange (draft(s)), or 
iii authorises another bank to negotiate. j)(38) 
Thus, where payment is by documentary credit, the buyer arranges with his 
bank (issuing bank) to open a credit, usually via a bank in the seller's 
country (the intermediate or correspondent bank), in favour of the seller, 
whereby the latter is paid the contract price in exchange for agreed 
documents showing that the goods have been shipped and are on their way 
to the buyer. 
The shipping documents will comprise the seller's invoice for the goods, the 
bill of lading, an insurance policy (in CIF contracts) and other demanded 
certificates! 39) The correspondent bank will then notify the seller that 
instructions have been received to open a credit for his favour and the 
details of the requested documents. As soon as the goods are shipped, the 
seller will present these documents to the correspondent bank. The banks 
are not concerned with the goods themselves nor whether they are 
contractually correct. (40 
Article (4) of the UCP provides that: "in credit operations all parties 
concerned deal with documents, and not in goods, services and/or other 
performances to which the documents may relate" 
Morever, documentary credit is separated from the contract of sales or other 
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned 
with or bound by such contracts. (41) This separation of the credit from and 
independent of the underlying contract of sale or other transaction is called 
the autonomy of the credit. (42) 
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As soon as the correspondent bank receives the specified document from 
the seller, the bank has a duty to use due diligence when examining the 
documents and examines only the "face" of the documents, the bank has to 
pay if the documents on their face are in accordance with the documentary 
credit provisions; on the other hand the bank is entitled to reject the 
documents which do not strictly conform to the terms of the credit, this legal 
principle is conveniently referred to as the doctrine of strict compliance. (43) 
Since the bank is concerned only with the apparent good order of the 
documents, it commits no breach of duty even by paying against forged 
documents provided that it examined them with reasonable care. (44) 
Art. 15 of the (UCP) provides that: 
"Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, 
accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any document(s), 
or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the 
documents or superimposed thereon; nor do they assume any liability 
or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, 
packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any 
document(s), or for the good faith or acts and or omissions, solvency, 
performance or standing of the consignors, the carriers, the 
forwarders, the consignees, or insurers of the goods or any other 
person whomsoever. " 
The same principle above is the common rule. (45) After acceptance the 
document, by the correspondent bank and paying the beneficiary, the 
correspondent bank is entitled to obtain reimbursement against such 
documents from the issuing bank and the issuing bank is entitled to obtain 
payment against them from the buyer. (46 
If there is manifest fraud the bank is not only entitled but obliged to refuse 
payment under the credit. (47) 
There are many variations in the forms of documentary credits, the principal 
distinctions being between revocable and irrevocable credits, and confirmed 
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and unconfirmed credits. Under the (UCP), an irrevocable credit constitutes 
a definite undertaking by the issuing bank that the credit will be made 
available if the seller complies with the stipulated conditions. A revocable 
credit does not constitute a definite undertaking by the issuing bank and may 
be cancelled or modified without notice. (48) 
The distinction between a confirmed and unconfirmed credit(49) turns upon 
whether or not the correspondent bank accepts a direct obligation to the 
seller to honour the credit, in the confirmed credit the bank accepts this 
obligation while in the unconfirmed credit the bank have no obligation to 
make payment under the credit. 
The letter of credit invariably stipulates a date when it will expire and after 
which the correspondent bank will refuse to accept the documents presented 
by the seller. (50) 
Under documentary credits, the buyer does not see the documents or the 
goods until after the purchase price has been paid to the seller and in this 
respect, the system is more susceptible to frauds. 
2.1.3 Methods of Documentary Fraud. 
From the previous definitions of documentary fraud, it is clear that this kind 
of fraud may be committed by any party to the international sale transaction 
by use of forged and/or falsified documents related to this transaction. 
Practically speaking, documentary fraud can take place in any one of the 
following methods: 
1. Forged shipping documents, by the seller (exporter), to 
camouflage the fact that no cargo exists. 
By this method the unscrupulous seller can cash the L/C, which is opened in 
his favour by the buyer, by presenting to the corresponding bank bogus 
documents such as B/L and other documents conforming to the buyer's 
instructions. 
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The B/L is the most important document in this matter. It may be either 
forged on the standard form of a well-known shipping company, or a 
completely fictitious company. In such cases the carrying vessel named in 
the bill ma y be in the port or it may be on the other side of the world 
undergoing repair in dry dock not involved in the voyage in question, 
alternatively, the vessel could be completely fictitious. (51) 
The other documents which accompany the B/L in this transaction, such as 
an invoice for the sale price, a marine insurance policy for the transport, and 
the certificates of origin, are easily forged since most of these documents 
are relatively simple pieces of paper without elaborate design. 
When the innocent buyer receives these documents he will then expect to 
take delivery at the intended port of destination when the vessel fails to 
arrive, or does so without the goods, and the buyer discovers the fraud, the 
seller will have disappeared! 
Some illustrated examples: 
In 1950 the late Dr Emil Savundra acted as a broker to supply 45,000 drums 
of lubricants to the Chinese Government on a c. i. f price of US $1.23 million. 
The shipment was allegedly made in January, 1951 by a Swedish vessel. 
The documents showed the shippers to be based in Marseille, payment was 
made in Switzerland against B/L Lloyd's survey certificate, export licence, 
analysis report, and other documents. It later transpired that neither the 
vessel, the French shipper nor the cargo actually existed and the documents 
presented to the bank were entirely false. In addition, export of oil to China 
was unlawful, thus giving the Chinese little recourse due to the illegality of 
the transaction. (52) 
In 1981 an Egyptian buyer agreed to buy a number of second-hand vehicles 
from a company in Liechtenstein who offered a very attractive price. The 
buyer in Egypt opened a letter of credit in the sum of DM 350,000 in favour 
of the Liechtenstein company, with the condition that payment was to be 
made by the sellers bank in Switzerland against the production of a clean 
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B/L and the beneficiary's invoice. The German seller fabricated a B/L 
bearing the title of a shipping company which had gone bankrupt several 
months before. The ship named in the B/L was at that time discharging 
general cargo at the port of Lisbon, while the port of loading as shown in the 
B/L was Hamburg and in fact there was no cargo. 
The Lichenstein company presented the forged B/L and invoice to the Swiss 
bank who paid out the full amount. The receiver in Egypt waited and waited 
and of course, no avail. (53) 
Another famous case involving forged bills of lading was Etablissement 
Esefka International v. Central Bank of Nigeria. (54) The Ministry of Defence 
of Nigeria ordered 240,000 tons of cement CIF Lagos from the plaintiffs, 
payment to be by irrevocable, transferable and a divisible letter of credit, as 
to 94,000 tons of cement to be shipped in eight vessels. The shipping 
documents, bills of lading, certificates etc. were presented to Midland Bank 
in London, advising bank for the Central Bank of Nigeria, as though 
everything was in good order. The bank paid out about US $6 million. In later 
investigations, lawyers checked in Nigeria and Greece and obtained very 
strong evidence that no genuine documents existed, as the bills of lading 
were forged and the eight vessels probably never existed. The bills of lading 
were signed by a master stating that goods were shipped at a port in 
Greece. Lawyers discovered that the ships named had never been in 
Greece and such quantities of cement as were contained in the bills of 
lading were not obtainable in that port. The bills of lading had been forged 
as to goods which never existed. In addition, the seller had provided signed 
certificates of value and certificates of origin confirming that the invoices 
were correct and the goods were produced in Greece; all were forged. The 
court held that, as the L/C covered all 240,000 tons of cement, the 
documents ought to be correct and valid and, if they are forged or fraudulent, 
the bank had a defence in point of law against being liable to pay and had a 
counterclaim, on the basis of equitable set-off, for money which the bank had 
overpaid on false documents. 
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2. The seller ships complete rubbish or worthless goods in place of 
the goods specified in the bill of lading. 
If the fraudulent seller finds it difficult to commit documentary fraud as in the 
first scenario he will use this alternative. In this kind of documentary fraud 
the goods are not of a kind susceptible to full inspection at the time of 
loading on board a ship - and that may happen when the goods are loaded 
in containers or drums. The master does not have facilities for sampling the 
contents but he relies on the details supplied to him by the shipper in these 
cases the master has the right to put reservation clauses in the B/L, about 
the content, measurement and weight of the goods, stated under the 
heading `description of Goods' such as `said to weight Gross, 105,000 
kgs', or `weight and quantity unknown'. (55) 
The fraudulent shippers load the containers with sand, rocks, rubbish or fill 
the drums with water then obtain a bill of lading from a carrier made out even 
with a reservation such as " Said to contain" basis, specifying the goods 
that the unfortunate buyer expects to receive. The seller tenders this bill to 
the correspondent bank with other accompanying documents, usually 
falsified, which results in his being paid, if the bank finds these documents 
appear on their face according to the documentary credit provisions. (56) But 
the buyer may require a clean negotiable bill of lading which is an almost 
invariable practice when the buyer arranges payment through a letter of 
credit. In this case the fraudulent seller will remove the reservation clause 
from the bill of lading after he receives it from the carrier to make it seem to 
be clean when he tenders it to the bank. 
At common law (the Hague-Visby Rules have different provisions) some 
reservation clauses in the bill of lading such as "said by shipper to 
contain" and similar clauses, do not make a bill clause (unclean). There is 
thus no reason why a bill with these comments should not be accepted. (57) 
believe it is better to regard the bill of lading with the above clause, or 
similar, as an "unclean" document in order to prevent any fraud being 
committed through this loophole. But if the buyer's instructions, in his letter 
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of credit to the seller, make it clear that this kind of clause is acceptable then 
there is no reason for the correspondent bank to refuse payment on the 
grounds that the bill is claused (unclean) although by this fraud-method the 
shipper will in most instances pay for the cost of of transporting, there will 
still generally be a substantial margin of profit in the deal. 
Some illustrative examples: 
In the American case of Sztein v. T. Henry Schroeder Banking Corp (58) a 
buyer, located in the United States, purchased a quantity of bristles from an 
Indian seller. A US bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of 
the seller, which included the standard provision of payment against the 
presentation of a bill of lading and an invoice relating to the underlying 
goods. The seller placed cases on board a ship, obtained the required 
documents and presented them to the bank, the documents conformed 
precisely with the terms of credit. The cases loaded on board the ship 
contained not bristles, however, but cow hair, other worthless material and 
rubbish (59) . 
In the well known English case Midland v. Seymour, (60) the seller had 
shipped rubbish instead of duck feathers. 
In Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney Ltd v. Jalsard Pty Ltd, (61 a 
consignment of Christmas lights manufactured in Taiwan turned out to be 
unusable although a "Certificate of Inspection" attested that the goods 
appeared to be in good condition. 
3. To ship goods of lesser quantity or quality, by the seller, instead 
of that specified in the contract of sale with the buyer. 
The scenario of this kind of documentary fraud is similar to the one in 
number two above, the fraudulent seller here will generally pay for the 
transportation cost as in number two, the only difference is that the 
fraudulent seller here sends less quality or quantity goods instead of the 
rubbish or worthless goods as in number two. In this case the fraudster 
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maybe wants to pretend that what he does simply a breach of contract and 
not fraud. If there will be any criminal action raised against him. 
Some illustrative examples: 
In the United Bank Ltd v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, (62) a US buyer entered 
into a contract with a Pakistani manufacturer for the purchase of boxing 
gloves. An irrevocable letter of credit was issued in favour of the seller. The 
gloves which the manufacturer shipped were "old, unpadded, ripped and 
mildewed gloves rather than the new gloves to be manufactured as 
agreed upon". (63) 
In NMC Enterprises, inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (14) NMC, a 
wholesaler of audio products, bought receivers from CBS. To assure 
payment, a letter of credit was issued in favour of CBS. The buyer sought to 
enjoin payment on the letter, alleging that the receivers delivery did not 
conform to the specifications as described in the sales brochure presented 
by the seller during the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the sale 
contract, and also alleging that an officer of the seller had admitted that he 
had been aware of this nonconformity prior to delivery but failed to notify the 
buyer. The alleged nonconformity of the receivers actually delivered 
consisted of a substantially lower power output than that specified in the 
brochure which adversely effected the quality of sound produced. (65) The 
court granted an injunction, classifying the case as belonging to the category 
of fraud. (66 
4. The insertion of a false date of shipment in the bill of lading, by 
the seller or a third party, to show that the shipment has been 
made in time, or a "received for shipment" bill may be altered so 
(67) as to appear as a "shipped bill" . 
Some illustrative examples: 
In the case of Merchants Corp. of America v. Chase Manhattan Bank. (68) A 
US bank issued a letter of credit undertaking to pay against shipping 
documents showing that the goods were placed on board a ship in Korea not 
later than January 31st, 1968. The beneficiary presented documents which 
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seemingly conformed with the terms of the letter of credit. (69) The customers 
alleged that the documents were fraudulent since the ship had apparently 
docked for loading in the Korean port only on February 13th, 1968. The 
court was satisfied that the dispute was not as to warranty or breach of the 
contract between the buyer and the seller but as to the terms of the letter of 
credit. The court then granted an injunction. (70) 
Likewise, in Siderius Inc. v. Wallace Co. Inc., (") an irrevocable letter of 
credit was issued for the benefit of a seller of steel pipe. The credit required 
presentation of a bill of lading certifying shipment not later than January 15th 
1975. The seller presented to the bank a bill of lading dated January 15th 
1975. In fact, the ship had arrived at the loading port on January 29th 1975. 
In the trial, the jury found that the seller knowingly and intentionally had 
falsely represented the date that the pipe was loaded on board the ship. The 
issuer refused the seller's payment demand under the credit. The court 
affirmed the issuer's position: "... In this instance (case), the fraud related 
to the documents themselves and not the pipe which was the subject 
of underlying contract, upon notification by the customer, to give the 
bank the option to honour or dishonour". (72) 
In the United City Merchants (investments) Ltd v. Royal Bank of Canada, (73) 
an English exporter sold goods to buyers in Peru, and at the request of the 
latter, who wished to evade Peruvian exchange control laws, agreed to 
double the price and to transmit half the total to the buyer's associates in 
Miami. Payment was by a letter of credit confirmed on or before 15 
December 1976. They were shipped on 16 December, and a clerk of the 
carrier's agent issued bills of lading fraudulently back-dated without the 
knowledge of the sellers or their assignees to 15 December. The bank 
resisted payment on the grounds, inter alias, of fraud. (74) 
5. The shipper sells the same cargo to two or more parties. 
B/L are usually issued in sets of three or four originals, one of which being 
accomplished, the others stand void; one is kept on the board ship, and the 
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others are sent to the consignee by mail, or given to the shipper to tender 
them to the bank under a documentary credit, to ensure that at least one will 
arrive to the consignee safely. (76) 
Fraud is committed this way, by the seller, if he dishonestly sells the same 
cargo twice as only one original is required to obtain delivery of the goods. 
This way we assume that the seller may succeed in tendering one original 
B/L to the correspondent bank and use the other bill or bills to deceive the 
other buyer(s). 
The alternative way of fraud committed is when the seller can issue the B/L 
himself, especially when he owns the ship or charters it. In this case the 
fraudulent seller can issue two sets of B/L or more for the same cargo to 
more than one buyer. 
Illustrative example: 
The Vikik arrived at Piombino, Italy on 18th August 1981 to load a cargo of 
angle iron for consignees in Iran. It sailed on 24th August 1980 and after 
bunkering stopped at Liverno and Ceuta, and loaded further general cargo 
for Iran at Bilbao. When the Vikik left Bilbao, it had on board approximately 
8,000 tons of steel sheets and coils, bags of caolin, glass sheets and 
aluminium tubes. 
The Vikik transited the Suez Canal South-bound on 31st October 1982, 
caught fire in the early hours of 1st November 1982 and reportedly sank. 
The crew were all rescued by another vessel on the same day. After 
investigations were instituted by the IMB, it was revealed that Mr Kavadas, 
the ship owner had arranged to sell the cargo to a "bonafide" businessman 
in Port Said while the cargo was being loaded in Piombino. To this end he 
issued two sets of bills of lading one to the genuine Iranian consignees and 
the other to Egyptian. In accordance with the second arrangement, the 
Vikik called at Port Said between 8th October 1981 and 29th October 1981 
discharged the cargo there. (76) 
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6. Indemnify the carrier's by the shipper, against the consequence 
of making false representation in the B/L so as to deceive third 
parties. 
The bill of lading, as a receipt for the goods, should relate to the goods 
actually shipped, and they should not contain a misdescription of the goods 
which was known to be incorrect. (") 
Thus the B/L is conclusive evidence of shipment against the person who 
actually signed it. (78) As we have seen, the carrier on finding that the goods 
are not in apparent good order and condition, has the right to put his 
reservation in the bill of lading regarding the condition of the shipment but 
sometimes in the case of the documentary credit transaction, the carrier is 
asked by the shipper to issue a clean bill contrary to the facts which put the 
carrier in an evident predicament. If he obliges, he may be liable to the 
consignee; if he refuses, he inconveniences the shipper, who will be unable 
to obtain finance from the bank if he presents a claused instead of a clean 
bill. The obvious way out of this difficulty is for the shipper to offer the carrier 
a letter of indemnity under which the shipper will recompense him for any 
loss sustained as the result of the issue of a clean bill of lading. The issue of 
a letter of indemnity is in fact (virtually) a fraud, except in the case of 
bonafide dispute as to the condition or packing of the goods, which is 
perpetrated, in the first place against the bank advancing payment against 
the production of a clean B/L and, secondly, against the consignee or buyer 
of the goods who has made the purchase in good order and condition of the 
goods. Additionally, the cargo underwriters may settle a claim which may 
have resulted from an event before they became at risk. Such fraud vitiates 
the indemnity and renders it illegal; the carrier cannot claim under it against 
the shipper and, from the carriers point of view, such indemnity is completely 
worthless. (79) 
In Brown, Jenkinson & Co. Ltd v. Percy Dalton (London) Ltd. (80) The 
defendant sellers and shippers required a clean B/L, which the plaintiffs 
(Loading Brokers and Chartering Agents) were willing to issue only against 
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indemnity. The indemnity given admitted that the containers of the goods 
(100 barrels of orange juice) were old and frail and covered the plaintiffs in 
respect of all loss or damage of whatsoever nature which might arise from 
the issuance of clean bills of lading. The defendants pleaded that the 
indemnity was unenforceable because it was founded on an illegal 
consideration, by a majority the Court of Appeal found in favour of the 
defendants, refusing to assist the plaintiffs. 
7. The fraudulently sub-sales of the cargo to more than one party, 
by the buyer or pledge the cargo before selling it. 
This kind of fraud happens as a result of sending more than one copy of B/L 
as a set to the buyer. The fraudulent buyer (e. g. consignee or endorsee) 
having received all the sets of B/L fraudulently enters into two or three 
separate sub-sales of the same goods. (81) This kind of fraud raises problems 
for the shipowner's or master when more than one buyer presents a bill of 
lading for the same cargo in the port of destination. (82) 
Illustrative example: 
In Glyn Mills & Co. v. East and West India Dock Co. (1882). (83) Goods were 
shipped to Cottam & Co. as consignees, and three bills of lading issued 
marked `First', `Second', and `Third' . 
During the voyage Cottam & Co. 
endorsed the bill of lading marked `First' to a bank to raise money by way of 
loan. Upon arrival, the goods were unloaded into the custody of a dock 
company. Cottam & Co. produced the bill of lading marked `Second', and the 
dock company (in good faith and without any knowledge of the pledge to the 
bank) delivered the goods to third parties upon delivery orders issued by 
Cottam & Co. The bank sued the dock company for conversion. The House 
of Lords held that the dock company was not guilty of conversion. Its duties 
extended no further than to deliver the goods to the first person to present a 
bill of lading. It was under no obligation to require all three, nor to take 
further steps to ensure that the presenter of the documents was in fact the 
consignee. 
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8. Buyers fraud through using forged documents to induce the 
carriers to part with goods. (84) 
Instances of fraud by the buyer, using this method, most often occur when 
payment is on a Documents Against Payment (D/P) basis. The fraudulent 
buyers in these cases have been able to make up a convincing set of 
documents together with bank stamp evidencing that payment has been 
made, then these documents are used to induce the carriers to part with the 
goods. At a later stage, the seller realises that the original documents are 
still with the bank and the goods have been cleared. 
9. Buyers fraud by obtaining delivery of goods without production 
of a B/L then selling the BIL to an innocent party 
In this case the delivery without the relevant documents is a fundamental 
breach of contract. But sometimes the ship may well arrive at the port of 
destination much earlier than the B/L. In this case the buyer may obtain 
delivery of goods from the carrier on the strength of a letter of indemnity, 
backed by first class banks, to the carrier for all the loss or damage caused 
to him by release of goods without proper documentation. This type of 
indemnity, honestly taken is not illegal nor unlikely to be upheld. (85) After the 
fraudulent buyer obtains delivery of good he will sell the B/L to an innocent 
buyer. 
10. The buyer and seller conspire to defraud a third party. (86) 
Some documentary frauds are carefully syndicated, instead of a solitary 
fraudster working on his own, a group of crooks acting as buyers and sellers 
will band together to defraud one or more banks using forged documents. 
These schemes require a degree of sophistication since to be successful the 
syndicate will need to obtain information about the bank or banks they wish 
to defraud and in particular the format of their letters of credit and issuing 
systems. 
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Forged letters of credit (usually in batches to increase the money obtainable) 
will then be made out purporting to have been issued by a bank in one 
country. These will then be sent in the normal manner to the correspondent 
bank in another country which would notify the beneficiaries. The 
beneficiaries being part of the syndicate would have in the meantime 
registered companies and opened false bank accounts using a false name. 
To obtain the documents specified under the letters of credit the fraudulent 
syndicate will either forge these documents or ship containers of rubbish and 
present these documents to the correspondent bank. They will then 
disappear, only when the correspondent bank tries to obtain reimbursement 
from the bank that has purposely issued these letters of credit. When the 
fraud becomes apparent, victims of these types of fraud are often 
understandably reluctant to let others know that they have been duped. 
Another fraudulent collaboration between the buyer and the seller may be 
occurred in order to contravene exchange control regulations, or to pay less 
customs duty on imports. The contravention of the exchange control can be 
committed when the buyer and the seller are in collusion to over-invoice to 
avoid the control regulations in the buyer's country. (") On the other hand the 
purchase price will fraudulently decrease by the seller, in the commercial 
invoice if the intention is to pay less customs duty on imports in the buyer's 
country. 
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2.2 Charter Party Fraud 
The chartering of vessels presents considerable potential for the fraudulent 
operator. Maritime Fraud involving charter parties (C/P) is described as "a 
fraudulent act on the part of the charterer of a vessel to the detriment of the 
shipowner, the shipper, or both"0) 
The above description restricts the scope of C/P fraud to the fraud 
committed by the charterer of a vessel only, although C/P fraud may be 
committed by the shipowner as well as against charterers or cargo interests. 
So C/P Fraud is described better by the UNCTAD Report as: 
"either a fraud committed by the charterer against the shipowner, 
through non-payment of hire, or a fraud committed by the shipowner 
against the charterer or cargo interests by charging extortionate 
additional freight. The variation to this theme includes where a sub- 
charterer defrauds the time charterer, shipowner and cargo interest. 'L2) 
Although the second description is wider than the first, it still does not cover 
all the illegal activities which may be committed by the shipowner against the 
charterer or cargo interests. 
From the previous descriptions, prior to examining the modus operandi of 
C/P Fraud, it is necessary to have a rudimentary understanding of the C/P 
and its types. 
2.2.1 The Charter-Parties and its Types 
The C/P is a contract to hire a ship on a given voyage or voyages or for a 
given period of time either to carry the charterer's own cargo, or to enable 
him to offer the ship's cargo space to others. ý3ý 
In spite of the absence of any rule requiring the written form of the C/P, 
most negotiations will ultimately lead to the formal drawing up of a written 
charter-party with standard terms and riders attached (4) while in Iraqi law the 
C/P contract should be in a written form according to Article 92 of the 
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Ottoman Maritime Trade Law of 20th August 1863 which states "Any 
contract... related to the hiring of a ship should be in written form... " (5) 
Types of Charter-party: 
There are three types of charter-party: 
1. Voyage C/P. 
2. Time C/P. 
3. Demise C/P. 
1. Voyage Charter-Party: 
Under this type of C/P the charterer hires the services of the ship to carry 
specified goods on a defined voyage or voyages as agreed on certain routes 
and to certain ports. (6 The reward of the shipowner being freight calculated 
according to the quantity of cargo carried, or it can be a lump sum freight. (7) 
The ship remains in the possession of, and under the control of the 
shipowner who exercises this right through the master and crew employed 
by him. So the charterer merely hires the use of the ship. (8) 
The shipowner and charterer usually contract on standard terms drawn up 
by trade organisations and suited to the various types of trade and cargo 
concerned. The approved forms are usually mentioned by their `Code 
names', e. g. `Gencon', `Russwood'. Parties are free to vary the clauses in 
the standard form to suit their own requirements. (9) 
The following provisions are usually found in most voyage charter-parties: 
1. The shipowner consents to supply a ship and states her position, 
capacity and class on the register. 
2. The shipowner undertakes to provide a seaworthy ship. 
3. The shipowner undertakes that his ship will proceed on voyage 
without undue delay i. e. with reasonable dispatch and without 
unjustifiable deviation. 
4. The shipowner undertakes to carry the cargo to its destination. 
5. The charterer consents to provide a full cargo. 
6. The charterer undertakes to pay freight. 
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7. Lay days and how they count. 
8. Arbitration clause. 
9. Limitation of liability clause (cesselr clause). 
10. A `general paramount clause', the aim of which, is to incorporate the 
ý'oý Hague Visby Rules or Hamburg Rules or any other rules. 
As far as the C/P Fraud is concerned it is necessary to consider in more 
detail the shipowner's undertaking that his ship will proceed on voyage 
without unjustifiable deviation. 
No Deviation: 
The term deviation is defined as any "departure from the route by which the 
carrier has expressly or impliedly contracted to carry the goods"(") Tetley 
defines deviation as "An intentional change in the geographic route of the 
voyage as contractecl'. 
(12) 
Thus it is clear that deviation means any departure of the ship from the set 
course of the voyage. (13) The course to be followed can be expressly 
stipulated in the C/P; in the absence of such stipulation it is an implied 
condition precedent in every voyage C/P that the ship shall proceed on the 
voyage without departure from her proper course. (14) The proper course is 
the ordinary trade route which can be easily ascertained by customary trade 
usage. There may be more than one customary route between the loading 
and discharge ports. 
15) 
Deviation is not approved for two reasons: first, marine insurance policies 
are used to cover goods and ships on strict voyages, so that deviation from 
the voyage means that insurance cover is not operative. (16) Secondly, 
deviation can mean that each voyage takes much longer than planned, and 
goods arrive late, to the charterer's or shipper's detriment. (") But deviation 
is justifiable and is allowed in certain cases by the common law, The 
Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971 (COGSA) or the contract itself. 
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A) Deviation allowed at Common Law: 
At Common Law deviation is allowed for the following reasons: 
1. For the purpose of saving human life, or aiding a ship in distress 
where human life may be in danger. But deviation to save property, 
ý18ý unless this is stipulated, is unjustifiable. 
2. For the safety of the adventure. 
The master is responsible for using all reasonable care to bring the 
adventure to a successful conclusion, and protecting the ship and cargo 
from undue risks, as agent for the shipowner. So where a master receives 
credible information that if he continues in the direct course of his voyage, 
his ship will be exposed to some imminent peril, he is justified in pausing and 
deviating from the direct course, and taking any step that a prudent man 
would take for purpose of avoiding the danger. (19 
Deviation is considered justifiable as well when it was made in order to affect 
repairs at a port of refuge; and this was so even if the repairs had become 
necessary through the initial breach of duty on the carrier's part by providing 
an unseaworthy ship at the commencement of the voyage. (20) 
B) Deviation allowed at (COGSA, 1971): 
COGSA's 1971 deviation provisions contained in the United Kingdom law 
are identical, with a slight addition, to the deviation provision in Article 4 
para. 4 of the Hague Nisby Rules. (21) Under the COGSA, deviation is 
extended to, and becomes justifiable to, save property at sea. The law also 
permits other reasonable deviation. (22) Whether deviation is reasonable or 
not has repeatedly been said to be a question of fact, which means that 
deviation is governed by the individual relevant circumstances which de 
facto exist in the particular cases and the carrier must take in to his 
consideration the joint interests of ship and cargo. (23) 
C) Deviation allowed by the Contract: 
The deviation may also be justified by express stipulations (e. g. "deviation 
clauses") in the contract according to it the shipowner will have the right to 
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call at ports off the ordinary trade route. This clause is usually very far 
reaching, as its conditions are drawn up entirely for the shipowner's benefit it 
is construed strictly against him. (24) 
2. Time Charter-Parties: 
In a Time C/P the vessel is hired for a certain length of time, e. g. six months, 
one year. The vessel here is still in the possession of the shipowner and the 
master and crew remain his servants and he is responsible for them. (25) Thus 
if the master signs a Bill of Lading he signs as the shipowner's agent making 
the shipowner liable as carrier to the shipper and his assignees. (26) At the 
same time the charterer may sign the B/L himself on behalf of the 
shipowner's, the signature binds the shipowner as principals to the contract 
contained in or evidenced by the Bill of Lading. (27) 
Unlike a voyage C/P the master must follow the instructions of the charterer 
in the ship's lawful commercial business, and take the ship wherever he 
orders. (28) Although the parties are free to make their contract in any form 
they like, it is usual for them to adopt one of the standard forms of contract 
e. g. Gencon, Baltime. 
The following provisions are usually found in most time charter-parties: 
1. The shipowner consents to supply a ship for a period of time, and 
states her size, speed, fuel, consumption and the quantity of fuel on 
board; 
2. The shipowner undertakes to pay for the crew's wages, the ship's 
insurance, her stores and ensures to maintain her in a completely 
efficient condition; 
3. The time of delivery and the port of delivery of the ship to the 
charterer are stated; 
4. The charterer consents to engage only in lawful trades and carry 
lawful goods and use only safe ports; 
5. The charterer consents to supply and pay for fuel, to pay dock and 
harbour dues, and arrange and pay for loading and discharge; 
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6. The charterer undertakes to pay a named sum for the hire of the ship, 
the usual clause states that payment must be made in cash 30 days in 
advance, and that in default of payment the shipowner's have the right 
of withdrawing the ship from the service of the charterer; (29) 
7. A clause about the redelivery of the ship, 
8. Charterers' obligation to provide the master with full sailing directions 
and the master is to be under the orders of the charterer; 
9. Arbitration clause; 
10. The charterer undertakes to compensate the shipowner for any loss 
or damage to the ship by careless loading or discharge; 
11. A clause regarding payment of commission to the shipbroker for 
negotiating the C/P. (30 
3. Demise Charter-Party: 
Demise C/P also known as "Bareboat" C/P is a contract of the lease of the 
ship, in which the ship is put at the disposal of the charterer for a certain 
period of time, and the charterer takes over virtually the management and 
control of the ship, employing his own Crew and Master who become his 
temporary employees, therefore, the shipowner has no responsibility in 
connection with goods shipped while the vessel is thus hired. (31) 
Sometimes the owner, may arrange to supervise the ship by appointing the 
ships chief engineer. The most important point in this kind of C/P is to know 
whether the possession and control of the ship pass to the charterer, and 
that always depends on the intention of the parties. The test which is used to 
discover this intention is whether the master is to be the charterer's agent or 
agent of the shipowner. (32) 
This kind of C/P is not very usual although it is more common today in the oil 
tanker trade. (33) 
2.2.2 Modus Operandi of Charter-Party Fraud 
There are two methods in classifying the modus Operandi of C/P Fraud. The 
first method classifies them as follows: 
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Frauds committed in order to obtain a C/P Contract and with a view of 
fraudulent action by benefiting from the transaction. This kind of fraud 
takes place when false representations are made intentionally by the 
owners (or their broker) regarding the vessel which is being fixed by 
the charterer, e. g. of a statement in the C/P to the effect that the 
vessel is in "every way fit for service", or regarding the dead weight 
and cubic capacity of the vessel or, in particular, its speed and 
consumption. (34 
2. Frauds committed in the fulfilment of the contract which was 
established by both parties in good faith. (35) 
But according to the above classification it is not always easy to make a 
clear distinction between frauds committed in order to obtain a contract, and 
frauds committed in fulfilling it. A typical borderline case is when the 
charterers from the outset have decided not to honour the obligations they 
undertake in the C/P to pay freight or time charter hire. Moreover, the type of 
fraud in the category (36) above is out of the scope of what was described as 
C/P Fraud as it can occur the same way in other legal shipping transactions 
such as the sale of ships. 
The second and more prevailing method of classifying the modus Operandi 
of C/P Fraud is dependent upon the party who commits the fraud. So under 
this classification C/P Fraud may be committed by: 
1. The charterer against the shipowner and cargo interests. 
2. The shipowner against the charterer or the shipper/consignee. The 
variations to this fraud include a sub-charterer defrauding the time 
charterer, ship owner and cargo interests. (37) 
1. Charterers Fraud: 
In time of a depressed shipping market, owners anxious to avoid laying 
vessels up are tempted to charter them even to previously unknown 
companies, without demanding any substantial financial guarantees for the 
performance of the charter contract. 
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The fraudulent charterer can turn this situation to his advantage. Having 
chartered a vessel from an unsuspecting owner on a time or bareboat basis 
where the hire is to be paid normally monthly or semi-monthly in advance, 
after that the charterer either sub-charters the vessel out on a voyage basis 
as the disponent owner or opens a liner service. Whatever he chooses, he 
holds himself out as ready and willing to carry the goods of others and 
canvasses for cargo in the normal way. He is facilitated in obtaining cargoes 
to carry in that he is able to offer attractively low rates for freight, since he 
has no intention of completing the contract of a freightment. Once the goods 
are loaded, the charterer issues the bills of lading to the shippers of cargo or 
their agents against freight due for transportation to its destination, such 
freight will very often be payable in total upon signing Bills of Lading. The 
charterers therefore may collect the full freight from the cargo owners for the 
whole voyage in question while only paying a month's or half a month's hire 
to the ship-owner. The charterer after paying the initial payment of the hire 
and, of course, having collected all the freight defaults on further hire 
payments. The usual Modus Operandi is for the charterer to disappear as 
he has no further interest in the ship or to go into liquidation, (38) leaving the 
ship-owner, shippers and consignees with the awkward and expensive 
problem of resolving the situation. (39) 
It is very important to make a distinction between the above fraud in which 
the charterer intends to defraud from outset, and the frustration of a C/P in 
which both the ship-owner and the charterer will be discharged from their 
obligations under the C/P if it becomes frustrated owing to the impossibility 
of performance of the contract or delay or subsequent change in the law. (40 
But it is often very difficult to distinguish between genuine C/P failure and 
(41) failure as a result of an intent to defraud. 
Although there is a dearth of reported incidents regarding the above fraud, 
there is an incident reported in which an Austrian charterer named Heinz 
Bayer, who is alleged to have collected 100% prepaid freight on timber lots 
for the Gulf. He abandoned 20 time chartered vessels after payment of the 
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first four weeks of hire. The subsequent attempts to chase up this charterer 
and his guarantors were unsuccessful. (42) 
2) The Shipowner's Fraud: 
Shipowner's fraud can be committed in the following ways: 
1. When the charterer absconds after collecting the freight in the 
charterer's fraud, especially in time C/P; the shipowner is now, as 
carrier, contractually bound by the terms of the B/L to deliver the 
cargo to its destination. (43) Article 111, rule 2 of the Schedule of the 
COGSA 1971 states that the carrier "... shall properly and carefully 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods 
carried". 
There are two exceptions in which the shipowner will not be bound by 
the B/L, first where the B/L terms indicate that the liability is 
undertaken by another party, (`) and, second, where the master is 
unauthorised to sign a B/L which contains terms inconsistent with the 
C/p. (45) Apart from those exceptions the shipper or the consignee of 
the B/L may enforce the right to have the goods delivered as per the 
B/L. 
As the shipowner is no longer being paid his hire, he may not have 
the financial resources to complete the voyage, his options are as 
following: 
A. He can complete the voyage and deliver the cargo to the B/L holders 
and thus absorb the loss, hoping perhaps to track the charterer down. 
B. Some owners manage to obtain extra freight payments from the cargo 
interests through negotiation with them or through demanding ransom 
from them against a promise to deliver the cargo to its destination. (46) 
C. He may be tempted to sell the cargo en route to recoup his lost hire, 
and so get himself involved in fraud, to the detriment of the cargo 
interest. (47) 
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It seems from the above illustration that the B/L holder's rights appear 
to be protected by COGSA, this may not be the case where the ship is 
in a jurisdiction where the B/L holder has no locus standi to bring an 
action and/or where COGSA does not apply. (48) 
2. Ship-owners may commit fraud against charterers or cargo interests 
through this scenario; the ship loads cargo, freight is collected and 
B/L issued. The ship puts into a convenient way port on the pretext of 
urgent repairs or change of crew. During its stay in port, the ship is 
arrested by an "accommodating creditor" for unpaid bills. The ship is 
sold by a court order to meet the claim which is very exaggerated 
since generally under such a situation the buyer takes the vessel free 
of all encumbrances, including Contract of Affreightement obligations 
of the previous owner even as to the cargo on board, (49) he is thus in a 
position to demand additional freight from cargo interests to complete 
the voyage. Ultimately it turns out that the previous shipowner, the 
accommodating creditor and the new owner are all working in 
conspiracy to defraud the cargo interests. (50) 
3. Similarly, fraud committed by shipowners against charterers and 
shippers is almost always accompanied by unjustifiable deviation and 
theft of the cargo. This kind of fraud can be committed by the 
shipowner deceiving the cargo owner into chartering the vessel for a 
voyage, or voyages, to an agreed destination. Instead of proceeding 
to its agreed distination port, the vessel deviates en route to another 
convenience port where the whole cargo is sold for the benefit of the 
shipowner. (51) 
If the cargo was dispatched CIF, the ultimate loser, as in most Maritime 
Fraud, will be the insurers. However, there will repeatedly be incidental 
losses to consignees who hold the insurable interest not least through loss 
of trading profits arising due to absence of the goods with which they 
(52) intended to deal. 
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In general, it is not easy for a shipowner to have his ship enter a port and 
illegally sell the cargo. However, there are certain countries where it is 
easier than others to do so. These countries are usually racked by political 
turmoil, civil disorders in which the port areas are not under close 
supervision and control by the government, as in Lebanon during the civil 
war, and/or rampant corruption. (53) 
The IMB's analyses of the incidents of Maritime Fraud have revealed that 
deviations account for a significant proportion of Maritime Fraud and that 
they are almost exclusively aimed at buyers in developing countries, 
especially, but not only, those of the Middle East and West Africa. (54) It has 
been revealed as well that typically, when the vessel deviates from her 
route, enters a convenient port under a different name, flag, or nominal 
ownership and after discharging and selling the cargo she resumes 
operation under the new name, (55) or is scuttled to hide the fact that cargo 
has been stolen, in which case there is an overlap with insurance frauds. (56 
The ship under this kind of fraud is usually sailing under a "flag of 
convenience" normally Panama, or under the Greek flag. (57) 
It is not always the case that the fraudulent shipowner will plan from the 
outset to sell the cargo at a convenient port. Sometimes the shipowner 
resorts to selling the cargo when he gets into financial difficulties during the 
course of the voyage or after contracting to perform the voyage, the 
shipowner realises that the discharge is unlikely to proceed as he had 
intended due to the destination port congestion in which vessels were 
delayed awaiting berths for many months and a number of charterers could 
not sustain demurrage payments. Some shipowners resorted to 
warehousing the cargo and abandoning the voyages, while some 
shipowners realised that it was better for their interests to earn a huge profit 
by selling the cargo in a convenient port where not too many questions were 
asked. (58) 
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Illustrative examples of the ship owners fraud: 
1. In May 1979, the Cypriot-owned freighter the Ivip was chartered to a 
British company which, in turn, had chartered her on to a Romanian 
concern. On 21st May she was loaded with 10,000 metric tons of 
caustic soda for consignees in Jakarta. After she set off on her 
scheduled journey on 12 July she made an unscheduled stop at the 
port of Chios. The reason given was non payment of charter fees, a 
claim hotly denied by the charterers. Shortly after that the owners 
managed to get a sequestration order for the ship in the Piraeus 
Court. According to it the shipowners have the right to discharge the 
cargo at Piraeus or at any other port in the Eastern Mediterranean 
which was nearer to Chios and had proper storage facilities. 
Although this order needed judicial approval before it could be 
implemented, the ship without waiting for such approval, weighed 
anchor and set off to Tripoli to deliver the cargo (for which the 
Indonesians were still waiting) to a Lebanese buyer. 
In October 1979, the original buyers of the cargo's lawyers succeeded 
in getting the ship arrested in Tripoli for discharging stolen goods. 
Moreover permission was granted for the transfer of the case from 
highly volatile area of Tripoli to the then more stable area of Beirut. 
While these legal moves were in process, the ship changed her 
owner and her name, and it become the Panamaian-owned Lady 
Ensil. At this stage a substantial amount of the cargo was still 
believed to be aboard. While the Beirut Court looked at this case the 
courtroom was suddenly invaded by a small band of armed men who 
threatened the judge and his officers and threatened to take the 
original buyer's lawyer as hostage. Happily, some quick thinking and 
talking averted the likely bloodshed. In the end, the original buyer's 
lawyers and the lawyer retained by the Lebanese buyer and various 
government officials reached a compromise solution based on the 
realities of the current situation and the near-impossibility that either 
the shippers or the original consignees could prove fraud against 
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anybody. The consignees would pay extra for the delivery of the full 
cargo as originally agreed. Like a surprising number of cases. It was 
quicker, cheaper and considerably safer to recover a diverted cargo 
by buying it back rather than relying merely on the Court's 
procedures. (59) 
2. The M. V. Amali loaded a cargo of lentils in Iskenderun, Turkey for 
Karachi. Instead of proceeding directly to the Suez Canal from 
Iskenderun, she diverted to Limassol, Cyprus, took on a part cargo of 
arms as well as the lentils in Lebanon and sailed out as the "Lucas 
Sky'. The Lucas Sky was, a short while later, arrested in Bari, Italy for 
carrying 4.7 tones of hashish and hashish oil, welded into her fore 
peak tank. It is thought that the hashish was payment for the cargo 
discharged in Beirut. (60 
3. The Alexandros K. sailed from Bulgaria with 3,000 tons of steel in 
December 1979. Three months thereafter, the cargo was sold to a 
Spanish firm, who in turn sold it to an Egyptian company. However, 
the vessel never arrived in Egypt. In May 1979 the Egyptian 
consignee investigated and found that the vessel was in Piraeus. He 
went aboard and was relieved to find that the steel was still in the 
hatches. The same night, 20th May 1979, the vessel left Piraeus and 
was not heard of for a month. It deviated to Zouk, Lebanon in July as 
the "Leila" and sold her cargo to local interests. (61 
In many such cases, the Saudis were the victims. (62) So in October 1979, an 
unilateral order was issued by the Saudis banning any vessel which had first 
called at Lebanon from its ports. This was the first ban to be imposed by a 
nation for non-political reasons. (63) 
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2.3 MARINE INSURANCE FRAUD 
INTRODUCTION 
Marine insurance is possibly the oldest type of insurance. (') It is an 
important part of international trade and provides a secure background for 
commerce. Without it, few would be able to take the risks and the uncertainty 
of trade. (2) 
The contract of marine insurance is governed by the MARINE INSURANCE 
ACT (M. I. A) 1906. The schedule to this Act contains the standard form 
policy known as the Lloyd's SG policy. This has been replaced by the 
Lloyd's marine policy, and the Institute cargo clause since January 1 1982. (3) 
The three most important sets of clauses are known as clauses A, B and C. 
Section 1 of the (M. I. A) defines marine insurance as: "A contract whereby 
the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in a manner and to the 
extent thereby agreed against marine losses. That is to say, the losses 
incident to marine adventure". The words 'marine adventure' as stated in the 
Act to particularly refer to a situation where "any ship, goods or other 
moveables, are exposed to maritime perils; such property is referred to in 
this Act as "insurable property". (4) 
Maritime perils are defined to include the perils consequent on, or incident to 
navigation of the sea. that is, perils of the sea, war perils, fire, pirates, 
robbers, thieves, captures, seizures, restraints and detainments of princes 
and peoples, jettison, barratry, and any other similar peril or perils which are 
ý5ý designated by the policy. 
The large sums of money involved in the insurance transactions are an 
obvious target for fraud. (6 
Before considering the (modus operandi) of maritime insurance fraud, some 
basic principles of marine insurance must be consider briefly first. 
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2.3.1 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE MARINE INSURANCE 
1. INSURABLE INTEREST 
It is a necessary pre-condition for valid insurance and a fundamental 
principle of insurance law . 
(7) In Lucena v. Craufurd (8) Lawrence J. defined 
an insurble interest in the following terms "to be interested in the 
preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with respect to it as to have 
benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction ". 
The (M. I. A. ) defines the insurable interest by Sec. 5: 
(1. Every person has an insurable interest who is interested in a marine 
adventure; 
2. In particular, a person is interested in a marine adventure where he 
stands in any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any 
insurable property at risk therin, in consequence of which he may 
benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be 
prejudiced by its loss, or by damage thereto, or by the detention 
thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof. ) 
Various persons have or may have an insurable interest in the property at 
risk in marine adventure. (9) 
Accordingly, where the assured has no insurable interest in the subject 
matter insured, he can recover nothing under the policy, for he has suffered 
no loss and the insurer is under no duty to indemnify him. So in the cases of 
the non-existant cargo in the documentury fraud the insurer is able to 
contend that as the goods insured and claimed for were never shipped, the 
assured has no insurable interest, the policy never attached and the insurer 
was never at risk at all. ('o) 
Therfore if the assured has no insurable interest, and no expectation of 
getting one, the contract is void as it is contrary to the statutory prohibition 
against contracts of marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering. (") And 
it is void also under the Gaming Act 1845, S. 18. 
69 
2. UTMOST GOOD FAITH 
It must be noted that section 17 of the (M. I. A) expressly provides that a 
marine insurance contract is a contract of utmost good faith and if this 
utmost good faith is not observed by either party, the other may declare the 
contract to be void and of null effect. 
Allied with this provision is Section 18 (1) of the Act which imposes upon the 
assured the duty to make full disclosure of every material circumstance 
relating to the risk when applying for a marine insurance policy, that is, 
everything "which would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in 
fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. '112) 
Disclosure must be made before the contract is made. 
In the absence of inquiry, there are some circumstances which need not be 
disclosed, such as, circumstances which, in the ordinary course of business, 
ought to be known by the insurer and circumstances in respect of which 
information has been waived by the insurer. (13) As stated in S. 18(4) of the 
(M. I. A. ), whether a particular circumstance be material or not is a question of 
fact. 
For example, in Britain, in marine insurance it is unnecessary for the assured 
to disclose that the risk has been previously refused by other insurers, 
thus, in North British Fishing Boat Insurance Co LTD v Starr (14) Rowlatt J, 
observed. (15) "Now, no one contends that the mere fact that other 
underwriters have refused a risk ought to be disclosed. The underwriter sits 
there to receive offers of business and to accept or refuse them as he thinks 
fit, and what one man thinks good business another may not care to take. 
And he sits there to gauge the situation, and to quote for himself. " In the 
United States', cases it seems that the assured ought to disclose that the 
risk has been previously refused by other insurers. Thus, in Knight V. U. S. 
Fire Insurance Co., (16 the plaintiff purchased $65,000 worth of antique 
Buddha statues in Thailand. Additionally, the plaintiff acquired marine 
insurance for the statues at a value of $30 million on the 
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pretext that they were very rare. The insurance company from the London 
market conducted an investigation and arranged an appraisal. When the 
appraisal uncovered that the statues were not worth $30 million, the plaintiff 
persuaded New York market underwriters to issue a similar $30 million 
policy. No investigation was made prior to the issuance of the policy. The 
Buddha statues were then loaded into a container and put on a ship that 
subsequently sank with all her cargo. (") In the ensuing legal action, the court 
found fraud in the second application for insurance because all the relevant 
facts had not been disclosed, particularly the fact that insurance coverage 
had been denied for the same cargo by a London insurance company. (18 
The nationality of the assured was regarded, sometimes, as a material fact 
which ought to have been disclosed. In Demetriades & Co v. Northern 
Assurance Co., The Spathari(19) cargo was insured for a voyage from Leith 
to Piraeus. The ship carrying it sank off the coast of Portugal. The insurers 
repudiated liability under the policy. One of its arguments was that there 
had been non-disclosure of a material fact, viz that there was a Greek 
interest in the vessel, and that this was material to the risk in view of the 
attitude of underwriters with regard to Greek ships. (20) 
It is again a question of fact whether a representation is material or not. If the 
assured fails in fulfilment the above duty, the insurer may void the 
contract. 
(21) 
Section 20 of the (MIA)1906 deals with the effect of various representations. 
A material representation must be true, otherwise the insurer can avoid the 
contract (s. 20-1). A material representation is one which would influence the 
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or accepting the risk 
[s. 20 (2)]. The sanction distinguishes between representations as to 
expectation or belief [s. 20(3)]. In the case of the former, the insurer cannot 
void the contract if the representation of fact is substantially correct, 
[s. 20(4)], in the case of the latter, the insurer can not avoid the contract if the 
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representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is made in good faith 
[s. 20(5)]. 
3. INDEMNITY 
Under this principle the assured is entitled to be indemnified precisely to the 
extent of his pecuniary loss he has suffered as a result of the occurrence of 
an event against which the insurer has agreed to protect him. (22) 
Accordingly, the assured is not permitted to make a gambling profit on the 
insurance. (23) 
In cases of, where the assured has over-insured the subject matter by 
double insurance, (24) he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, claim 
payment from the underwriters in such order as he may think fit. On 
condition that he is not entitled to receive any sum in excess of the indemnity 
allowed by ( MIA) 1906. (25) 
Most cargo policies are valued and the indemnity is the sum fixed by the 
policy. (26) Gross over-valuation made in good faith is not grounds for 
avoiding the policy or reducing the amount payable under it, (27) but gross 
overvaluation if not disclosed, is evidence of fraud, (28) entitling the insurer to 
avoid the contract. In this case fraud is very clear, as laid down by 
Balhache, J. (29) "the discrepancy between the insured value and the actual 
insurable value is of such a nature as to change the character of the risk, 
from a business risk to a speculative risk ". 
2.3.2 THE MODUS OPERANDI OF MARINE INSURANCE FRAUD 
Marine insurance fraud is the kind of fraud committed by anyone connected 
with a marine trade transaction against the underwriters directly or indirectly. 
The underwriters become clearly involved when either the perpetrators of 
fraud or the victims of fraud make a claim against them under the insurance 
policy. 
Frauds of this type are quite diverse, and can fall into two categories 
1. Frauds committed in order to obtain insurance policy. 
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2. Frauds committed after the insurance contract is deemed to be 
concluded. 30 
1. FRAUDS COMMITTED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN INSURANCE POLICY. 
This type of fraud occurs during the negotiations leading to the formation of 
the contract of marine insurance. It involves, fraudulent misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure to the insurer of a material fact, usually concerning the value 
or the condition of the ship in hull insurance or the value or the condition of 
the cargo in cargo insurance. 
A representation is either made voluntarily by the assured or in answer to 
questions put to him by the insurers. 
The aim of the assured in committing such frauds is often either inducing the 
insurer to accept the risk at a smaller premium than he would otherwise 
require, by impressing him with a more favourable view of the risk, or 
(31) securing from him an insurance which would otherwise be refused. 
In the cases of misrepresentation the fact so stated would make the risk 
seem smaller than it was in reality while in non-disclosure the undisclosed 
fact would tend to show the risk to be greater than it would otherwise appear 
to be. (32) 
If the underwriter discovers the misrepresentation or the non-disclosure by 
the assured, he is entitled to avoid the policy. (33) In lonides v. Pender (34) the 
assured did not disclose that the real value of the insured cargo was £970, 
but he insured it for £2,800. The insurer was held to be entitled to avoid 
liability because the overvaluation was material. In Gulfsten Cargo Ltd v. 
Reliance Insurance Co. The Papoose (35) the insurers were held to be 
entitled to avoid liability under a time policy in respect of the insured vessel 
because the assured had not disclosed that (i) in June 1961 the master had 
reported to the assured that the vessel had unusual rhythmic vibrations and 
leaked excessively; (ii) after a period in a shipyard she again leaked 
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excessively; and (iii) in September 1961 a marine surveyor had reported that 
she was unfit for any use offshore. (36 
2. FRAUDS COMMITTED AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT 
Frauds committed in order to obtain insurance policy may not be the only 
target of the fraudsters. This fraud may form the first step in committing a 
more grand design of a fraudulent claim. Misrepresentation in the value of a 
ship which is to be the subject of an arranged total loss or misrepresenting 
the value of a cargo, or even the very existence of a non-existant cargo, 
which is to vanish below the waves, are all common threads in the plot of 
false total loss claims. 
The arrangement for the total loss of the vessel can be organised in 
different ways. It may involve scuttling, deliberate stranding of the vessel, 
arson, deliberate machinery damage and barratry. In this type of fraud 
scuttling is most frequently encountered and sometimes can take the form of 
barratry, therefore it must be considered in greater detail, arson can also be 
looked at, but the others are not common enough to warrant significant 
investigation. 
A. SCUTTLING 
Scuttling can be defined as "the wilful casting away", (") of a vessel with the 
connivance of the owners. , (38) The usual purpose of this practice is to claim 
against the underwriters as Lord Summneý39) states "ships are not cast away 
out of lightness of heart or sheer animal spirits. There must be some strong 
motive at work and this is usually the hope of gain". 
Ships' scuttling is not a new phenomenon, it is as old as marine insurance. (40 
A reference to this crime was reported in 215 B. C. (" 
The temptation for a few fraudulent shipowners to dispose of their ships has 
often proved irresistible. Since "Lloyd's Law Reports" began publication in 
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1919, there have been more than two dozen reported cases on "scuttlers". 
The early 1920s must have been a peak period in recent legal history for 
cases of allegations of scuttling on the part of an assured in the loss of his 
vessel. The freight market had evaporated and ship values had plunged for 
the shipowners, wilting under the costs of running a vessel, and in particular 
for the already heavily mortgaged shipowner. The way out became largely 
plain by casting the vessel away and claiming under the insurance policy. (42) 
So, ships and freight markets tend to go down together!! In the last decades 
economic history has repeated itself and the shipowners route to salvation 
remains the same. Moreover, averting ruin is by no means the sole motive 
for the scuttling of a vessel, and a significant band of criminally motivated 
entrepreneurs have derived vast financial gains from scuttling ships 
(43) especially in the cases of the over-insured vessel. 
Scuttling cases during the 1920s revealed the following features: 
1. The aim of the shipowners is to claim hull insurance (hull fraud). 
2. The vessels were either in balast(44) or had a low value cargo on 
board at the time of the losses. A noteable exception however, was 
the case of the "Palitana", (45) in April 1922, in which a grossly over- 
manifested cargo was involved. 
3. The shipowners were in financial difficulties. (46 
4. There is no collusion with the cargo owners. 
5. Scuttling cases seems to be unsophisticated, simple-minded affairs 
e. g. in the deliberate sinking of the 'Cruz'(47) in 1920. The master went 
down with his ship, the sinking presumably being carried out without 
his prior knowledge. In the scuttling of the 'Katina448) in April 1921, 
the ship's cook appearing as a defence witness, testified that "the 
captain came to me saying / was to prepare meals for the men 
because he was going to sink the ship that night". 
6. The vessels were grossly over-insured, sometimes by four times or 
more of their real values e. g. 'The Ramon Mambra'(49) was insured for 
£180,000 while her market value did not exceed £30,000. 
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In the post second war period, hull frauds appear to have decreased. But a 
new fraud developed in the late seventies, the (rust-bucket fraud). This term 
refers to the scuttling fraud which involves an old ship which has reached the 
end of its economic life and may well be less valuable than the insurance 
monies which represent it. (50 
Such frauds have been predominant in the Far East, 
(51) 
and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Common features of the majority of this typical fraud, 
especially in the Far East, would be: 
1. The vessels involved are normally more than 15 years old and are in 
very poor condition. (52) 
2. Involvement of cargo owners, shipowners and the crew; 
3. The vessels allegedly carrying high-value general cargoes e. g. 
electronic equipment, textiles, frozen fish, tin and rubber. (53) 
4. Vessels under a flag of convenience, the (FERIT) report 1979, 
revealed that of the 48 cases investigated more than 84% of the 
vessels flew the Panamanian flag. (54) 
5. There is usually no loss of life or real risk to the crew. This is not 
necessarily for humanitarian reasons of the organisers but more to do 
with the fact that ships scuttling crews can be found easier if there is 
no risk to lives involved. (55) 
6. The aim is to claim cargo and hull insurance. 
The modus operandi, generally follows the pattern described below: 
An old insured vessel loaded with a high value insured cargo, deviating to a 
port and secretly off-loading the cargo, (56) on resuming the voyage, the 
vessel is scuttled, the cargo owners claim under the insurance policy; the 
shipowner claims under the hull insurance, and also receives, a percentage 
from the cargo owners. (57) 
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The variations to the above theme are: 
1. The cargo is not loaded but exists on paper only, which can also be 
classified as a documentary fraud discussed in the first chapter of this 
thesis; 
2. Instead of the manifested cargo, only rubbish is loaded, such as sand 
in coffee bags; 
3. The sinking is faked, that is, the vessel does not sink but later 
"reappears" under the guise of a new name and nationality. (58) 
Cases of suspected scuttles have only rarely been brought to court by 
insurers, mainly because of the immense problems often presented in 
producing enough evidence to prove the cause of the loss and who knew 
about it. In some cases the vessel was scuttled in very deep and 
inaccessible areas in the ocean which made the investigations, thereafter, a 
waste of time and a considerable waste of money. 59) 
The result of any scuttling fraud is that there will be fraudulent claims by the 
scuttlers aganst the underwriter, or there will be claims by the innocent party 
(like the cargo owners in some cases) against the underwriter. The burden of 
proof to establish this claim and the position of the defendant underwriter 
may require separate treatment Then we will give illustrated examples 
about some famous scuttling cases. 
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THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SCUTTLING CASES 
After scuttling his ship, the assured shipowner must establish a prima facie 
case of a loss by a peril insured against. In the claims which have came 
before the courts the most popular perils relied upon have been 'perils of the 
(so) seas' or 'barratry'. 
1. PERILS OF THE SEAS 
The assured most likely bases his claim upon 'perils of the seas'. According 
to the general principle, must establish a prima facie case of ".... fortuitous 
accidents or casualties of the seas.. it ýs'ý . 
To establish this case the assured's task was relatively simple. The only 
thing he needed to show was that his vessel was lost at sea and that was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case as explained by Lord Justice Atkin, 
in Societe D'Avances v. Merchant's Marine Ins. Co., (62) "... I think, it is quite 
plain that in the first instance the onus of proof is upon the plaintiffs, as 
indeed it is upon all plaintiffs, to prove their case, that means, I think, that the 
plaintiff has to establish by recognised methods that he has suffered a loss 
from a peril insured against. I think it is reasonably clear that in the case of 
an insurance upon hull, if in fact the ship has gone down in mid-ocean, that is 
at any rate, with nothing more, prima facie evidence that the ship was lost 
from a peril insured against. ". (63) 
Thus the assured does not have to tender proof of the accident being 
fortuitous. As a result in cases of an unexplained loss, this clearly puts the 
burden upon the underwriters to remove any doubts as to what caused the 
loss of the vessel. If the underwriters fail to remove this doubt, the plaintiff 
assured will recover under his policy. (64 
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Samuel v. Dumas, (65) this easy 
way to recovery is no longer open to the assured. In that case, the House of 
Lords decided that scuttling was not within the scope of the concept of 'perils 
of the seas', it therefore became material to discover whether the vessel had 
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been willfully cast away or whether indeed the loss was a fortuitous 
casualty. (66 Therefore, the assured was, no longer to be relieved of showing 
that the loss was fortuitous 
If the question of whether the loss was fortuitous or not remains uncertain, 
the assured has not discharged the burden of proving his case. (67) 
In the more recent case of the " MAREL" His honour Judge DIAMOND, 
stated: (68) "First, the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that a 
ship was lost by perils of the sea is and remains throughout on the owners. 
Whether or not underwriters seek to prove an alternative cause of the loss.... 
Second, it is not sufficient for owners, in order to discharge the burden of 
proof which rests on them, merely to prove the incursion of seawater into an 
insured vessel. This is because an entry of sea water is not in itself a peril of 
the sea... " 
From the foregoing discussion we have seen that there is no longer an easy 
route for the fraudulent shipowner who had scuttled his vessel to win the 
case aganst the underwriter 
Once the assured has established a prima facie case of loss by a peril 
insured against, it is thereafter up to the underwriter to rebut the case, allege 
wilful misconduct, or use some other form of defence which may exist under 
the (M. I. A. ) 1906 by reason of which he may void the policy. 
For more than 200 years, marine underwriters have had two advantages in 
'scuttling' cases. Firstly, underwriters were not required to give 'particulars' 
in their defence. it was enough if, in a few brief paragraphs, the defendant 
underwriters put the plaintiff to proof of loss by insured perils or alleged that 
the vessel was wilfully cast away with the connivance of her owners. (69 
The above practice has been modified by the Court of Appeal in the GOLD 
SK Y<70) and the DIAS, (") wherein both the Court of Appeal held that, 
henceforth, underwriters would be required to give particulars of the matters 
upon which they relied to support a plea that the vessel had been wilfully 
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cast away the underwriters need only give the best particulars of the 
allegations of scuttling which they are able to do and subject to amendment 
(72) and amplification, if necessary, before or during the trial. 
If the underwriter accused the owner of scuttling his ship the standard of 
proof required should be identical to that required in criminal cases, that is, 
proof of the matter with sufficient certainty to put the issue beyond 
reasonable doubt. Certainly this was the approach taken in the earlier 
cases. In the GLORIA, (73). Mr Justice Branson felt no need to pretend that 
there was any real distinction between the reasonable doubt in criminal law 
and that applied in respect of alleged scuttling in marine insurance cases, he 
said: 
"Scuttling is a crime, and the court will not find that it has been 
committed unless it is proved with the same degree of certainty as is 
required for the proof of a crime . 
If however, the evidence is such 
that the court giving full weight to the consideration that scuttling is a 
crime, is not satisfied that the ship was scuttled, but finds that the 
probability that her loss was fortuitous, the plaintiffs will fail". (74) 
The same principle above was adopted by Mr Justice Mocatta in the GOLD 
SKY. (75) 
Secondly, the posittion of an underwriter who wishes to establish a plea that 
the vessel had been wilfully cast away is not an enviable one, though 
modern technology has considerably helped on the evidential side. One 
form of aid which is available, however, is his right to apply to the court for 
an order for the discovery of ship's papers under Order 72 r, 10 of The Rules 
of the Supreme Court. This is one of the choicer weapons in the armament 
of the underwriter where the facts, as available, do not readily point to any 
easy victory in the event of alleging the assured's misconduct. The practice 
of asking for an order for ship's papers goes back to before 1800 and has 
survived until the present day in cases of marine insurance, particularly 
('s) where scuttling is alleged. In not one case before 1973 does it appear 
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that such a request has been refused where the underwriters allege scuttling 
by the assured. The complete discovery of the ship's papers may take years 
and the cost, borne by the assured, may amount to thousands of pounds. 
But from the case of the SAGEORGE, (") Mr Justice KERR, in a clear and 
searching judgement, clearly revealed the way in which the request for such 
an order, with its consequent delays and costs could be used to force the 
assured into compromise. In the circumstances, he refused to exercise his 
discretion in favour of the underwriters. When the case reached the Court of 
Appeal, it was said that in scuttling cases the order should not be made 
automatically as a "sort of Pavlovian reaction" to a statement by underwriters 
Counsel that defendants intend to plead scuttling, so the court of Appeal 
refused to interfere with this exercise of the judge's dicretion. (78) 
From the foregoing discussion it would appear that the underwriters will have 
to think more carefully before they can expect to sit back on such an order in 
the hope that the sender or non-existent case for scuttling which they 
presently have will blossom into flower when all the little bits of paper they 
have requested are finally gathered together. 
2. BARRATRY 
Though 'perils' of the sea is not such an attractive peril upon which to found 
a claim, the fraudulent scuttler has been provided with another option which 
relieves him of the burden of having to show the accidental nature of the 
loss. This other option is to hand his claim on the peril of 'barratry'(79) 
contained in the Lloyd's SG policy. 
The notion of barratry covers all aspects of fraud, or criminal knavery done 
by the master or mariners against the interests of the owner of the ship. (80) 
Barratry is defined as follows: in r. 11 of the rules for construction of policy 
annexed to the M. I. A. 1906. 
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The term 'barratry' includes "every wrongful act willfully committed by the 
master or crew to the prejudice of the owner, or, as the case may be, the 
charterer. " 
The most obvious 'wrongful act' would be scuttling the vessel. The phrase 
'to the prejudice of the owner' has been interpreted to mean "without his 
consent - or without his privity". 
(81 
The consent or privity can range from active complicity to mere passive 
concurrence e. g. if the suggestion of scuttling comes from someone else, 
and the owner implies consent by saying nothing against it, he would be 
regarded privy. (82) But if an owner does not consent to a deliberate sinking in 
any way then it would still be 'to his prejudice' even if he is financially better 
off by having the insurance money than the ship. (83) 
Thus from the above definitions, in order to make a claim under the peril of 
barratry the owners must establish a prima facie case by offering evidence 
which involves both a deliberate sinking and the absence of their consent. 
However, it was decided by the Court of Appeal in Elfie A Issaias v Marine 
Ins Co Ltd/84) that when the assured presents evidence that his vessel was 
sunk by a member of the crew, the onus is then on the underwriters to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the assured was privy to the sinking of his 
ship. The court applied the strict principal that the burden of proving 
complicity in crime is on the party alleging the crime. The assured is, 
therefore, relieved, of his burden of proving "prejudice" and the burden of 
proof shifts to the underwriter. 
Atkin U explains later in the judgment why the court took such an attitude, 
he said: (85) 
"The charge of privity against the owner makes against him an 
allegation of what would be a crime if committed in respect of an 
English ship, and what, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
am entitled to assume is a crime by Greek law if committed in respect 
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of a Greek ship; and is in any case a charge of very serious 
dishonesty, the plaintiff is entitled to invoke in his favour, a principle of 
English law so well established that it is somewhat surprising to find 
little reference to it in some recent case, the principle of presumption 
of innocence. These propositions are the very cornerstone of British 
justice.... 
The question therefore is whether the defendants have succeeded in 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the owner was privy to the act 
of the Captain in scuttling the ship. Not necessarily by knowing or 
directing the particular act but by procuring, either by direct or by hint 
or suggestion, or by even ommitting to prevent a known or suspected 
intention in some way wilfully to lose the ship". 
The above case showed how the criminal principal of presumption of 
innocence overrides the so-called general principal of civil litigation that a 
plaintiff must prove his prima facie case. (86) 
The result of placing the burden of proof upon the underwriters is that it 
becomes so easy for the fraudulent shipowner who has scuttled his ship to 
recover under his policy. 
The above view of the burden of proof was not accepted by Kerr J in the 
Michael. (87) He said: 
"what must the owners establish to succeed in barratry? Apart from 
authority, the answer seems obvious in principle. The owners must 
establish a loss by the insured peril of barratry, which involves 
establishing both a deliberate sinking and the absence of the owners 
consent. If at the end of the day, the court is left in doubt whether the 
owners consented or not then it seems to me that the claim must 
fail". (88) 
When the Michael reached the court of appeal(89) Roskill LJ(90) in agreeing 
with the conclusion of Kerr J, on the facts of the case, expressly reserved his 
opinion on the issue of the burden of proof, (91) he queried without answering 
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whether it was open for Kerr J not to follow the decision in Elfie A Issaias. 
So Elfie A Issaias remains the law on the point which puts the underwriter in 
a hugely disadvantaged position in the suspicious total loss cases if he 
alleges scuttling with the consent or privity of the assured. His standard of 
proof should be at least above that of the normal standard of proof in civil 
cases and maybe that of criminal law: beyond reasonable doubt. (92) 
ILLUSTRATION EXAMPLE OF SCUTTLING CASES 
THE SALEM 
If there was any one case that can claim responsibility for bringing Maritime 
Fraud into the public spotlight, it has to be the scuttling of the supertanker 
SALEM. 
This is a gigantic ship which was used for a gigantic fraud. Behind this 
gigantic fraud there were of course gigantic swindlers. It was all to be done 
in the name of limited companies. No crook ever operates in his own name. 
The crooks use these companies as puppets with which to mount their 
frauds and to escape being discovered. 
The first step taken by the crooks was to form a company in the U. S. A 
(American Polamax International Inc. ), with an address in Houston, Texas, 
U. S. A. Then they formed a Swiss company under the name of Beets 
Trading AG with address in Zug, Switzerland. 
Using that name, in November 1979, the crooks agreed to sell nearly 
190,000 tons, worth $50 million, of Saudi Arabian light crude oil or 
equivalent crude oil to the South African Strategic Fuel Fund Association 
(S. F. F. ) for delivery at Durban. But the crooks lacked not only Saudi oil, but 
also the money to buy it and the ship to transport it. They used the sale 
contract to obtain an advance payment from a South African bank 
(Mercabank Ltd. ) sufficient to finance the purchase of a vessel called South 
Sun a super-tanker of 200,000 tons deadweight. The crooks, in the name of 
Oxford Shipping Co., (a Liberian company formed by the crooks) agreed to 
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buy the South Sun for $12.3 million and changed her name to SALEM not 
having paid a penny for her themselves. 
The next step was to let the vessel out on charter, using the name of the 
Oxford Shipping Co. Inc. The crooks offered her on the London market as 
available to carry a cargo of oil from the Arabian Gulf to Europe. This offer 
was taken up by innocent and very respectable company, Pontoil SA of 
Lausanne. Pontoil had already made a contract with an innocent and 
respectable Kuwait Oil Co. to buy about 200,000 tons of oil F. O. B. Kuwait. 
In order to carry out this contract of purchase, Pontoil SA chartered SALEM 
for a voyage from Kuwait to Europe. She was to go to Kuwait, load the 
200,000 tons of oil and proceed via the cape to Europe. the freight was to 
be paid to Swiss banks in favour of a company called Shipomex SA in 
Switzerland, that company was in the fraud; it had recently been formed by 
the crooks in Liberia but with an accommodation address in Zurich. 
When SALEM arrived to Kuwait, the crooks (the shipowners) put on board a 
new crew - they were Greek officers and Tunisian crewmen. They were the 
crooks' men and parties to the conspiracy. 
The Kuwait Oil Co., loaded 195,000 tons of oil into SALEM, Pontoil paid for 
it. The crooked master issued bills of lading for 195,000 tons of oil to be 
delivered to Italy to the order of Pontoil S A, Lausanne. 
SALEM left Kuwait apparently bound for Italy, going straight down the east 
coast of Africa, around the Cape and up the west coast through the Straits of 
Gibraltar to Italy. Soon after she left, Pontoil quite innocently sold the cargo 
to Shell on C. I. F. terms, so Shell, quite innocently then became the owners 
of the oil. Instead of going around the Cape, the laden vessel changed her 
name to LEMA and turned off to Durban. She made fast to a single buoy 
mooring one and half miles offshore, pumped 180,000 tons of oil into tanks 
ashore, left 15,000 tons aboard, and took in seawater to give the 
appearance of being fully laden This done, the vessel then sailed 
northward until off Dakar and Senegal. At the same time the South African 
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bankers paid for the oil (it came to over $50 million) to the crooks (Beet 
Trading AG. It was remitted to Switzerland immediately and distributed 
among the crooks via numbered accounts which cannot be traced. Their 
plan had succeeded. They had the money for the oil and they did not mind 
losing the vessel. 
Then in a calm sea in January 1980 there was a series of explosions on 
board and she went to the bottom. The scuttling was to avoid the detection 
of the cargo theft. The vessel's crew were picked up from lifeboats by a 
nearby British tanker; each one of them claimed the vessel had sunk 
following mysterious explosions. A little oil slick was seen on the water. 
Only 15,000 tons. The rest was all sea-water. 
The losers were Shell International, they had paid in full for 195,000 tons of 
crude oil and had received none of it. They claimed against the cargo 
insurers for about $56 million. 
The Court of Queen's Bench considered the policy wording and concluded 
that the loss was caused by the insured peril 'Taking at sea. 
(93) 
Taking at sea, for most of its history, meant capture from without the ship; 
but in 1969 the Court of Appeal in The Mandarin Star (1969) 2 All ER 776 
held that "taking at sea" also extended to appropriation of the cargo from 
within the ship by the master and owners of the ship. (94) 
In this case Mustill j(95) stated that "the words taking at sea were apt to cover 
a situation where the goods were lost through the deliberate acts of the crew 
committed at the instigation of the owners; the words had to be given their 
ordinary meaning and a taking covered a wrongful misappropriation by a 
bailee I. e. the shipowner, and could occur at sea even when the vessel was 
stationary and even if the ultimate disposition of the goods occurred on 
Shore at a later date; H. He added that "moment of taking occurred when the 
vessel turned aside from the direct course to Europe and made for Durban; 
until that time every act done by the master and crew had been consistent 
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with Pontoil's rights but then and thereafter everything done was inconsistent 
with those rights; and the taking occurred at sea. 11 
The court of appeal held (96) that in order to establish a taking at sea, there 
must be a change in possession. A change in the character of possession 
was not enough. Therefore, the cargo was 'taken' not when SALEM 
changed course for Durban, but at Durban, when the oil was pumped 
ashore. That taking, obviously, was not taking at sea, and therefore Shell 
must fail to recover, from underwriters, compensation for that part of the 
cargo which was pumped ashore at Durban. 
As to the part of oil which had gone down with SALEM, the court said "the 
proximate cause of this loss was the scuttling of the vessel and on the 
construction of CL. 8 of the Institute Cargo Clauses this was converted into a 
recoverable loss of the remaining portion of the cargo by a peril of the 
sea. ' 
(97) 
When this case reached the House of Lords the house agreed with the court 
of appeal on this issue. (98) 
Although the SALEM was insured for $24 million, the crooks never filed a 
claim for a hull insurance. They realized that any claim would be 
challenged, as the circumstances were surely suspicious, and they also 
wanted to avoid prosecution for insurance fraud. (99 
B. ARSON 
Arson can be defined as the wilfull destruction or damaging of property by 
fire with the intent to defraud the insurers. (100 
The question of arson is one that is not often considered in the context of 
Scuttling, but both practices are often closely related; as fire can be used as 
an alternative to disposing of a vessel, and for reasons that are easy to 
understand: 
1. Fire is an insured peril and any loss arising therefore will generally 
give the rise to a claim on underwriters. 
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2. Fire is probably the most advantageous from the point of view of the 
assured. All that need be proved is that there was a fire and that this 
brought about the loss. (101) The assured does not have to prove how 
the fire started or, if relevant, by whom. In Slattery v. Mance, the 
nature of this peril was reviewed by Salmon J. (102) He distinguished 
between the peril of " fire " and that of "perils of the seas", unlike the 
latter, which by reason of its definiton requires prima facie proof of 
fortuity, the peril of "fire" was not confined to accidental fire. It is 
sufficient that the assured shows there was a fire and that this caused 
the loss or damage and is not required to show the cause of the fire. 
In the Captain Panagos DP Evans j(103) compared fire with "the peril of 
the seas' and 'barratry' by saying 'Fire' unlike 'peril of the seas' did not 
itself connote a fortuity; unlike 'barratry' there was no statutory 
definition of connivance had to be disproved". 
3. It is widely believed that 'accidental' fires are easy to contrive and 
can be achieved with minimal risk and crew involvement. 
4. It is generally thought to be very difficult to prove that a fire was 
started deliberately, a fire expert has compared the fire situation to a 
picture which has been cut to pieces by the fretsaw of fire during 
which many of the pieces have been destroyed; it is the fire expert's 
function to interpret what has been left and attempt to reconstruct the 
original picture. (104) 
5. Fire started in certain parts of a vessel, notably the engine room and 
accommodation areas, frequently result in a vessel becoming a total 
loss. (105) 
A deliberate fire can take the form of barratry or such a fire may be the result 
of a conscious conspiracy between the owner and others, with the intention 
of defrauding the vessel's hull underwriters. 
Whilst explosions very often result from the outbreak of fire on board a 
vessel, fraudsters rarely involve themselves in explosions. Part of the 
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reason may lie in the fact that the existence of explosives as a causative 
factor in the destruction of a vessel is technically not difficult to establish. ('") 
In spite of the apparent advantages in a claim in fire cases, fraudsters 
infrequently involve themselves in arson. This is due to the unexpected 
hazards such actions may entail. (107) 
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2.4 MISCELLANEOUS FRAUDS 
Residual frauds within this category can be included: Mortgage fraud, partial 
conversion of cargoes of crude oil and maritime agents' fraud. 
2.4.1 MORTGAGE FRAUD 
In the international shipping market purchases are almost in every case, 
effected by means of large loans from bankers and others. Additional loans 
may be effected during the course of the ship's life. The bankers will want to 
make sure that their money is as secure as possible and they will acquire 
this security in many ways, the most prominent of which is to take a 
mortgage on the ship. (') 
However, as we shall see, ships are not an ideal form of security. One of 
the reasons is that, being a floating object, it can disappear from and escape 
out from the jurisdiction of the courts whose aid the mortgagee may be 
entitled to seek. ý2ý 
In the UK the Act governing ship mortgages is the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894. The relevant sections of the Act are Sections 31-46 inclusive. There 
is no legal obligation to register a mortgage. Nevertheless, in order to have 
proper legal effect, registration is necessary. Any mortgagee who does not 
register his mortgage gains none of the benefits available under the Act, but, 
it must be emphasised that failure to register a mortgage does not render the 
mortgage void. ý3ý 
From the date of registration the mortgagee has priority over all other 
mortgages registered after his and all unregistered mortgages or charges 
ý4ý even if created before his registration. 
Thus, before lending money to a shipowner it is obviously important for the 
lender to check the register carefully. This is not always possible without 
great inconvenience if the loan is to be made, and the mortgage to be 
executed at a place other than the port of registry of the ship. 
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Despite the importance of the mortgage system in the international shipping 
market, the possibility of using a marine mortgage as a vehicle to commit 
fraud is, in theory, quite simple, and a number of such frauds have been 
reported to the IMB. The reason for the existence of such fraud rests, 
paradoxically, in the inexistence or in the defective regulation of the shipping 
registry. If there was a unified discipline on the method of carrying the ship 
registry in the different legal systems, mortgage fraud would probably 
disappear. 
Mortgage frauds arise from the shipowner, as the mortgager, failing to meet 
the mortgage payments and intentionally avoiding jurisdictions where the 
ship might be subject to arrest by the mortgagee. As part of such frauds, the 
ship may be registered in a new country, particularly one that does not 
require a de-registration certificate from the previous country of registration 
(which usually would require notice to the mortgagee before being granted). 
Such registration in a new country without being subject to any recorded 
mortgages will make the ship appear free of encumbances allowing the 
unscrupulous shipowner to sell the ship to an unsuspecting buyer for the 
entire benefit of the shipowner or, for that matter, the obtaining of additional 
funds by taking out of a new mortgage. (5) 
In the United Kingdom there is no need to provide a deletion certificate for 
registration of a foreign vessel. The United Kingdom being one of the few 
jurisdictions to retain this practice. Moreover, if a ship ceases to be a British 
ship the certificate of registration has to be delivered up to the Registrar for 
cancellation, (6 but, no deletion certificate is issued. An outstanding 
mortgage will remain on the register but cannot affect the rights of a foreign 
owner unless the laws of the new state of registry so provide. (7) 
The only effective possibility to fight against mortgage fraud is the creation of 
a national or international ship registry. The registry must have access to 
not only the changes on property but also the mortgages and other 
privileged credits that entitle judicial sale. It is also important that every 
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state should require a de-registration certificate before registering a foreign 
(8) vessel. 
2.4.2 Partial conversion of cargoes of crude oil 
A relatively recent phenomenon is the partial conversion from cargoes of 
crude, fuel and gas oil both for use in the bunkers of the tankers and for sale 
to small-time port traders who deal in small quantities of oil as "slops". 
Usually in these cases only a small amount of the cargo will be stolen 
(although it may have a high value) as the aggregate annual profit of this 
type of crime can run into tens of millions of dollars, a fact which explains 
why some shipowners think it worthwhile to make very careful plans for this 
kind of fraud. Ships have been fitted out with highly specialised concealed 
or camouflaged piping systems which may lead to the fuel tanks or to other 
concealed containers. (9) 
The supplier will deliver the oil, but as it is loaded part of it is diverted 
through the hidden pipes. When the delivery is completed the master may 
challenge the amount loaded, claiming that it fell short of the figures 
specified in the bills of lading and able, apparently, to back up his complaint 
by showing that the tanks are not filled to the required levels. In this way the 
master of the modified tanker may well get away with insisting that the bill of 
lading be altered to show the reduced amount. It is thought that several 
such frauds have already taken place and gone undetected. ('o) 
The conversion of the crude oil by the tanker operators is made easier by 
the continuing inexactitude in the measurement of large quantities of crude 
oil. (11) 
The bill of lading figure for oil loaded on board the ship is normally taken 
from calculations based on the shore terminal figures, derived generally from 
the shore tank ullages or pipeline meter reading . The cargo is again 
measured on discharge. It is often the case that ship and shore loading 
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figures will differ, and it is almost invariably the case that loading and 
dischrage figures will show some variation. 
That such discrepancies do occur is not surprising when consideration is 
given to the fact that ships' tanks are of an irregular shape, making 
callibration difficult. Moreover, the vessel is not always on an even trim, 
requiring the use of tables to correct the ullages. It is also difficult to 
calculate accurately an average temperature for the contents of individual 
tanks. Additionally, the movement of the ship makes the taking of accurate 
ullage readings a difficult process. (12) 
There are additional factors, such as losses through evaporation and other 
genuine cases, which result in a lesser quantity of cargo being discharged 
than loaded. 
The combination of these factors is such that transit losses of up to one half 
of one percent of a total cargo have become accepted within the oil 
transportation industry, and arouse little comment. (13) 
Unfortunately, these factors also work very much to the advantage of the 
unscrupulous tanker operator wishing to reduce his operating costs by 
burning stolen cargo oil as fuel. 
Investigations conducted by the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs into the 
M. T. "YPAPANTI" and M. T. "TAXIARHIS" and "HARALABOS" highlighted 
the extreme hazards associated with diverting low flash point crude oil into 
the fuel oil tanks. The risk of explosion during a voyage where this practice 
('a) is carried out is very high. 
The Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, stipulates that no oil having a 
flash point of less than 60 degrees centigrade shall be used, except for 
emergency generator fuel which may have a flash point of not less than 43 
degrees centigrade. In both "YPAPANTI" and "TAXIARHIS" sampling had 
detected oil in the bunker tanks having a flash point of under 10 degrees 
centigrade. Subsequent to these findings the Government of Liberia 
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submitted a note on the use of low flash point cargo as fuel to the 48th 
Session of the International Maritime Organisation, Marine Safety 
Committee. In this submission, Liberia stated that- 
". . the practice described.... 
is more widespread than may be presently 
apparent and is a serious source of danger to ships and personnel 
both at sea and in port and also to port installations which service 
tankers. °415) 
So this illegal practice was described as a potentially suicidal form of 
fraud . 
(16) 
There have been many instances to illustrate these illegal practices over the 
past decade, many of which have been taken to arbitration because of the 
complexities of the issues and proof involved. Some have been through the 
civil courts of the state concerned resulting in some judicial assessments of 
the conduct of conversion fraud . 
"ý 
There have been a few cargo conversion cases which have come to the 
criminal courts as well as being taken to civil law or the arbitrators. On the 
whole the result of those cases has tended to be encouraging for the injured 
cargo owners and should make it clear to the nation prosecuting authorities 
involved that these operations are worth the effort of investigation and trial. 
In such cases the conversions are often done on a planned and regular 
basis rather than being impulsive frauds. In the case of the tanker Octania 
Sun(18) which was owned and operated by a company called Octania 
Trading, the master of the tanker, Captain Magoulas, was prosecuted in a 
criminal court in Louisiana in the United States in 1984 over the discovery by 
inspectors of stolen cargo in the vessels' bunker tanks. The oil had, it 
appeared, found its way into the bunkers through a pipeline connecting 
those tanks with the cargo tanks. The line, the court was told, was known 
aboard ship as the "thief' and was operated in conjunction with a sounding 
pipe in the (Center) forward starboard deep tank which was plugged so that 
it would give false readings. (19 
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The ship's owners settled with the cargo owners over the incident, but 
Captain Magoulas was indicted and found guilty of cargo theft. He was 
sentenced to ten years in the Louisiana Federal Prison, but fled the 
jurisdiction before the sentence could be imposed. (20) 
Cases such as these have helped to establish that conversion of oil cargoes 
can be a very expensive practice for the converter with heavy civil and even 
possible criminal penalties. But nobody believes that all, or even most, 
conversion cases have been tracked down and challenged. 
2.4.3 MARITIME AGENTS FRAUD 
An agent, in general, is a person who acts for or on behalf of another (the 
principal) in such a way that the principal is legally liable for all acts carried 
out under such agency. ý21ý 
As far as Maritime Fraud is concerned, agency frauds arise from the 
activities of shipping agents generally, whether acting as shipbrokers, freight 
brokers, ships agents, etc. Among other activities, as intermediaries 
between two parties (the shipowner on the one hand, and the charterer or 
the shipper on the other), they are in a position to allow fraudsters to 
continue operating by describing them as being completely trustworthy (22) or 
by failing to undertake adequate investigations before fixing a charter or 
accepting cargoes for shipment and/or prepaid freight. (23) In this respect, 
they can very often be either accomplices or unwitting pawns in the charter 
party frauds described in (2.2 of this thesis) where a charterer, either as 
disponent owner or liner operator, offers the chartered vessel to carry the 
goods of others, obtains prepaid freight and disappears while failing to pay 
charter hire to the shipowner. Due to the maritime agent's position of 
confidence, he will frequently be the conduit for large sums of money or will 
be in a position to direct their disposal, whether as part of charter hire 
payments, or in the case of agents for a liner service, as prepaid freight. It 
has been reported that some unscrupulous shipbrokers had been diverting 
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funds and then disappearing. (24) In addition, frauds have occurred where 
persons have successfully posed as reputable and well-known shipbrokers 
in order to direct charter hire payments to their controlled accounts. (25) On 
other occasions, ship agents are in the position to issue false or back-dated 
(26) bills of lading as a means to commit his fraud. 
The maritime agent who works as a freight forwarder may commit the fraud 
by tariff manipulation, the practice whereby a freight forwarder obtains 
money by deception from the shipper and causes loss to the shipowner by 
either: 
a) Describing the goods as one thing to the shipping company and 
paying less freight but subsequently describing them in a different 
way to the shipper, and claiming a higher freight reimbursement; or 
b) Grouping dissimilar items (possibly in a container) under one name to 
induce the shipping company to charge freight at one rate for all the 
items, to their detriment. When claiming reimbursement from the 
shipper, the freight is charged at the correct rate for each item and 
thereby the freight forwarder obtains more money from the shipper 
than he actually paid to the shipping company. (27) 
In another way, the freight forwarder can commit the fraud by cube-cutting, 
the practice whereby he obtains money by deception from the shipper and 
causes losses to the shipowner by giving to the shipping company short 
measures of cargoes on which freight is charged by volume. When claiming 
reimbursement from the shipper, the freight is charged on the correct cubic 
measurement, thereby, the freight forwarder obtains more money from the 
shipper than he actually paid to the shipping company. (28) Containerisation 
can be said to have made the use of this malpractice easier. 
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PART THREE 3 
ANALYSIS OF MARITIME FRAUD UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated before in 1.2.2, Maritime Fraud is by its nature international in 
character. It can affect virtually all parties to an international trade transaction 
with the involvement of anything between four and up to ten countries thus 
hampering investigation, extradition and prosecution of offenders. (') 
Although there is a dearth of criminal cases about the subject, in this part we 
will examine all types of Maritime Fraud according to Iraqi and English Law, 
this will assist us in understanding the real legal characterisation of acts of 
Maritime Fraud. 
Are all types of Maritime Fraud regarded as crimes of fraud in both legal 
systems, or do they fall into combinations of other crimes such as theft and 
breach of trust, or do they fall into civil fraud? This kind of analysis is very 
important, as follows- 
1. In the extradition (2) treaties, states usually specify the precise grounds 
for which extradition may be granted, and they generally require that 
before granting extradition in a specific case it must be determined that 
the act which is the basis of the extradition request is considered a crime 
under the law of both the requesting and custody states, (3) and the 
extradition treaties usually state a list of extraditable offences. If these 
conditions are applicable, disputes as to scope of extraditable acts 
under a treaty are not uncommon. For example, it has been said that 
there are difficulties in respect of the extradition treaty between the 
United States and the United Kingdom because of the apparent difficulty 
of the Department of Justice (USA) and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (UK) agreeing on the extent to which federal statutory 
definitions of fraud translate into common law concepts. (4) 
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2. 
3 
4. 
In regard to the principle of juristsdiction, it is very important to know the 
nature of the accused's act abroad, for example, according to Article 10 
of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, an Iraqi citizen who commits, or 
is party to, a crime abroad regarded as a felony or misdemeanour under 
this law(s) shall be liable to prosecution under this law if he is found in 
Iraq and this act is punishable under the law of the country in which the 
act occurred. This rule applies whether the offender obtained Iraqi 
nationality after committing the crime or had Iraqi nationality at the time 
of committing the crime but lost it afterwards. Prior to prosecution of this 
crime, permission should be obtained from the Minister of Justice. (6 
Nationally, some types of Maritime Fraud may fall under the 
characterisation of the crime of fraud, theft or breach of trust or other 
crimes and to decide which criminal characterisation applies to Maritime 
Fraud is very important in regard to the penalty. In Iraq for example the 
penalty for some types of theft is the death penalty if the theft occurred 
during the war, (7) while the penalty for the fraud extends to five years 
imprisonment whether the fraud occurred during or after the war. (8) 
The examination of Maritime Fraud according to criminal law results in 
cardinal importance in the civil law of property. For example, in Scottish 
law, a person who buys an article from someone who obtained it by 
fraud obtains a good title if he acts in good faith and without knowledge 
of the fraud, but he cannot obtain a title to the article if it has been 
stolen. (9) While the Iraqi Civil Code is similar to the Scottish Civil Law in 
regard to fraud and theft, it is different from Scottish Law in regard to 
other crimes. Article 1163 of the Iraqi Civil Code No. 40 of 1951 states: 
"1. The Civil Court will not hear a property action from anyone against 
whoever had in good faith gained possession of a moveable or a bearer 
warrant by Virtue of a just title. 2. Subject to proof to the contrary, mere 
possession is a presumption of just title and good faith. If 
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While article 1164 states, "An exception to the rules of the previous article, a 
person who has lost or robbed or been usurped, or had embezzled a moveable 
or a bearer warrant, can, within three years from the date of the loss or the theft 
or the usurping, or the embezzlement, bring an action to recover it from a third 
party in whose possession it is, even if such third party is of good faith ". 
Bearing in mind the foregoing points, in order to examine Maritime Fraud 
according to criminal law we will divide this part into two chapters, the first 
examines Maritime Fraud according to the Iraqi Law, the second according to 
English Law. 
3.2 MARITIME FRAUD UNDER IRAQI LAW 
In order to analyse Maritime Fraud according to Iraqi law, we will divide this 
subject into two parts. The first will deal with criminal fraud in Iraqi law in 
general, and the second will scrutinise Maritime Fraud according to Iraqi law. 
3.2.1 The crime of fraud in Iraqi law. 
Before trying the crime of fraud according to the valid penal law in Iraq now, it 
is useful to give a brief historic background about the Iraqi law specially in 
regard to the crime of fraud. 
A Historical Background 
The historical background in Iraqi Law will be traced from ancient Iraqi Laws 
passing through Islamic Law which was applied in Iraq until 1859 and then in 
the modern Iraqi Law. 
A. In the Ancient Iraqi Laws: 
The Ancient Iraqi Laws have been regarded as the most ancient written Laws in 
the world. (10) In the laws before Hammurabi's Law (1792-1750 B. C. ) there is 
no mention of the Maritime Fraud or the crime of fraud. Excavation may 
discover some rules in this respect in the future, while in Hammurabi's Laws 
however, many articles concern shipping aspects! " It does not include any 
article about Maritime Fraud, but Article 112, as Driver & Miles considers, is a 
fraud by a carrier but not necessarily a maritime carrier. (12) This article states: 
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"If a man is engaged on a trading journey and has delivered silver (or) 
gold or (precious) stones or any chattels in his possessions to a man and 
has consigned them to him for consignment (to their destination) (if) that 
man has not delivered whatever was consigned (to him) where it was to 
be consigned but takes and keeps (it) the owner of the consignment 
shall convict that man of not having delivered what was consigned (to 
him) and that man shall give 5-fold anything that was delivered to him to 
the owner of the consignment. " 
The most important legal point in this article is, that it is not said that the carrier 
has stolen but that he has taken away the goods; he is technically not a "thief' 
and the penalty is not death but a compensation payment. He has not taken the 
goods vi auf clam but has received them lawfully by the voluntary act of the 
consignor and only subsequently converts them to his own use, and therefore 
his offence is not theft. (13) 
In other articles there are some rules about the crime of fraud in general such 
as Article 23 which sates "if the robber is not caught, the man who has been 
robbed shall formally declare whatever he has lost before a god, and the city 
and the mayor in whose territory or district the robbery has been committed 
shall replace whatever he has lost for him. " In case of any false pretence about 
this fact by someone, Article 126 states if nothing belonging to him is lost but 
the man states `something belonging to me is lost' and accuses his district, his 
district shall formally declare before a god that nothing belonging to him is lost, 
and he must double anything for which he has brought a claim and give it to his 
district". In this respect I quote from Will Durant's Commentary of Article 23 
"What modern City is so well governed that it would dare to offer such 
reimbursements to the victims of its negligence, has the law progressed since 
, Hammurabi, or only increased and multiplied" 
(14) 
So the ancient Iraqi Laws know the Crime of Fraud in general, separated from 
theft(15) and breach of trust(16) in addition to knowing fraud by a carrier as a form 
of what is regarded today as International Maritime Fraud. 
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B. In Islamic Law: 
Bona fides and trust are the basic principles of any Commercial Transaction 
under Islamic Law. So any appropriation of others' property by illegitimate 
means is enjoined whatever the means is. These general rules are enacted in 
the Holy Qur'an (17) which states "Ye believers devour not each other's property 
among yourselves unlawfully save that be trading by mutual consent; and kill 
not your (own) self; verily, God is merciful unto you. " This verse clearly 
indicates the significance or importance Islam attaches to fairplay and honesty 
in business. Dishonesty to any people is spoken here as killing them. The 
concluding words of the verse are an exhortation towards kindness to each 
other even in business and God's mercy is assured as the reward for honesty, 
fairplay and mutual kindness. As a result of that, fraud is forbidden according 
to Islamic Law because it includes deception of the other for the purpose of 
appropriation of his property. Moreover some types of frauds are condemned 
clearly in the Holy Qur'an by some verses of Surat Al-Mutafifin Lxxx 111 
which states "1. Woe to those that deal in fraud; 2. Those who, when they have 
to receive by measure from men, exact full measure; 3. But when they have to 
give by measure or weight to men, give less than due ... " As a result of that 
fraud is forbidden according to Islamic law because it includes deception of the 
other for the purpose of appropriation of his property. 
The Muslim juriststs compare the swindler to a hypocrite because he declares 
something to his victim and hides another. (") Fraud has been regarded as a 
Ta'azir Crime, this term encompasses all offences for which the Shari'a (Islamic 
Law) does not prescribe a penalty, punishment of these crimes proceeds 
instead from the discretionary authority of the sovereign as delegated to the 
judge. (19) 
The crime of fraud is distinguished from other crimes against property such as 
theft and breach of trust. Theft requires secrecy in committing in addition to 
conditions not required in Fraud, while the distinction between Fraud and 
breach of trust is that the victim parts with his property in the crime of fraud by 
fraudulent means but this not required in an breach of trust. (20) 
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Thus the above rule of crime of fraud by extension can be applied to the 
International Maritime Fraud as a modern form. 
C. In the Modern Iraqi Law: 
The Islamic Criminal Law had been applied in Iraq until the Ottoman Penal Law 
was issued in 1859 which is completely derived from Napoleon Penal Law of 
1810. This Law was applied in Iraq as a part of the Ottoman Empire at that 
time. There are no specific rules in this law about Maritime Fraud but Article 
232 of this law is concerned with fraud in general. This law was repealed in 
1918 and replaced by the Baghdad Penal Law issued by the British authorities 
during their occupation of Iraq after the first World War. This law was derived 
from previous law, the Egyptian and Indian laws. (21) This law did not mention 
specific rules to Maritime Fraud but there was a mention of the crime of fraud in 
general (Articles 277-279). The Baghdad law was repealed in 1969 and 
replaced by the valid Iraqi Penal Law No. 111 dated 1969. This law deals with 
fraud in general in (Articles 456 & 457) and does not deal specifically with 
Maritime Fraud. So the general rules of the Crime of Fraud can be applied if its 
conditions are available. 
1. Article 456(22) states "A - Whoever receives or transfers possession of 
anothers movable property to himself or to a third party by using one of the 
following means: 
a) fraudulent means; 
b) by assuming a false name or false qualities, or by establishment of false 
statement about a particular fact whenever this means deceiving the 
victim and inducing him to hand over property, shall be punished with 
imprisonment which may extend to five years. 
2. And the same penalty shall be imposed on whoever uses the same 
means to induce another party to hand over or transfer possession of a 
debenture deed, a disposal deed or deed of release or any other deed 
which can be used as evidence for the property rights or any other real 
rights or uses the same means to convince another to sign a similar 
deed or revoke it, spoil it or modify it. " 
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While Article 457(23) states "whoever disposes of real or movable property 
knowing that he is not the owner of it or he has no disposal rights on it. Or he 
disposes of this property knowing he has previously disposed of the same. He 
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years whenever 
this act injures any person". 
Through reading both articles we can see that Iraqi law deals with the crime of 
fraud in detail in Article 456 while Article 457 states a special case of fraud in 
which the offender used the means of disposal of moveable or real property 
and because of the last special case is merely fraudulent means, previously it 
was one of the fraudulent means in the crime of farud in the repealed Baghdad 
Penal Code(24) it is still a fraudulent means in most of the Arabic Penal Codes 
stated in the main articles of fraud (25) and thus we think that the Iraqi Code does 
not change the character of this means by putting it in a separate Article. 
Therefore, we will derive the basic element of the crime of fraud from Article 
456 because it includes pure fraud and we will discuss what Article 457 added 
to the crime of fraud. It is clear that what Article 457 added is a new fraudulent 
means plus stipulating that the result of using this means must injure a third 
party. 
From the foregoing Articles we can conclude that the elements of the crime of 
fraud are: 
1) criminal conduct representing the use of one of the fraudulent means 
stated in law by the offender; 
2) a criminal result represented by the obtaining of another's property; 
3) causation between the fraudulent means and the obtaining of another's 
property. 
4) criminal intention. 
These four elements will be analysed separately. 
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3.2.1.1 USE OF ONE OF THE FRAUDULENT MEANS RESTRICTED BY 
LAW. 
INTRODUCTION 
The crime of fraud is based on the idea of deceiving others and inducing them 
to hand over their property to the offender or to a third party. This requires 
criminal conduct from the offender by using one of the fraudulent means. 
In general, it is not a condition in any criminal conduct that it must be 
committed by any specific means. In the crime of murder for example, it is not 
necessary to specify the means by which the crime has been committed, i. e. 
the weapon used. While the legislature sometimes interferes and states the 
means by which the crime would be committed, and regards it as an element in 
the crime. This is what we found in the crime of fraud in Iraqi and some other 
comparable laws. (26) 
The reason behind the strict criteria by which the crime of fraud would be 
committed is to make a distinction between what is regarded as criminal fraud 
and civil fraud, which can be committed by mere lying. Although lying in 
criminal and civil fraud is of the same nature, we will see that only lying with 
specific conditions regarded by the legislature as criminal conduct threatening 
society and must be punished if the lie is used to commit a fraudulent act. 
Civil fraud in Arabic (Al-tadles) and French (dol) is deceit used to persuade 
another to enter into a contract in such cases the victim's consent is regarded 
as a 'lack of consent' by the Iraqi civil code, if the result is unfair or unjust to 
him (27) no matter what kind of lie was used to induce him by the other to enter 
the contract, as long as, the victim has been misled. (28) 
As far as the criminal fraud is concerned, the French Penal Code in Article 405 
listed two means by which fraud may be committed. Those means are: 
1) By assuming a false name or false qualities; 
2) Using fraudulent manoeuvres. 
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Egyptian Criminal Code, Article 336 incorporated the above two means and 
added the additional fraudulent means of fraud by disposal of movable or real 
property. While the Iraqi Penal Code listed the fraudulent means in article 456 
and 457 by one of the following; 
1. Using fraudulent means; 
2. By assuming a false name or false qualities; 
3. By establishment of false statement about a particular fact. 
4. Fraud by the disposal of moveable or real property. 
Although the use of one of these means is enough for the committing of fraud, 
some fraudsters may use more than one means to give their criminal activities 
more opportunity to succeed, but if he uses a means not listed above, his 
action will not be criminal but may simply be civil fraud. 
Now we will examine these four means. 
1. Using fraudulent means. 
This is one of the most important means by which the crime of fraud can be 
committed, but the Iraqi Penal Code, like many others, does not give a 
definition of fraudulent means. The reason behind this is that any definition 
will be incapable of covering all the means which can be the basis for 
fraudulent conduct, (29) but the French writers tries to define it as a lie supported 
by material act (actes materiels) or external facts (faites exteriets) or theatrical 
production (mise en scene) which can make the lie seem true (30) Arab writers 
defined it as false pretence supported by external appearance which can 
deceive and induce the victim to hand over the property. (31) 
From the above definition we can see that there are two conditions which 
should be combined in order to fulfil fraudulent means. The First should be 
false pretence and The second' supported by external appearance'. We can 
now examine these two conditions. 
A. False pretence. 
Fraudulent conduct should be characterised by lies in order to deceive the 
victim. Lies are the changing of the facts i. e. making true facts false and that 
115 
can be spoken, written, signing, concealment or omission. (32) If the person is 
telling the truth but he believes it to be a lie, he is not committing fraud even 
though he receives property by virtue of it. (33) It is not necessary that false 
pretence should be completely false, it can true in part, as long as the part 
which the offender wanted to convince the victim of is false. For example, 
when the offender convinces the victim of the existence of a company this may 
be true, but the company is not as profitable as is stated by the offender. (34) In 
order for the information to be described as false, the information should be 
false at the time of stating, otherwise it is not false pretences. 
It is not important for the lie to be directed at a certain person or to unknown 
people, as in the case of publishing false information. 
The Arab judiciary and juristsprudence agree that a mere lie is not enough to 
form fraudulent means, (35) also simple lies, even in writing, are not in 
themselves (escroquerie - fraud) in French law 
(36) because the penal code 
should not interfere in order to protect someone who has been deceived simply 
on the basis of a simple lie, the victim should be more cautious. (37) Moreover, 
mere omission is not enough to form fraudulent means. By omission we mean, 
restrain from correcting someone's false belief about certain facts. For 
example, if someone hands over property to X believing it to be Y and X knows 
that this person is mistaken as to the identity of the receiver, X has not 
committed fraud because mere abstention is not enough to form fraudulent 
means. This case can be characterised as a special crime under article 450(38) 
of the Iraqi Penal Code which states "whoever unjustly appropriates lost 
property or any property which comes into his possession by mistake or by 
chance, or dishonestly uses it for his benefit or for another's benefit, when he 
knows or has not taken the necessary means to discover the owner, shall be 
punished by imprisonment which may extend to one year or a fine no more than 
100 dinar or by one of these two penalties. " 
is not criminal fraud also in the case of the seller who abstains from telling 
the buyer about any hidden defect in the goods he sells and receives more 
116 
money than he should receive (i. e. more than the value of the goods) this kind 
of fraud is merely civil fraud. (39) 
1. THE EXTERNAL APPEARANCE 
As discussed previously, the mere lie is not enough to form fraudulent means, 
but should be combined with external appearance. The stipulation of external 
appearance is derived from the French expression (manoeuvers frauduleuse) 
and in particular (manoeuvers) which means something done by hand (de main 
oeuvre) or more than just something that had been said. (40) The external 
appearance is figuratively called as (mise en scene) which means theatrical 
production. This expression is used because the offender who tells the lie to 
his victim and covers his lie by external appearance is as if he is acting on a 
theatrical scene through which the lie take on a definite form. (41) The external 
appearances are convincing means supporting and adding more credibility to 
the offender's lie, and because the supporting means are innumerable, 
juristsprudence has not reached any comprehensive or preclusive definition for 
it. Even Garcon said "it is not important to find a definition to the idioms used by 
the courts like manoeuvres, or external appearance or material facts, because 
its meaning will became clear through individual cases. (42) 
Although the external appearances are boundless, we can list what is regarded 
as external appearances by some criminal cases and the works of the French 
and Arab judiciary, as follows: 
A. Seeking the assistance or backing of a third person. 
B. Use of true or false documents. 
C. Making use of publishing means. 
D. Misusing of true qualities. 
E. Pretence of certain appearances by acting. 
F. By using "sleight-of-hand" or anything material. 
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We can now examine these external appearances. 
A. Seeking the assistance or backing of a third person. 
The fraudster often seeks the assistance or backing of a third person to support 
his false pretences, in this way false pretences develop into fraudulent 
means. (43) The reason behind regarding the third person's backing as 
necessary in external appearance are. First, the third person seems to be, in 
the victim's eye, a neutral party and sometimes the victim goes farther and 
thinks that the intervention of the third person is in his interest. ( 44) 
people usually believe any statement which is delivered by more than one 
person, while they are less likely to believe the same statement if it is 
delivered by one person only, especially if the victim has to hand over part of 
his property. (45) 
French and Arab writers (46) stipulate two conditions regarding the backing of 
the third person as crucial in external appearance: 
a) The seeking of a third person's assistance should be done by the 
offender's efforts and planning. Thus, it is not enough to form external 
appearance if a third person interferes spontaneously because the 
offender's behaviour is merely a lie. (47) 
It is not relevant whether the third person is in collusion with the offender 
or is deceived by him, and the offender used him to deceive the victim. 
(48) 
b) The third person should not be the offender's representative or agent 
who repeats the offender's lie, but if the representative or agent 
expresses his own idea, his act forms the external appearance. (49) 
We believe that the sufficiency of what was expressed by a third person to form 
the external appearance should be left to the discretion of the trial judge 
according to the circumstances of each case taking into consideration the 
capacity of the victim. 
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The backing of the third person can be achieved by talking face to face, or 
using the phone in which the third person backs the false pretences of the 
accused. Moreover the backing can be done by writing or signing or whichever 
gives most crediblity to the alleged false pretences. (50 
This method of committing fraud is very common in the fraudulent sale of goods 
by auction. The Egyptian criminal court has decided that fraudulent means is 
fulfilled by the conspiracy of more than two people to open a fabric shop with 
the intention of selling the fabrics to the public by false auction, pretending that 
the shop owner is bankrupt according to adjudication of bankruptcy and the 
conspirators duty is to act as a by- bidder (puffer) in order to raise the fabric 
price to the excessive limit. (51) 
B. Use of True or False Documents 
The fraudsters may use true or false documents to support the false pretences. 
In the case of using true documents the accused may use a genuine licence of 
establishing a new company to convince his victims about the existence of the 
company and then to deceive them to buy the company's shares, after that, the 
offenders disappear. (52) In most cases, fraudsters use false or forged 
documents. (53) 
Some writers and some Egyptian cases stipulate two conditions of a false 
document which is used by the accused. First, it should not be repetition of his 
oral lie (54) and secondly, it should not be issued by the accused himself but 
should be issued by another party, or the accused should have related it to 
another party whether the other party is known or fictitious . 
(55) 
We have found that some French cases did not stipulate the above conditions, 
e. g. the shop owner who gives a prospective buyer a false balance sheet of his 
shop stating untrue profits to induce the buyer to pay an excessive price, is 
regarded by the French court as fraudulent means although the balance sheet 
is repetition to the owner's oral lie and it is issued by him and not another 
person. (56) We believe that what is enough to form the external appearance by 
the use of true or false documents should be left to the discretion of the trial 
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judge according to the circumstances of each case taking into consideration the 
capacity of the victim. 
It is worth noting here that the accused, by using forged documents may be 
liable to the crime of forgery under articles 276 to 297 of the Iraqi Penal Code if 
he forged the document himself and all the elements of the crime apply to his 
act. Moreover, when he uses a forged document with the knowledge of it being 
forged, he may be liable to the crime of using a forged document under article 
298 of the Iraqi Penal Code and above all the use of a forged document is 
fraudulent means and if the accused succeeds in using it he may be liable to 
the crime of fraud under article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code. In this case, the 
act of the accused forms a multiplicity of crimes. In a case like that he will be 
liable for the crime for which the penalty is most severe and if all the multiplicity 
of crimes have the same penalty the judge should apply one of them. (57) In Iraqi 
law the penalty for the crime of forgery is applicable to the crime of using 
forged documents and this penalty may be extended to fifteen years 
imprisonment (articles 289-290). This is more severe than the penalty for fraud. 
C. Making use of Publishing Means 
Fraudsters mostly use modern publishing means to promote their false 
pretences. They distribute leaflets, use television or radio advertising in order 
to make their promotion well known. (68) False publications which raise the 
hopes of the existence of a fictitious foundation or firm, or raise false hopes in 
peoples minds, are regarded as an external appearance by French writers. (59) 
Because of the magnitude of the lie and the importance of the means by which 
it is publicised. The French courts decided in one case that the merchant who 
misleads the public by advertising that his goods are manufactured by blind 
people was committing fraud by fraudulent means. (0) Arab writers have 
concluded likewise. However, we should realise that mere `puffing' of goods 
by publishing means is not enough to form fraudulent means because it is 
merely an advertisement to promote goods, just as whoever advertises that his 
goods are cheap. He does not intend to misappropriate anothers property, but 
ýs'ý to promote his own goods. 
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D. Misuse of True Qualities 
The fraudster may be exploiting his true qualities in order to support his false 
pretences in view of the credibility which can rise from his social or professional 
position. (62) The French writer Pierre Bouzat said that the misuse of true 
qualities as an external appearance should be applied exceptionally, only when 
the judiciary decides that certain qualities may give credibility to the person 
who fulfils it, such as doctors, notaries, or bank managers. (63) 
The French court decided that the misuse of true qualities was applicable in the 
case of a priest who deceived an old man in his eighties by making him believe 
that he had committed serious sins and the only way he could be saved from 
going to hell when he died was for the priest to pray for him. As a payment for 
this the priest took 300 francs from the old man. (64) Arab writers have 
concluded likewise. (65) In one case, the Tunisian High Court decided that a 
traffic policeman who deceived a car driver by saying that he had committed a 
traffic offence, took money from him as a fine and gave him a false receipt was 
(ss) enough to constitute fraud. 
From the foregoing discussion we can see that two conditions should be met in 
order to prove misuse of true qualities. Firstly. the qualities should be true and 
secondly, there should be some link between the true quality and the false 
pretence, i. e. if a non-medical professional promised to cure a woman of 
infertility, this would not be misuse of true qualities. 
E. Pretence of Certain Appearances by Acting 
The fraudster can act in many different ways to deceive his victim, for example 
acting as an important business man and opening an office for his bogus 
company, taking up residence in a top class hotel. This creates the illusion of 
being successful and trustworthy. (67 As an example of these means, the 
Egyptian Court held that a fraudster who set himself up in splendid offices, 
telling his victim that he was a wealthy owner and supplier to the British Army 
committed fraud by using fraudulent means. (68) 
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In another case a French Court held that a passenger who collected his 
luggage without having returned the receipt then claimed his luggage did not 
arrive and tried to gain compensation for it was using fraudulent means. 161, It is 
noticeable in this case that fraudulent means was fulfilled by the whole act - 
both keeping the receipt and claiming the loss of his luggage. (70) 
There was also the case of the labourer who injured himself deliberately and 
then claimed that the injury was industrial and tried to claim compensation from 
his employers. He thus committed fraudulent means by acting. (") 
F. By Using 'Sleight-of-Hand' or Anything Material 
1. Using Sleight-of-Hand 
The skilful hand plays an important role, such as in gambling. In 1860 the 
French Court decided that a crime of fraud would be committed if playing 
cards were marked or if the player used the cards in such a way as to assist 
him in using sleight-of-hand. Thereafter, when an offender appealed against 
his conviction, the Supreme Court held that "the fraudulent manoeuvre was 
aimed at giving fictitious hope of success to the players and the possible 
opportunity of success did not exist". Therefore, the judgement of the first court 
was upheld. (72) 
2. Using Anything Material 
The list of objects which can be used by the offender here is endless. This 
demonstrated by giving the victim something worthless as collateral for a loan 
but telling him the item is valuable and will cover the amount of the loan. (73) 
Also, offenders may tamper with meters, for example, a taxi driver altering his 
meter so that his passengers are charged more for their journeys than they 
should be. (74) 
The Iraqi High Court held that whoever sells gas containers with a false seal 
(the seal signifies that the container is full and unused) and sells it to 
customers on the pretence that it is full, will be committing fraud. (75) 
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Ending the discussion on fraudulent means, it is worthwhile to note that 
although the Iraqi Penal Code does not mention the aim of fraudulent means, 
the French and many Arab penal codes (76 state some aims of fraudulent 
means. By aims we mean the facts by which the offender intends to convince 
the victim and if he convinces him in another fact he has not committed fraud 
as stated by Article 405 of the French Penal Code. Under this Article the 
offender should convince his victim to believe in the existence of a false 
foundation, authority or credibility, or create the hope of success or fear of a 
fictitious event. 
(77) 
Although the reason behind listing the above aims is to give a limitation to what 
is regarded as fraudulent means, the list covers all the possible aims by which 
the offender may defraud his victim. 
2. ASSUMING A FALSE NAME OR FALSE QUALITY 
According to article 456-1-B of the Iraqi Penal Code, the crime of fraud can be 
committed by assuming a false name or false quality . 
This means that a mere 
lie is enough, as long as it relates to the false name or quality. Therefore, there 
is no need for the external appearance to support the lie, although the offender 
mostly does support his lie by external appearance in order to give himself a 
greater chance of success. (78) 
The reason for regarding a lie as enough to use this fraudulent method is that 
people usually believe anyone introducing himself or his quality. So, if 
someone introduces himself as a doctor he is not expected to be asked to 
produce his university diplomas, or if a woman introduces herself as Mrs X, 
she is not expected to show her marriage certificate. (79) It is clear from the 
word "assuming" that the accused should use a positive act and not a mere 
omission. (80) The assumption of the false name or quality can be fulfilled by 
talking to the victim or by any other act which purports to show a certain quality 
such as, wearing a military uniform. 
Although fraud can be committed either by assuming a false name or false 
quality, some criminals use them together. 
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The Iraqi Penal Code, like many other Codes, does not give any definition to a 
false name but the juriststs define it as assuming a name which is different from 
the accused's true name or the name by which he is usually known (reputation 
name), whether this name is fictitious or of a known person. (8 ) 
Some French writers stipulated that a false name should add more credibility to 
the accused's lie, i. e. better than if he had used his true name. So, assuming 
the name of a trustworthy person is fraudulent means. While assuming a 
name which is unknown to the victim will not lend any credibility to the 
accused's lie and is not enough to fulfil false name as fraudulent means. (82) 
The name is regarded as false whether it is different from the true or 
"reputation" name fully or partially as long as the change will mislead the 
victim. 
(83) 
As in false name, the Iraqi Penal Code does not define false quality, but jurists 
defined it as - whatever quality the accused falsely relates to himself, which 
adds to his personality more credibility on the condition that the assumed 
quality should be one which people usually believe without asking for proof of 
identity. (134) There are many qualities that can be assumed by the fraudster, e. g. 
military, civil and religious rank. As an example, in one French case the 
accused attended court sessions of some misdemeanours in a Lyon court. He 
recorded the substantial fines against some convicted people, and afterwards 
he went to their homes pretending that he had come from the police to collect 
the fine and after receiving the money gave a false receipt to his victims. (85) In 
Iraqi courts there are many similar cases. (86) Moreover, the French (87) and 
Arab courts regard whoever falsely states he is an agent of the other is a false 
quality. (88) 
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A FALSE STATEMENT ABOUT A 
PARTICULAR FACT. 
According to Article 456-1-B of the Iraqi Penal Code the crime of fraud can be 
committed by the way of establishment of false statements about a particular 
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fact. Such a fraudulent way is not found in the comparable Arabic Penal Codes 
except Article 242 of the Bahrain Penal Code of 1955 which states that: 
"any representation which has been given about a particular fact related 
to the past or the present with the knowledge that it is false by the 
person who gives the presentation that it is false and any intentional 
concealment or misrepresentation about the correctness of facts is 
regarded as fraud. " 
Iraqi writers almost all concur in their criticism of this method of committing 
fraud, because they think that the range of this method is very broad and 
covers any lie, while a mere lie is not an element in the crime of fraud. (89) We 
think that this method is a bad translation of the English version of the Baghdad 
Penal Code which states "by means of any false statement of an exciting fact. " 
The English version made the range of the lie narrower, while the Arabic 
version is very broad and covers any lie. We believe that the difference in 
translation occurred due to a typographical error, i. e. the word 'exciting' should 
be 'existing'. The basis for this belief is that the Baghdad Penal Code adopted 
this method from the English juristsprudence, especially when English writers 
talk about the crime of obtaining property by false pretence, they stipulate that 
this pretence should relate to existing fact. (90) Thus, a condition of this method 
is that the offender should deceive his victim by inducing him to believe in the 
existence of an event or facts which are untrue, whether this event is fictitious 
or exists but is partially false, and there is no need for any external 
appearance. 
To justify this method two conditions should obtain. 
1) False pretences by the offender: 
False pretences should be expressed by a positive act and not merely an 
omission, and we arrive at this conclusion from the word 'establishment' which 
is stated by the Iraqi Code denoting a positive fact. 
A false pretence can be expressed by oral or written means or any other means 
as long as it is an appropriate means to give the victim a false impression as in 
the case of a seller who sold a sparrow as a canary. (He had painted the bird. ) 
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His conduct is a clear expression of a lie. (91) False pretence can be a complete 
lie, as in the case of the shopkeeper who pretends that his shop has been 
burgled, but in fact he has burgled his own shop. Or the lie can be partial if the 
burglary actually happened but the shopkeeper exaggerated the goods that 
were stolen from his shop. 
2) False pretence should relate to a particular fact. 
This means any specific event related to the past or the present. In the case of 
false pretence which is related to the future, this would not be enough to fulfil 
fraudulent means, because the victim can think about the false pretence and 
use his discretion. (92) Moreover, fraudulent means is not committed by just 
expressing an idea about a certain fact because this idea will be examined at 
the other person's discretion also. So, the mere exaggeration or 'puffing' of the 
goods is not enough to fulfil this fraudulent means. But, if the lie relates to the 
essence of the goods or its quantity or its measure or number, that be enough 
to fulfil this fraudulent means. (93) But, in this case it is better to classify this 
matter as a crime of cheating in a commercial transaction, under article 467 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code which states: 
"whoever cheats his counterpart contractor about the true nature of 
goods or their essential quality, component, type or origin, in the 
circumstances which these things were regarded as a fundamental 
reason to enter into a contract, or cheating related to the number of 
goods or its quantity, measure, weight, capacity or the intrinsic value of 
what was delivered from it was not what it was contracted to be, shall be 
punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years and a fine 
which may extend to 200 Iraqi dinar or by one of these penalties. " 
Thus, we see that the method of establishment of a false statement about a 
particular fact is broad enough to cover many fraudulent activities, for example, 
the Iraqi courts applied this method to signal the crime of fraud when 
withdrawing cheques while there is not enough funds to cover them. (94) That 
was before the Baghdad Penal Code added an article to be applied in this 
case. (95) The basis for this application was that the accused made a false 
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pretence about certain facts, which was the existence of funds to cover the 
cheque. So, the Iraqi courts at that time, closed the gap in the Baghdad Penal 
Code. Therefore, merely a lie is enough to fulfil this means in condition that it 
relates to a certain fact. 
4. FRAUD BY THE DISPOSAL OF MOVEABLE OR REAL PROPERTY. 
The Iraqi Penal Code states that fraudulent means in article 457 is a distinct 
crime adjunct to the crime of fraud. The article says" whoever disposes of real 
or movable property knowing that he is not the owner of it or he has no disposal 
rights on it, or he disposes of this property knowing he has previously disposed 
of the same. he shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five 
years whenever this act injures any person. " 
It appears from this article that the law restricts the fulfilment of this fraudulent 
to its resulting in injury affecting any person. There is no such means in the 
French Penal Code. Therefore, the disposition of another's property should be 
supported by external appearance in order to regard the offender's act as a 
fraudulent manoeuvre in French law. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that the mere pretence of ownership is 
not enough to fulfil false quality. (96) This fraudulent means was added to the 
repealed Egyptian Penal Code of 1904 in article 293 which states "--- or by 
disposal of moveable or real property of which he is not the owner and he has 
no disposal rights. " 
The main reason behind the establishment of this means is to punish the 
fraudsters who sell their real property to someone and before the contract is 
officially registered, or after that, they sell or pawn the same property to another 
person by which they can appropriate the debt or the price of the property. (97) 
Many Arab Penal Codes adopted this fraudulent means from the Egyptian 
Penal Code although the drafting may be slightly different. Some Arab Penal 
Codes list this means with the other fraudulent means in the main article as to 
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fraud. (98) While other Penal Codes, (Iraqi Code is included), state this means 
in a distinct article within the same chapter of fraud. (99) 
Although the Iraqi Penal Code deals with this means in a separate article, we 
believe that in the nature of this fraudulent means is the same as the other 
means which are stated in article 456. According to this means, the fraudster 
falsely pretends that he has the authority to dispose of certain property. He 
does this either by persuading his victim that he is the owner or at least an 
agent for the owner, or the false pretence can be achieved by concealing the 
fact that he has previously disposed of the same. Thus, from article 457 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code, the following five elements should be proved in order for this 
crime to have been committed: 
1. The accused should dispose of real or moveable property which is not 
his own, or on which he has no disposal rights, or he has previously 
disposed of the same. 
2. Criminal results represented by the obtaining of another's property. 
3. Causation link between the disposal and the receipt of another's 
property. 
4. The other's injury. 
5. The criminal intention. 
We will examine here only the first element as the other elements are regarded 
as the same general nature as of fraud in article 456, except the injury 
element, which we will examine when we consider injury in the crime of fraud 
in general. 
Thus, in order to fulfil the criteria for means of disposal of moveable or real 
property, two elements should be proved. 
1. The accused should dispose of moveable or real property. 
2. The accused should not be the owner of it, nor have any disposal rights 
of it, or have previously disposed of the same. 
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We can examine these two elements: 
1. The disposal of moveable or real property. 
In order to define "disposal' Arab writers were almost in complete agreement 
that, as far as the crime of fraud is concerned the disposal is any legal act 
which intends to transfer the property ownership, or establish a real right on it, 
while the acts which tend to establish an individual's right are not legal disposal 
such as renting another's property, or give it, as in trust, to a trustee. (100 
Thus, selling the other's property is fraudulent means under article 457, while 
renting the other's property is not, because the last act is not disposal 
according to the above Arab writer's opinions unless the accused supports his 
lie by external appearance. In this way, the criterion for fraudulent means in 
article 456 can be fulfilled. 
The above definition of disposal is derived from the civil law concept of 
disposal, (101) but there are some other writers who believe that disposal can be 
achieved even by acts which tend to establish individual rights notwithstanding 
that this concept is incorrect according to civil law rules. (102) We believe that 
this tendency is more correct because the nature of the act of whoever sells the 
other's property is not very different from whoever rents the other's property. 
In both cases the accused pretends explicitly or implicitly that he is the owner 
of the property, or he has the disposal rights to it and in both cases the act can 
lead to another's injury. 
Criminal disposal can be achieved by merely promising in a preliminary 
contract. So, if the accused sold another's house pretending that it is his and 
signed a preliminary contract according to which he received a partial payment, 
he will have committed fraud under article 457, even though he did not register 
the contract in the Registry Office or hand over the house to the buyer. (103) The 
disposal of real property is more important than the disposal of moveable 
property, because real property is almost in the de facto possession of the 
other as in the rent case, so that the other may believe that the occupier is the 
owner. A situation like that can help the fraudster in his task to deceive his 
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victim. Most crimes against property in the Iraqi Penal Code do not protect real 
property, while moveable property is well protected. 
2. The accused should not be the owner of the property nor should he 
have disposal rights over it, or have previously disposed of the same. This 
element can be divided into three parts as follows: 
a) The accused should not be the owner of the property and have no 
disposal rights over it. According to general principles the owner has 
the right to dispose of his property by all legitimate disposal means. (104 
Thus, if the owner sells his moveable or real property, his disposal is 
correct. Even though he may have thought that the sold property was not 
his, there is no criminal liability against him for this action. (105 
Likewise, the disposal right may be given to a person who is not the 
owner such as an agent of the owner, in this case the agent will not have 
committed fraud if he has sold his principal's property, as long as he 
does not exceed his mandate. If however the accused was not the 
owner of the property disposed of at the time of disposal and had no 
legitimate authority to dispose of it, he has committed fraud, under article 
457, whether the true owner is known or not to the accused. 
Also, there is no need to support his false pretences by any external 
appearance. Therefore, if a son sells his parents' property without any 
authority from them he will have committed fraud under article 457. 
Likewise, if a partner in common property sells the whole property 
without the authority of the other partners he has committed fraud, as 
long as his disposal covers the other's share in the common 
partnership. (106 
b) The accused is the owner of the disposed property but he has no rights 
of disposal over it. 
In general, the owner has the right to dispose of his property in 
legitimate ways, but by legal reason the owner's disposal rights may be 
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restricted, and as a result of that he cannot dispose of his property. If he 
does so, in spite of the restrictions, he will have committed fraud, under 
article 457. The reason for regarding the owner's act as punishable is 
that the owner falsely pretends that he has rights of disposal and he is 
capable of transferring the right of the property to his victim which makes 
the victim believe this pretence and hand over his money in return for 
the rights which he expected to receive. (107 
The restrictions which may prevent the owner from disposing of his 
property are many and can be imposed by law, in public or private 
interest, and can be imposed by contract. The legal restriction can be 
found in civil law of property and civil legislation. 
As an example, the owner's disposal rights might be restricted by a 
seizure order by the court. (118) In a situation like that, the owner will have 
committed fraud if he ignored this order and disposed of his property. If 
the seized property is moveable and it was left by the court in the 
owner's custody, and he disposed of it, he will have committed breach of 
trust (under article 454 of the Iraqi Penal Code) towards the court and 
fraud against the person who purchased it or to whom the property was 
disposed. 
c. The owner disposes of his property although he has previously disposed 
of the same. 
It is clear that if the owner sells his property to another person he will 
lose his ownership, so, if he sells the same property again he will have 
committed fraud under article 457 because he disposed of property 
which no longer belonged to him. Sometimes, the owner will not legally 
lose his ownership by the first sale, therefore, he can sell the property 
again and conceal the first sale from the second buyer. By this conduct, 
the seller will cause injury to the first purchaser. According to Iraqi Civil 
Code Of 1951, a preliminary contract of sale is not enough to transfer 
the ownership to the buyer and in order to transfer ownership the 
contract should be registered in the Real Property Registry Office. (109 
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Before that, the preliminary sale contract is merely a promise to transfer 
ownership. so, the seller of the real property will not lose ownership if he 
enters merely a preliminary contract, but if the seller breaks his promise 
to the first buyer and sells his real property to a second buyer he will be 
liable to compensate the first buyer under article 1127 of the Iraqi Civil 
Code. 
We believe that the seller's behaviour in the above case can be classified as 
fraud under article 457 of the Iraqi Penal Code. Because the seller disposed of 
his property despite previously disposing of the same, and this conduct will 
cause injury to the first buyer, although, the civil law rule allowed him to enter 
into another contract because he was still the owner and he had the disposal 
rights at the same time. 
3.2.1.2 FRAUDULENT RESULT 
THE OBTAINING OF THE ANOTHER'S PROPERTY 
The Iraqi Code defines fraudulent result in article 456-1 by saying "Whoever 
receives or transfers possession of anothers moveable property------etc". And 
by the same article in section 2 the Code expresses fraudulent result by saying 
"----Whoever uses the same means to induce another party to hand over or 
transfer possession of a debenture deed, disposal deed or deed of release or 
any other deed which can be used as evidence for the property rights or any 
other real rights or uses the same means to convince another to sign a similar 
deed or revoke it, spoil it or modify it" Thus the obtaining is the important 
element in the fraudulent result. In order to consider this result we will divide 
this subject into three parts. The first concerns the things capable of being 
obtained by fraud and the second deals with the obtaining, and we will examine 
in the third whether injury of the victim or a third party is an element in the crime 
of fraud . 
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1. OBJECTS CAPABLE OF BEING OBTAINED BY FRAUD 
From article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code, it appears that objects capable of 
being obtained by fraud are either another's moveable property (article 456-1) 
or one of the deeds which is described in article (456-2). We will deal with 
them separately. 
A) Another's moveable property. 
In order to commit fraud under article 456-1 of the Iraqi Penal Code the 
accused should obtain another's moveable property. The property in this 
context means anything that has a certain value whether it is pecuniary, public 
or private as long as it can be possessed but it should be corporeal. This 
includes money whether in the form of coins, notes, postal orders or other 
orders or negotiable instruments. (110) 
Air and other gases as well as water and other fluids are capable of being 
obtained by fraud provided they are owned, have been brought into a definite 
place, and of measurable quantity. 
Any article which has value, however small, can be obtained by fraud so it was 
held in Iraq that a cheque book and a passport are property which can be 
obtained by fraud. ("') But obtaining services by fraudulent means is not fraud. 
The Iraqi Penal Code regards the electricity as movable property as far as the 
crime of theft is concerned . 
(112) Electricity therefore can be obtained by fraud as 
long as it is capable of being transferred 
Moreover, any articles which have moral or sentimental value as in personal 
letters can be obtained by fraud as long as they are an object of personal 
ownership, and it has the value of the papers on which it was written although 
the value of its contents is more than what the papers are worth. (113) The 
French judiciary took the same view and held that the letter which contains no 
obligation or release can be obtained by fraud although article 405 of the 
French Penal Code seems to cover only the documents which contain 
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pecuniary value. (114) Furthermore it was held in France that Fraud can be 
committed by obtaining an election ticket. 
(115) 
Property which can be obtained by fraud should be moveable. Moveable in this 
context means capable of being moved by any means such as lifting or carrying 
even if the movement may damage the property. 
116) 
According to article 456-1 of the Iraqi Penal Code, the movable property which 
can be obtained by fraud should belong to someone else whether known or 
not. ("') So, a man cannot obtain his own property by fraud even if he acts in 
the mistaken belief that it belongs to someone else. 
B) The Deeds 
In addition to moveable property specific deeds are capable of being obtained 
by fraud under article 456-2 which states "----and the same penalty shall be 
imposed on whoever uses the same means to induce another party to hand 
over or transfer possession of a debenture deed, disposal deed or deed of 
release or any other deed which can be used as evidence for the property 
rights or any other real rights or uses the same means to convince another to 
sign a similar deed, revoke it, spoil it or modify it. 11 
As far as the crime of fraud is concerned, the deed can be defined as any 
document having pecuniary value. (118) French writers took a wider concept of 
the deed in regard to fraud under article 405 of the French Penal Code. Their 
concept includes all the legal facts by which a legal relation will establish or 
end. 119) That means those writers do not stipulate that the deed should be 
corporeal, but it can cover what the document contains. So, it is enough if the 
accused obtained a release from his creditor without receiving the release deed 
physically (120) and some French writers go farther by saying that the deed 
concept includes the judicial procedure's documents even though this 
document is not stated in article 405 of the French Penal Code, but it has value 
to the person who received it. (121) 
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We believe that the above French interpretation can be applied to the concept 
of the deed in the Iraqi Penal Code although the Iraqi Code, by listing these 
deeds in a separate section, seems to restrict the deeds which can be obtained 
by fraud. 
2. THE OBTAINING 
The criminal result in the crime of fraud will be achieved by obtaining property 
from a victim who hands it over to the offender. This result is defined by the 
French Penal Code as, the receiving of moveable property from the victim, 
"Remettre ou delivrer". Most Arab Penal Codes took the same direction as the 
French Penal Code and defined the fraudulent result as handing over the 
moveable property by the victim to the offender who then fraudulently 
appropriated it. (122) Thus, the handing over of the property is the essence of 
the fraudulent result in these Arabic codes. 
The Iraqi Penal Code takes a similar view to the French and Arab Codes, by 
defining fraudulent result in section 1 of article 456 which states "whoever 
receives or transfers possession of another's movable property to himself or to 
a third party. " Although this section mentions the offender's act of receiving or 
transferring the moveable property, the same section in paragraph B states that 
this receiving or transferring of the property will be achieved by "deceiving the 
victim and inducing him to hand over property. " While section 2 of article 456 
defines the fraudulent result as "-------to induce another party to hand over or 
transfer possession of debenture deed--or--to convince another to sign a similar 
deed or revoke it, spoil it, or modify it. " 
It is clear from the above article that the victim's role in the fraudulent result is 
presented by the handing over of the moveable property or one of the deeds 
that were specified by the article to the offender. And when the offender obtains 
or receives it, according to the Iraqi Penal Code expression, fraudulent result 
will be achieved. 
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Therefore, in order to consider this final result we will divide this subsection into 
two parts. The first deals with the handing over of the moveable property while 
the second concerns the handing over of deeds 
THE HANDING OVER OF MOVEABLE PROPERTY 
The handing over of moveable property seems to be a mere physical act 
achieved by delivering by hand the property to the offender, but the Arab 
writers believe that handing over is wider than the above concept. It is a legal 
act or disposition represented by the victim's will to deliver the property to the 
offender while the physical delivery is external appearance of the 
disposition. (123) 
The disposition here does not mean that it should be legitimate according to 
civil law rules because it is presumed here that the victim's will is effected by 
fraudulent means which leads to the victim's lack of consent. Thus, handing 
over is a legal disposition by the victim's will to allow the offender to control 
physically the moveable property. (124) 
The handing over is mostly achieved by delivering the moveable property to the 
offender who obtains it immediately. While the obtaining can be achieved in 
any case by which the moveable property enters into the accused's control, 
such as, when it is delivered to the accused's house or his warehouse by the 
victim. 
(126) 
The ways by which the property may be handed over are varied, so it can be 
achieved by delivering the moveable property by hand or by handing over the 
key of the place in which the property is held. It happens mostly that the victim 
himself, or through his agent, hands over the property to the offender. (126) 
Fraudulent result can be achieved if the property is handed over to the accused 
himself or other person (Article 456-1). Notwithstanding, whether the other 
person is an innocent party or an accomplice of the offender as in the case of a 
man who defrauded the jeweller to give some jewellery to his girlfriend despite 
the fact that she was innocent and had no knowledge of the fraud. (127) 
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On the other hand, if the victim hands over the property to the offender or a 
third person, is it necessarily true that this handing over transfers possession 
as well, and which is the wider concept - transferring possession or handing 
over the property? To answer these questions we will first consider the 
concept of possession and how it can be handed over. 
POSSESSION 
Possession is a civil law term, but the French writer Garcon used it in criminal 
law to establish a theory which is known as "the legal theory" in order to define 
the notion of appropriation, (soustrait) in the crime of theft and to make a 
distinction between crimes against the property. (128) 
Possession is defined as physical 
independently, and knowingly. (129) 
control of something by someone 
Possession has two elements. The first one is material and the second is the 
mental element. The material element is represented by the independent 
physical control of the object and with the knowledge of the possessor. While 
the mental element is represented by the possessor's intention to appear as 
the owner of the object. 
130) According to these two elements, possession is 
divided into two types. - Perfect possession - le possession propremant dite; 
and - Temporary p ossession - le possession precaire, and some writers 
added "simple holding " which is regarded as a third type of possession. (131 In 
perfect possession, the possessor has the material and mental element of the 
possession as in the owner's case. While in temporary possession the 
possessor has the material element only. According to this, someone may 
have something in his possession but admits it does not belong to him, as in 
the case of an agent holding property for his principle. The possessor here 
generally has the object in his possession by way of a contract which gives him 
this authority. (132) 
In simple holding, the person has neither the material nor mental element of 
the possession, but he has only a simple holding of the item. For this reason 
some writers criticise those who call this kind of holding as possession. (133) An 
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example of this kind of simple holding would be in the case of the porter who 
carries passengers bags, inside the train station under the supervision of the 
passengers. (134 
Possession, whether it is perfect or temporary, can be transferred by handing it 
over to another person, with the intention of transferring its possession. (135) It 
is worth noticing here that the victim in the crime of fraud can transfer the 
possession of the property to the offender although he has been deceived into 
doing so. (136) While the handing over of the property to another person just to 
check it or to value it or to try it under it's owner's supervision will not transfer 
any possession to the other who is simply holding it. (137) 
From the foregoing, we saw that the term handing over is wider than 
transferring possession because the handing over may mean transferring 
possession or transferring merely simple holding. 
Some writers believe that fraudulent result will be achieved only if the victim 
transfers perfect possession to the accused (138) but other writers take a wider 
view and believe that any kind of handing over of the property by the victim to 
the offender will be enough to achieve fraudulent result, whether it transfers 
the perfect or temporary possession or mere simple holding as long as the 
handing over has been achieved as a result of fraudulent means by the 
accused. Moreover, those writers added that in the crime of theft it is important 
to examine the victim's intention when he handed over his property to the 
offender. There is no theft if he transferred any possession to the offender, but 
if he transferred the simple holding this will not prevent theft being committed. 
In the crime of fraud there is no need to examine the victim's intention, as long 
as he handed over his property after he was deceived by the offender's 
fraudulent means. (139 
The French and Arab judiciary adopted this opinion in the case of an accused 
who pretends to be the other's agent and by this means deceives the victim 
and obtains money from him pretending that he wants to collect it for his 
principal. In this case he will have committed fraud although the victim here 
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transferred to the offender the temporary possession only. (140) We believe that 
this opinion is more correct and it is applicable for Iraqi law which states in 
Article 456-1 "whoever receives or transfers possession of another's property 
.... 
" and stipulates that this result should be preceded by the handing over of 
the property. So, from the final result "receives or transfers possession" it is 
clear that the term receives wide enough to cover any kind of handing over of 
property, whether it transfers possession or not. 
HANDING OVER OF THE DEED 
The Iraqi Penal Code states this result by Section 2 of Article 456-2 which 
says. "And the same penalty shall be imposed on whoever uses the same 
means to induce another party to hand over or transfer possession of a 
debenture deed, disposal deed or deed of release or any other deed which can 
be used as evidence for the property rights or any other real rights or uses the 
same means to convince another to sign a similar deed or revoke it, spoil it or 
modify it. " 
From the above section it is clear that fraudulent result can be achieved by 
handing over the deed in the same manner as the handing over of the 
moveable property as we discussed previously, because the deed is moveable 
property. Moreover, the handing over of the deed can be achieved without 
physically delivering the deed itself. As when the accused induces the victim to 
sign or revoke or spoil or modify a deed. By these means the offender will 
benefit from the victim's act as if he physically received a deed. Especially by 
establishing an obligation against the victim or releases himself from any 
obligation or modifying it or destroys any evidence against himself. 
This result is an application of what we said about the handing over of the 
moveable property when we described it as a legal disposition. 
Thus, fraudulent result will be achieved here by merely signing, revoking, 
spoiling or modifying of the deed by the victim without need further action by 
the accused. 
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INJURY IN THE CRIME OF FRAUD 
The Iraqi Penal Code does not stipulate in article 456 that fraud should result 
in any injury to the victim or any other third party. This is the same as in the 
French Penal Code (Article 405). So, some French and Arab writers believe 
that injury is not an element in the crime of fraud but injury is presumed when 
the fraud is completed . 
(141) Other French and Arab writers believe that the 
injury is an element in the crime of fraud even if no injury results. (142) Such as 
in the case of inducing the other by fraudulent means to hand over a void deed. 
The French judiciary believes that fraud is committed if the handing over of the 
property is the result of fraudulent means which leads to the victim's lack of 
consent. (143) So, the crime of fraud can be committed even if the fraudster gives 
his victim the price of what he had bought from him by fraud as long as the 
victim's will was affected by the fraudulent act when he accepted selling his 
goods. We believe that injury is not an element in the crime of fraud in article 
456, although it is presumed if the victim is defrauded and handed over his 
property as his will was not free after he was misled by the offender. Under 
article 457 of the Iraqi Penal Code, injury is an element of fraud because as the 
article states "whenever this act injures any person" and injury usually appears 
as a financial loss to the victim or a third party. 
3.2.1.3 CAUSATION IN THE CRIME OF FRAUD 
To commit the crime of fraud it is not enough that the accused should use one 
of the fraudulent means and obtain property from the victim but the obtaining 
should be the direct result of fraudulent means which were used by the 
accused. In other words, fraudulent conduct should cause the criminal 
result. (1 
The causation is not just an element of fraud which should exist according to 
the general rules of criminal law but its existence is necessary according to the 
drafting of the article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code which states in section 1 
"Whoever receives or transfers possession of anothers moveable property to 
himself or to a third party by using one of the following means". This means that 
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the obtaining (receiving or transferring of the possession) should be fulfilled as 
a result of using the fraudulent act. Moreover in the same section (B) the Code 
adds "Wherever this means deceiving the victim and inducing him to hand over 
the property". Thus, for causation to exist in fraud, the following conditions 
should be implemented: 
1. The victim must be deceived as a result of the offender's use of 
fraudulent means. 
2. The handing over of property is the result of the victim having been 
deceived. 
3. The victim should be deceived before he hands over the property. 
We can consider these conditions separately. 
1. The victim must be deceived as a result of the offender's use of 
fraudulent means. 
In order to meet this condition, the offender must first use one of the 
fraudulent means which is strictly stated by law, as we have seen 
before. As an example, if the offender uses the first means (fraudulent 
means) his lie should be supported by external appearance, without that 
he is only telling a lie which is not enough to be regarded as a fraudulent 
means. In this instance if the victim believes this mere lie, he will be 
responsible for what he believed and the accused has not committed 
fraud. Therefore, there is no need to look for causation. 
Secondly the victim should be deceived by fraudulent means. This 
means by the lack of consent which affected the victim's will as a result 
of fraudulent means. (145) 
Therefore fraudulent means should be directed to a human being and 
not to a machine. So it is not fraud in the case of using a worthless coin 
to buy cigarettes or food from a machine which was set for this purpose, 
a case like that can be classified as theft rather than fraud. (146 
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Some writers stipulate that the victim of fraud should have a certain 
amount of mental and legal capacity otherwise the crime against him 
will be the crime of "avail the need of the incapable person' (147) but other 
writers believe that the capable as well as the incapable person can be 
deceived by fraud so there is no need for this distinction. (148) Thus, the 
victim should fall into mistaken belief as a result of the fraudulent act no 
matter if the victim is naive or did not take any precautionary steps to 
protect himself. So, if the victim was not deceived by the fraudulent act 
there will be no causation and the offender's act may be regarded as an 
(1as) attempt to commit fraud. 
2. The handing over of property as the result of the victim being deceived. 
This means the victim is under the influence of being deceived when he 
handed over his property; in other words being deceived by a fraudulent 
act is one of the reasons for the handing over of property by the victim 
but it is not necessary that this should be the only reason behind 
handing it over. (150) So, if the victim was deceived into buying shares of 
a fictitious company, and then pays for these shares, the causation will 
be met even if the evidence shows that the victim wanted to show off in 
front of his friends as being rich when he paid the money for the shares 
in addition to his intention to buy the shares. But if the evidence shows 
that although the victim was deceived by fraudulent means this was not 
the reason for him to hand over the property as he would have handed 
over his property even if he was not deceived. In a case like that there is 
no causation. So, if the accused assumed a false name and pretended 
that he was the relative of a famous politician then asked a rich man for 
charity and the rich man gave him money, the evidence shows that the 
rich man gave his money not because he was deceived but because he 
likes to give to charity, in a case like that there is no causation. (151 
3. The victim should be deceived before he hands over the property. 
Causation presumes that the offender uses fraudulent means first which 
lead to the victim being deceived and as a result of that the victim will 
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hand over the property. That means, that if the victim handed over his 
property to the accused without any fraudulent act by the accused there 
will be no fraud, even if the accused used fraudulent means later in 
order to appropriate the property which he had already received. (152) 
3.2.1.4 CRIMINAL INTENTION 
In comparative juristsprudence almost all agree that the crime of fraud is an 
intentional crime. 
153) Criminal intention should be concurrent with each step of 
the accused when he commits the fraud. (154) As long as the crime of fraud is 
intentional crime, mere recklessness or carelessness is not enough to commit 
fraud. We believe that the nature of fraudulent means requires a prerequisite 
that its use should be intentional. 
The Iraqi Penal Code does not mention that the crime of fraud might be 
committed recklessly. Therefore, what kind of criminal intention should exist in 
the crime of fraud? Is the general criminal intention enough or should the 
offender have a special or specific criminal intention? French and Arab writers 
almost always agree that general intention should exist but they have different 
views about special intention, so we may consider them separately. 
GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENTION 
General criminal intention is a necessary element in the crime of fraud. Article 
456-1 of the Iraqi Penal Code states "Whoever receives or transfers 
possession of anothers moveable property to himself or to a third party by using 
one of the following means...... ". It is clear from this article that the accused 
should intend to use one of the fraudulent means in order to commit fraud. 
Article 457 of the Iraqi Penal Code also states "Whoever disposes real or 
moveable property knowing that he is not the owner of it or he has no disposal 
rights on it .... 
" From this article it appears also that although the accused 
knows that he is not the owner of the property or he has no disposal rights on it 
he intends to use this mean to commit fraud. 
Criminal intention has been defined by the Iraqi Penal Code in article 33 as 
"Directing the perpetrator's will to commit the acts which form the crime, aiming 
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at the result of the crime which has been committed, or any other criminal 
result. 11 
It is clear from this definition that criminal intention is represented by the 
perpetrator's knowledge of the crime's elements and directed his will to commit 
it. The perpetrator's knowledge is presumed here although the legal definition 
does not stipulate it. 
Thus general criminal intention in the crime of fraud may be achieved by 
fulfilling two elements: The perpetrator's knowledge of the fraud's elements and 
directing his will to commit it. (155) So, we can deal with them separately. 
A. The perpetrator's knowledge of the fraud's elements 
The perpetrator should be aware of all the fraud's elements at the time of 
committing the fraud. This knowledge requires that the accused must know that 
he uses fraudulent means and intends to deceive the victim and induce him to 
hand over the moveable property or one of the deeds which are described by 
law. Moreover the accused should know that this property belongs to others. 
Thus the accused must first know that he is lying but if he believes in what he 
says to the other, he is not committing fraud even if his statement in fact is a 
lie. (156) But the French (157) and Egyptian(158) judiciary held that if the accused 
statement is something impossible to believe in, this will be evidence against 
the accused. So, if a person promises to extract gold from another mineral as 
he has the required knowledge of chemistry, this will be evidence of his 
criminal intention because this kind of promise is not acceptable even if the 
(1 accused believes in what he promised . 
5sý 
B. The perpetrator's will should be directed to commit the fraud. 
This means that the accused's intention should be directed to commit the 
fraudulent act in order to achieve a fraudulent result which is stated by law. 
The accused here should have free will when he acts fraudulently and should 
be capable of knowing the nature of his acts. The age of discretion according to 
the Iraqi Juvenile's Care Code is on reaching nine years of age. 
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SPECIAL CRIMINAL INTENTION IN THE CRIME OF FRAUD 
Sometimes the law or the nature of the crime stipulates the existence of a 
special criminal intention in some crimes in addition to the general criminal 
intention. We mean by special intention that the accused's intention is to 
achieve a special aim or result. (160 
Comparative juristsprudence is not in agreement about the necessity of a 
special intention in the crime of fraud. 
Article 405 of the French Penal Code stipulates that the accused should 
"appropriate or attempt to appropriate the whole or part of the other's 
fortune ", (161) It seems from this article that the French Code stipulates that the 
accused should intend or attempt to appropriate the others property. 
Nevertheless, some French writers believe that general criminal intention is 
enough in fraud. (162) 
Article 336 of the Egyptian Penal Code is similar to article 405 of the French 
Penal Code in this matter. Egyptian writers almost all agree that the accused 
should have a special intention in the crime of fraud. This intention is the 
intention to own the other's property and this intention should exist at the time 
of obtaining the property. (163) 
In Iraq, some writers took the same view as the Egyptian writers by stipulating a 
special criminal intention in the crime of fraud . 
(164) We believe that general 
criminal intention is enough to form the 'mens rea' in the crime of fraud as the 
Iraqi Penal Code does not stipulate that it should be a special criminal 
intention in fraud, and the nature of this crime does not need special intention, 
for example according to section two of article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code, a 
fraudulent result can be achieved by inducing the victim to sign, revoke, spoil 
or modify a deed. Therefore, there is no need for the accused to have a 
special intention to obtain the deed itself, or to own it. If all the fraud's elements 
are achieved as we described previously the crime of fraud will be complete 
(165) and the perpetrator's motives are not an element in the crime of fraud. 
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Thus the French judiciary held that the crime of fraud was committed in the 
case of the creditor who had used fraudulent means to obtain his due debt 
from his debtor as the legitimate aim will not negate the illegality of the 
means. 
(166 
However, according to article 128-1 of the Iraqi Penal Code honest motives 
are a legal excuse of remission of the penalty. 
3.2.2 SCRUTINISING MARITIME FRAUD UNDER IRAQI LAW 
1- DOCUMENTARY FRAUD 
As we have seen from the foregoing discussion about documentary fraud , 
(167) 
this type of fraud may be committed by the issue of forged or falsified 
documents related to the international sale transaction such as a bill of lading 
(B/L) or certificate of origin, etc. When the seller commits this type of fraud he 
usually obtains payment from the correspondent bank in respect of inferior or 
non existent goods by means of a forged certificate of origin or B/L. Under the 
Iraqi Penal Code the use of a false or forged document is fraudulent means 
(article 456-1-A) and using it to induce the correspondent bank to hand over 
the money (sale price) can be classified as a crime of fraud (article 456-1). 
Moreover, the seller may be committing the crime of forgery and the crime of 
using forged documents at the same time. So, an outline will be given below of 
these two crimes but I consider dealing with all aspects of forgery offences 
unnecessary. 
THE CRIME OF FORGERY 
Forgery has been defined by article 286 of the Iraqi Penal Code as: 
"An alteration of the fact in a deed or document or any other instrument 
by one of the material or immaterial ways which is stated by law with the 
intent to defraud, whenever this alteration injures the public interest or 
any person. " 
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Material forgery may be committed in one of the following ways: 
A. Using a forged signature, finger print, stamp or changing a genuine 
signature, finger print or stamp. 
B. Obtaining by surprise or fraudulently the signature, fingerprint or stamp 
of a person who does not know the true contents of the instrument. 
C. Completion of an instrument which is signed, fingerprinted or stamped in 
blank without the affirmation of the person to whom the signature, finger 
print or stamp belongs, and the misuse of the signature, finger print or 
stamp. 
D. Making any change by addition, deletion, modification or by other means 
in the instrument's writing, numbers, pictures, signals, or any other thing 
included in it. 
E. Making or counterfeiting an instrument. (1611) 
It is clear from the above ways that this kind of forgery leaves a material trace 
on the instrument, 
(169) 
although this trace can sometimes be very difficult to 
discover. 
The immaterial forgery may be committed in one of the following ways: 
A. Altering the affirmation of the persons concerned in the instrument which 
was set up for this purpose. 
B. Representing a forged fact in the form of a true fact with the knowledge 
of its being forged. 
C. Representing an unrecognised fact in the form of a recognised fact. 
D. Assuming a false personality or a false quality or in general any 
alteration of the fact in an instrument or withholding of any statement at 
the time of writing the instrument which was set up to be evidence for 
It. 
(170) 
It is clear from the above that immaterial forgery is related to altering a 
statement which is then written in the instrument. For example, someone 
asking another person to write a certain statement in the instrument but the 
other person writes a different statement from the true one requested, in this 
way the instrument leaves no material trace of a sign of forgery, 
(171) 
so 
147 
immaterial forgery should be committed only at the time of writing the 
instrument. 
Article 288 of the Iraqi Penal Code defines an official instrument as "the 
instrument which was approved by a public servant according to his authority or 
he interferes with the writing of it by any means or interference to give it official 
character", while an ordinary instrument does not need this formality. The 
penalty of forgery of official instrument may be extended to 15 years 
imprisonment (articles 289 & 290). While the penalty of forgery of the ordinary 
instrument may be extended to 7 years imprisonment (article 295-1 ). 
The Egyptian court held that an official instrument, as far as forgery is 
concerned, does not apply to the instrument which was regarded as official 
according to the foreign laws of the country in which it was written. So, forgery 
in a foreign B/L was held to be a forgery in an ordinary instrument and not an 
official one although it was approved and stamped by a foreign counsellor and 
his deputy. (172) But, as we have seen before, the official formality is not a 
condition for issuing the B/L so it is not an official instrument but an ordinary 
one. (173) 
Criminal intention in the crime of forgery is general and special. General 
intention is represented by the offender knowing that he is altering an 
instrument by one of the ways stated by law and this act leads to the injury of 
others. While special intention is the intention to defraud which means the 
intention of using the forged document no matter what was the motive of the 
offender by committing the forgery. (174) 
THE CRIME OF USING OF A FORGED INSTRUMENT 
The Iraqi Penal Code regards the use of a forged instrument as a separate 
crime from forgery but the same penalty as for forgery can be applied for the 
crime of using a forged document (article 298). The result from this distinction 
between those two crimes is that the person who commits forgery will be 
punished even if he did not use the forged instrument, likewise, the person 
148 
who uses the forged instrument will be punished even if he did not commit the 
forgery. (175) 
By using the forged instrument the material element of the crime of using 
forged document will comply. So, if the offender used a forged instrument in 
order to convince another to hand over some money, the crime of using a 
forged instrument is completed even if the accused did not receive any money 
at the end, because the obtaining of the money is not an element in the crime 
of using a forged instrument. But the obtaining of the money or a moveable 
property is a necessary element in the crime of fraud . 
(176) Criminal intention in 
the crime of using a forged instrument will exist when the offender knows that 
the instrument he has used is forged, no matter what his motive was in using 
it. (177) 
From the foregoing discussion we can categorise documentary fraud according 
to the Iraqi Penal Code as follows: 
1. In the case of using forged shipping documents, by the seller (exporter), 
to camouflage the fact that no cargo exists. This act can be 
characterised as forgery of an ordinary document, (article 295) and the 
crime of using a forged document (article 298) and the crime of fraud 
(article 456-1) because the accused used fraudulent means 
represented by a forged document in order to obtain money from the 
correspondent bank. In a case like that the court will apply the penalty 
of the crime which is most severe (article 141) and the most severe 
penalty here is the penalty for forgery which may extend to 7 years. 
2. In the case of a seller shipping complete rubbish or worthless goods 
instead of the goods specified in the B/L, mostly there is no forgery as 
the accused here usually loaded the "alleged goods" in containers and 
supplied the master with the details of the shipment in order to induce 
him to give him a clean B/L. Up to this point, we can characterise this act 
as fraud (article 456-2) as the accused falsely pretended that the 
container contained quality goods and this is fraudulent means and if he 
receives the B/L from the master the fraud will be completed in the first 
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stage against the master as the B/L is a property deed. Then, if the 
accused used this B/L to get payment for the "alleged goods" from the 
correspondent bank he will have committed fraud under article 456-1 
towards the bank as he used the B/L as a document issued by a third 
party to induce the bank to make the payment for him and this act is 
fraudulent means. 
But if the master knew that the shipment was rubbish and not goods 
although he supplied the shipper with a clean B/L, then the master will 
be an accomplice to the shipper's act and he will be punished with the 
same penalty as the principal actor (the shipper) (article 50), for the 
crime of fraud against the bank if the shipper uses this bill to obtain the 
payment from the correspondent bank. 
More often in a case like the above, the master will insist on putting a 
reservation clause in the B/L about the content of the shipment such as, 
" said to contain..... " but this kind of clause may cause difficulty for the 
shipper to claim the money from the correspondent bank. So if the 
shipper forged the B/L by removing this clause he will be liable for the 
forgery and the crime of using a forged document also the crime of fraud 
under article 456-1 if he used this B/L to obtain the selling price from the 
correspondent bank. 
3. In the case of shipping goods of lesser quantity or quality by the seller, 
instead of that specified in the contract of sale with the buyer, here, if the 
B/L is forged the accused will be liable for the crime of forgery (article 
295) and the crime of using forged documents (article 298) as well as 
the crime of fraud (article 456-1) and also the crime of cheating in a 
commercial transaction (article 467). While if the B/L is not forged but it 
tells a lie about the true quality of the goods, here the case can be 
characterised as a crime of fraud against the correspondent bank and 
the crime of cheating in the commercial transaction (article 467), and 
according to article 141 of the Iraqi Penal Code the offender shall be 
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punished with the penalty of the crime which is most severe which is the 
penalty for fraud. 
4. The case of insertion of a false date of shipment in the B/L by the seller 
or a third party to show that the shipment has been made in time, this 
can be categorised as forgery and the crime of using a forged document 
as well as fraud under article 456-1 as the correspondent bank would 
not hand over the money to the shipper if the bank had known the real 
date of shipment. 
5. In the case of selling the same cargo more than once by the shipper, the 
second sale can be categorised as fraud under article 457 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code as the shipper here disposed of property knowing he had 
previously disposed of the same and this act injures the second buyer if 
the goods had already been handed over to the first buyer. If this 
transaction involves any forged documents, the crime of forgery and 
using forged documents will be applied as well. 
6. In the case of indemnifying the carrier's by the shipper against the 
consequences of making false representation in the B/L so as to deceive 
a third party, the carrier here is an accomplice to the shipper's act and 
this act can be categorised as fraud against the correspondent bank as 
the carrier clearly operates in a bad faith. 
7. In the case of fraudulent sub-sales of cargo by the buyer to more than 
one party, or pledging the cargo before selling it and concealing the 
previous disposition, this can be categorised as fraud under article 457 
of the Iraqi Penal Code as the buyer here disposes of property knowing 
he has previously disposed of it and this act injures the other. 
8. In the case of the buyer's fraud through using forged document to induce 
the carrier to part with goods, this act may be categorised as forgery, 
using forged documents and fraud. 
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9. The case of buyers fraud by obtaining delivery of goods without 
production of a B/L then selling the B/L to an innocent party, the 
obtaining of goods sometimes against a letter of indemnity and this 
practice is legally correct, but the selling of the B/L later to an innocent 
buyer is fraud (article 456) because the B/L here expresses a lie about 
the existence of the goods with the carrier and this is fraudulent means. 
10. In the case of the buyer and the seller conspiring to defraud a third 
party, such as defrauding the correspondent bank by using a forged 
shipping document, this act is categorised as a crime of criminal 
conspiracy (article 55), the crime of fraud (article 456-1), the crime of 
forgery (article 295) and the crime of using a forged instrument (article 
298). 
Criminal conspiracy is defined by article 55 of the Iraqi Penal Code as "an 
agreement between two persons or more to commit a felony or misdemeanour 
of theft, fraud or forgery whether it is specific or not". If they are agreed about 
equipment and facilities to commit the crime, whenever this agreement is 
organised even from the beginning, and continues even for a short time. then 
the agreement is regarded as criminal conspiracy whether its ultimate motive is 
to commit those crimes or use them as a means to achieve a legitimate motive. 
Thus, the crime of criminal conspiracy can be committed without needing to 
commit the crime which was agreed to by the conspirators. 
Fraudulent collaboration between a buyer and a seller to contravene exchange 
control regulation, can be categorised as fraud by the buyer against his 
national bank because he is falsely pretending that the price of goods he 
bought is much higher than the real price and supplies the bank with a 
commercial invoice as evidence. This forms a fraudulent means although the 
buyer will pay the price of the currency which he bought from the bank. At the 
same time, this fraudulent act may be regarded as a crime of contravention of 
the exchange control regulation in Iraq. 
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On the other hand, if the purchase price is fraudulently decreased by the seller, 
in the commercial invoice, and if the intention is to pay less customs duty on 
imports in the buyer's country then this act can not be categorised as fraud 
according to the Iraqi Penal Code since the buyer here does not obtain money 
or moveable property as described in article 456 but this act can be regarded 
as a crime against the customs regulations. 
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CHARTER PARTY FRAUD 
A. 
1 
CHARTERER'S FRAUD 
As we have seen, (1713) this fraud can be committed by the charterer who 
has decided from the outset not to honour the obligations he undertook 
in the charter party (C/P) when he charters a vessel on a time or 
bareboat basis when the hire is to be paid normally monthly or twice a 
month in advance. After that the charterer either sub-charters the vessel 
out on a voyage basis as the disponent owner or opens a liner service, 
whatever he chooses, he holds himself out as ready to carry the goods 
of others. Once the goods are loaded, the charterer issues the B/L to the 
shippers of cargo or their agents against freight due for transportation 
for its destination such freight will very often be payable in total upon 
signing the B/L. 
The charterers therefore may collect the freight from the cargo owners 
while only paying a month or half a month hire to the shipowner - the 
charterer after paying the initial payment of the hire and, of course, 
having collected all the freight defaults on further hire payments-the 
usual modus operandi is for the charterer to disappear, as he has no 
further interest in the ship, or to go into liquidation. 
In order to categorise a case like this as fraud according to Iraqi law, the 
charterer should intend to defraud from the outset by false pretence as 
an honest carrier and support this lie by external appearance 
represented by chartering a ship and give his victims (the shipper) a 
B/L. So, this act can be classified as fraudulent means (article 456-1) 
and by obtaining the freight from his victims the fraud will be completed 
as long as the charterer has no intention of honouring his obligation from 
the beginning (article 456-1). This intention can be verified from the 
criminal record of the accused or his commercial reputation. 
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B. I When the charterer absconds after collecting the freight, especially in 
time C/P, the shipowner as carrier is generally bound by the terms of the 
B/L to deliver the cargo to its destination unless there are exceptions 
about his liability as mentioned before. 
So if the shipowner obtains a "ransom" payment from the cargo interest 
against delivery of the cargo to its destination his act can be 
characterised as a crime of extortion according to article 452-1 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code by which whoever threatens another and thereby 
induces him to deliver money shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to seven years. Some Iraqi writers believe that 
this article can be applied in the case of whoever extorts ransom to give 
up stolen property to its rightful owner(19) and this categorisation is 
similar to the shipowner's act although the shipowner did not steal the 
cargo. The consignee may lose his cargo if he does not pay the ransom 
to the shipowner. Iraqi writers stipulate that the obtaining of money 
should be unjust in order for the crime of extortion to materialise. (180) 
However, the shipowner may sell the cargo en route to recoup his lost 
hire, and this act can be regarded as breach of trust under article 453 
which states: "Whoever being in any manner entrusted with moveable 
property which belongs to another or receives this property for any 
purpose, dishonestly uses or disposes of that property, for his own or 
other's benefit, in violation of law or the explicit or implicit terms of the 
person who entrusted or handed it over to him, shall be punished with 
imprisonment which may extended to five years or a fine". 
The penalty will be imprisonment only if the offender is a carrier by land, 
sea, or air or he is the victim's servant and the property was handed 
over to him because this quality, or a lawyer, broker, or teller and the 
property was handed over to him in the course of his duty, or if the crime 
is committed by a clerk, employee or servant in regard to the money 
which was handed over to him by his employer. And the penalty will be 
extended up to 7 years imprisonment if the offender was a person who 
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was entrusted by the court on property or guardianship, curator, or any 
person who is in charge of the administrative of a charity organisation in 
regard to its property. 
2. In the scenario of the shipowner acting as a carrier and collected freight 
from the shippers against issuing a B/L, then the vessel puts into a 
convenient port on the pretext of urgent repairs, etc. During its stay in 
port, the ship is arrested by an " accommodating creditor " for unpaid 
bills. The ship is sold by a court in order to meet the claim which is very 
exaggerated. The new buyer then demands additional freight from cargo 
interests to complete the voyage, but in fact in this scenario, the 
previous shipowner, the accommodating creditor and the new owner are 
all working in conspiracy to defraud the cargo interest. 
Such cases can be categorised first as breach of trust (article 453) 
against the cargo interest because diverting the ship by the false 
pretence of urgent repairs plus transferring the shipment to the 
possession of the buyer is a kind of dishonestly disposing of the 
shipment can be regarded as a breach of trust on his part. 
Second, the demanding of the additional freight from the cargo interest 
by the buyer of the ship can be classified as fraud (article 456-1) against 
the cargo interest since the new buyer assumes false quality as owner 
while he works as a team with the first owner. 
Third, the first shipowner's and the buyer's act can be characterised as 
criminal conspiracy under article 55 of the Iraqi Penal Code. 
Fourth, the buyer of the vessel can be convicted on fraud (456-2) 
against the court by using fraudulent means to convince the court that 
he is a real creditor and then induce the court to order the sale of the 
vessel. In a case like that, some French and Arab writers believe that 
the crime of fraud can be committed to obtain judgement, because the 
judgement here is a deed with a financial value. (181 
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3. When the shipowner resorts to unjustifiable deviation in order to sell the 
cargo for his own benefit this act can be characterised first as fraud 
(article 456-1) against the shipper if the shipowner intends from the 
beginning to appropriate the cargo and he bought the ship and/or set up 
a shipping company for this purpose. So, he is pretending to be an 
honest shipowner and when he receives the shipment and the freight 
from the shippers the fraud will be complete . 
But if the shipowner is a professional carrier and he did not intend from 
the outset to appropriate the cargo but he intended to do so after he 
received the cargo, his act can be characterised as breach of trust 
(article 453 ), from the time of deviating the vessel en route because 
from this point he converts the cargo for his own account while the 
selling of it in the convenient port is a result of his previous appropriation 
of the cargo. 
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MARINE INSURANCE FRAUD 
A. Frauds committed in order to obtain an insurance policy. 
As we have seen, (182) this fraud involves fraudulent misrepresentation or non- 
disclosure to the insurer of a material fact, usually concerning the value or the 
condition of the ship in hull insurance or the value or the condition of the cargo 
in cargo insurance. The aim of the insured in committing such frauds is often 
either to induce the insurer to accept the risk at a smaller premium than he 
would otherwise require, by impressing him with a more favourable view of the 
risk, or securing from him insurance which would otherwise be refused. 
From the criminal law point of view, some Arab writers believe that the crime of 
fraud can be committed by using fraudulent means to obtain an insurance 
policy, i. e. in life insurance cases if the accused conspired with a doctor to give 
him a medical report concealing his diseases. (183) We believe this view is 
correct and it should be applied in marine insurance cases if there is any 
fraudulent means used to obtain the insurance policy, and the insurance policy 
is a document which has a financial value. 
B. Frauds committed after the conclusion of the insurance contract. 
Fraud committed in order to obtain an insurance policy may form the first step 
in committing a more grand design of a fraudulent claim. Misrepresentation of 
the value of a ship which is to be the subject of an arranged total loss, or 
misrepresenting the value of the cargo, or even the very existence of a non- 
existant cargo, which is to disappear below the waves, are all common threads 
in the plot of false total loss claims. 
The arrangement for the total loss of the vessel can be organised in different 
ways. The most frequently encountered ways are scuttling and arson 
SCUTTLING THE SHIP 
The usual purpose of this practice is to claim against the underwriters, and 
sometimes the cargo owners, shipowners and the crew are involved in the 
scuttling. 
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According to Iraqi law, scuttling of a ship in order to claim against the 
underwriters can be regarded first as fraud (Article 456-1). As fraudulent 
means here can be achieved by the claim itself supported by the evidence of 
the crew that the ship was lost by peril of the seas. Some French writers 
believe that the mere claim to the insurance company is not enough to form 
fraudulent means unless the assured shipowner added an external appearance 
to his lie. (1134) Other French writers believe that if the scuttling had been 
reported to the police before the claim to the underwriter was made this will 
form the external appearance because the police are supposed to investigate 
the event even speculatively. (185 But according to Iraqi law, the fraudulent 
behaviour of the assured can be classified under the method of establishment 
of a false statement about a particular fact (Article 456-1) as the assured here 
falsely pretends that his ship was lost by peril of the seas and the false 
pretence here is related to a particular fact which is the scuttling, and the true 
existence of the cargo or its quality. So there is no need for any external 
appearance in this method, but if the accused supported his claim by forged 
documents he would be committing documentary fraud as we considered 
before. Sometimes the assured is not interested in any claim against the 
underwriter after he scuttled the ship as he is interested in the cargo only and 
after he sells it for his own interest he scuttles the ship to camouflage his 
previous appropriation of the cargo. This is what happened in the Salem 
case, (186) in which the crooks formed more than one shipping company and 
bought a ship for the purpose of giving their victim the impression that they 
were honest carriers. This is fraudulent means and by receiving the cargo from 
Kuwait the fraud was completed. We believe, because the crooks had no 
intention of fulfilling their obligation from the beginning and they had already 
sold the cargo to South Africa before they received it in their ship. Therefore, 
the fraud was committed from the time of loading the ship in Kuwait and not 
from the time when Salam changed course for Durban (187) nor in Durban itself. 
But in the case of the carrier who was honest in the beginning but changed his 
mind in the course of the voyage and deviated course with the cargo on board, 
then sold the cargo in a convenient port for his own benefit, he will have 
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committed the crime of breach of trust (Article 453). Some shipowners 
resorted to scuttling their ship after this deviation to hide the fact about the 
previous appropriation of the cargo. 
Second, scuttling may be regarded as a crime against the safety of transport 
and the means of public transport. Article 354 of the Iraqi Penal Code states 
"Whoever intentionally exposes to danger by any means the safety of air or 
water navigation or the safety of a train, ship, airliner or any means of public 
transport, shall be punished with life imprisonment if this act results in a disaster 
happening to the train or the other means mentioned above . 
And the penalty 
will be the death penalty or life imprisonment if this act results in the death of a 
human being. " 
It is clear from the above article that the Iraqi law well protects public transport, 
that is transport belonging to the government. While the penalty is 
imprisonment which may extend to 15 years or a fine if the accused exposes to 
danger private transport, and the penalty will be imprisonment only if the acts 
result in the death of a human being (article 359). We believe that the penalty 
should be the same in both cases because most of the ships belong to private 
companies and in both cases the accused did the same harm to international 
transport. So the above penalty will apply to the owner if he commits scuttling 
himself or can be applied to the crew if the scuttling of the ship was to the 
prejudice of the owner and it can be applied for both of them if they are in 
conspiracy. 
Third, as the cases of scuttling ships mostly involves the shipowner, crew, and 
sometimes the cargo owners in order to defraud the underwriter, thus, it can be 
characterised as criminal conspiracy under article 55 of the Iraqi Penal Code. 
As we have seen the act of scuttling forms more than one crime, so according 
to article 141, the court will apply only the penalty of the crime which is more 
severe and that is the penalty of the crime against the safety of transport. 
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ARSON 
As fire can be used as an alternative way to disposing of a vessel, what we 
have said about the categorising of scuttling can be applied here as well. 
Moreover, this act can be characterised as the crime of arson under article 342 
of the Iraqi Penal Code which states: 
"1. Whoever intentionally sets a fire to moveable or real property even if it 
belongs to him, if thereby he exposes to danger people's lives or their 
property, shall be punished with imprisonment which can extend to 15 
years. 
2. The penalty will be life imprisonment or imprisonment which may extend 
to 15 years if the fire was set in one of the following places 
A).... B)... C).... D).... E).... 
F) A train station, a train engine, vehicle in which there is a person or a 
railway carriage in a train carrying passengers, airport, airliner, dock or in 
a ship...... 
3. If the motive behind this crime is to facilitate the committing of a felony or 
misdemeanour or to obscure its trace or if the offender breaks down the 
fire extinguisher, or if the fire leads to a permanent disability of any 
person or the setting of the fire was by the use of explosives or blasting 
materials, the penalty will be life imprisonment. 
4. If the fire leads to the death of a human being the penalty will be the 
death penalty or life imprisonment. 
It is clear from this article that it can be applied if the offender sets fire to his 
own ship and as his motive is mostly to facilitate the defrauding of the 
underwriter, his penalty can be extended to life imprisonment. 
A) MORTGAGE FRAUD. 
As we have seen, (188) mortgage fraud arises from the shipowner, as the 
mortgagor, failing to meet the mortgage payments and intentionally avoiding 
juristsdictions where the ship might be subject to arrest by the mortgagee. As 
part of such fraud, the ship may be registered in a new country, particularly one 
that does not require a de-registration certificate from the previous country of 
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registration. Such a new registration will make the ship appear free of 
encumbrances allowing the unscrupulous ship owner to sell the ship to an 
unsuspecting buyer for the entire benefit of the ship owner or, alternatively, the 
obtaining of additional funds by taking out a new mortgage. So the selling of 
the ship , or the taking out of a new mortgage, is a crime of fraud under article 
457 of the Iraqi Penal Code, committed by the method of disposing of property 
knowing he has previously disposed of the same, as the ship owner here 
conceals his previous disposition "the recorded mortgages if on his ship. 
It is not a crime to obtain additional funds by taking out more than one 
mortgage on the security of a ship if its value covers the amount of loans. But, 
this act will be regarded as a crime if the owner dishonestly conceals the 
"recorded mortgages" especially when they almost cover the value of the ship, 
and in the case of selling the ship, the new buyer must know whether the ship 
is free of encumbrances or not and by concealing the encumbrances of the 
ship and selling it, this will form the crime of fraud under article 457 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code. 
B) PARTIAL CONVERSION OF CARGOES OF CRUDE OIL. 
In this case there is partial conversion from cargoes of crude, fuel and gas oil 
both for use in bunkers of the tankers and sometimes for sale. That can happen 
when the supplier delivers the oil to the tanker and part of it is diverted through 
hidden pipes. When the delivery is completed the master may challenge the 
amount loaded claiming that it fell short of the figures specified in the B/L. A 
case like that can not be categorised as theft under Iraqi law because the 
shipper transfers temporary possession to the carrier voluntarily and this act 
will prevent theft from being applied. 
Moreover, this case cannot be categorised as fraud because there is no 
causation between the delivery of the oil and fraudulent means. Fraudulent 
means was used here after the ship was loaded with the cargo and the aim of 
the fraud was to challenge the amount loaded and not to receive more oil. So, 
we believe that a case like that can be characterised as a crime of breach of 
trust under article 453 of the Iraqi Penal Code, because the carrier or the 
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master here is entrusted with the cargo, and by using it for his own benefit he 
violated the terms of the shippers. 
Furthermore, as the use of crude oil as fuel is a serious source of danger to 
ships and personnel, both at sea and in port, this practice can be categorised, 
as a crime against he safety of transportation under articles 354 & 359 . 
C) MARITIME AGENTS FRAUDS 
A maritime agent sometimes acts as an accomplice in charter party frauds or 
documentary frauds by describing the fraudsters as being completely 
trustworthy, in a case like this the agent will be liable as an accomplice to the 
fraud under article 48 of the Iraqi Penal Code, and he will be punished as if he 
were the principal committing the fraud (article 50 of the Iraqi Penal Code). 
But the maritime agent is frequently the conduit for large sums of money or will 
be in a position to direct their disposal, whether as part of charter hire 
payments or in the case of agents for a liner service, as prepaid freight. So if 
the agent diverts the above funds for his own benefit, he will commit the crime 
of breach of trust under article 453 of the Iraqi Penal Code. But the above case 
can be characterised as fraud (article 546) if the accused has falsely pretended 
to be a reputable and well-known shipbroker in order to direct charter hire 
payments to his controlled account. 
In cases of tariff manipulation, the practice whereby a freight forwarder obtains 
money by deception from the shipper and causes loss to the shipowner by 
either describing the goods as one thing to the shipping company and paying 
less freight but subsequently describing them in a different way to the shipper 
and claiming higher freight reimbursement, or grouping dissimilar items 
(possibly in a container) under one name to induce the shipping company to 
charge freight at one rate for all the items, to their detriment. When claiming 
reimbursement from the shipper, the freight is charged at the correct rate for 
each item and thereby the freight forwarder obtains more from the shipper than 
he actually paid to the shipping company. 
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The freight forwarder's behaviour can be characterised as fraud against the 
shipper (article 456-1) by establishment of a false statement about a particular 
fact which was the tariff of shipment, and if he supports his false pretence by 
any forged document which is claimed to be from the shipping company he will 
have committed documentary fraud as we said before. 
However, if the freight forwarder gives the shipping company short measures of 
cargoes on which freight is charged by volume but when he claims 
reimbursement from the shipper the freight is charged on the correct cubic 
measurement, thereby, the freight forwarder obtains more money from the 
shipper than he actually paid to the shipping company, in this case the freight 
forwarder committed no fraud against the shipping company under Iraqi law 
because he obtained service by fraud and not moveable property or one of the 
deeds stated in article 456-2 but this act can be regarded as civil fraud. 
But the freight forwarder committed fraud against the shipper as we said above 
about the tariff manipulation, regardless of the fact that the shipper paid the 
freight for the correct cubic measurement. 
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3.3 MARITIME FRAUD UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
In order to analyse Maritime Fraud according to English law, we will divide this 
subject into two parts. The first will deal with criminal fraud in English law in 
general, and the second will scrutinise Maritime Fraud according to English 
law. 
3.3.1 The crime of fraud in English law 
English law knows no crime by the name of fraud. Instead it boasts a 
bewildering variety of offences which might be committed in the course of what 
a layman (or for that matter a lawyer) would describe as fraud. (1) 
Historically, in common law it did not constitute an indictable offence to effect 
cheats upon private individuals by a mere false affirmation or a bare lie. 
Accordingly, in R. v. Jones (2) an indictment of J. for obtaining money of another 
by pretending to come by the command of a third person to demand a debt or 
the like in his name; was quashed on the grounds that it was "not indictable 
unless he came with false tokens; playing with false dice is, for that is such a 
cheat as a person of ordinary, capacity cannot discover", Holt C. J. asked, 
"shall we indict a man for making a fool of another? " and bade the prosecutor 
to have recourse to a civil action. 
In R. v. Wheatly the indictment, which was at common law, was against a 
brewer, for his intention to deceive and defraud R. W. of his money, falsely, 
fraudulently and deceitfully sold and delivered to him 16 gallons of amber for 
and as 18 gallons of the same liquor, and received 15 s. as for the 18 gallons, 
knowing there were only 16 gallons. This, the court was clearly of the opinion, 
was not an indictable offence, but only a civil injury for which an action lay to 
recover damages (a). Lord Mansfield C. J. said: 
"lt amounts only to an unfair dealing and an imposition on this particular 
man by which he could not have suffered but from his own carelessness 
in not measuring it; whereas fraud to be the object of criminal 
prosecution must be of that kind which in its nature is calculated to 
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defraud numbers, as false weights or measures, false tokens, or where 
there is a conspiracy. ' 
It is equally clear that such a private cheat is not indictable, though it is 
accompanied by a false assertion to give it efficacy. As in R. v. Pinkney(4) 
where an indictment for selling a sack of corn at Rippon market, which the 
defendant falsely affirmed to be a Winchester bushel, whereas it was greatly 
deficient, was quashed upon motion; being, as the court said, no more than 
telling a lie. (5) 
Moreover, neither will the case differ if the defendant makes use of an apparent 
token, which in reality is upon the very face of it no more credit than his own 
assertion. ýsý 
So, Writings generally speaking, may be considered as tokens, yet they must 
be such as are made in the names of third persons; whereby some additional 
credit may be gained by the party using them. (7) 
Thus, in R. v. Lara(8) an indictment at common law charged that Lara, 
deceitfully intending by crafty means and devices to obtain possession of 
certain lottery tickets, the property of A., pretended that he wanted to purchase 
them for a valuable consideration, and delivered to A. a fictitious order for 
payment of money subscribed by him Lara, & C. purporting to be a draft upon 
his banker for the amount, which he knew had no authority to draw, and that it 
would not be paid; but which he falsely pretended to be a good order, and that 
he had money in the banker's hands and that it would be paid; by virtue of 
which he obtained possession of the tickets, and defrauded the prosecutor at 
the value. Judgement was arrested, on the grounds that the defendant was 
not charged with having used any false token to accomplish the deceit; for the 
banker's cheque drawn by the defendant himself entitled him to no more credit 
than his bare assertion that the money would be paid. It seems then that the 
false token must be such as is calculated to gain the party some additional 
credit and confidence beyond his own assertion, or that which is resolvable into 
such. 
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It is clear from the foregoing cases that criminal fraud at common law cannot be 
committed by a bare lie upon private individuals unless it is supported by a 
false token or device of a tangible character on which common prudence would 
not have guarded against. The false token here is very similar to the "external 
appearance" which should support the false pretence to fulfil the fraudulent 
means in both Iraqi and French law. (9) 
On the contrary, fraud which affects the public at large or tends to pervert, 
hinder or discredit the operation of public justice were indictable at common 
law. Moreover, when two or more persons act together to commit fraud, their 
agreement constitutes an indictable conspiracy. (10 
The narrowness in the common law, especially regarding fraud upon the 
individual, was felt to be defective as the diversity and complexity of 
commercial activity developed in the eighteenth century, so that statute 
intervened in 1757 by 30 Geo. 2, C. 24, S. 1 to make it a misdemeanour to 
obtain goods by false pretences. The above section stated: 
"That all persons who knowingly and designedly by false pretence or 
pretences shall obtain from any person or persons money, goods, wares 
or merchandises, with intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons 
of the same shall be deemed offenders against law and the public 
peace; and the court before whom such offenders shall be tried shall on 
conviction order them to be fined, imprisoned, or to be put in the pillory, 
or publicly whipped, or be transported according to the laws made for the 
transportation of offenders, for the term of seven years, as the court shall 
think fit". 
It was decided that the term "false pretences" was of great latitude, and was 
used to protect the weaker part of mankind, because all were not equally 
prudent; it seems difficult therefore, to restrain the interpretation of it to such 
false pretences only against which "common prudence" would not have 
guarded against. (") 
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30 Geo. 2., C. 24, S. 1., repealed by 7&8 Geo. 4. C. 27 and re-enacted by 7& 
8 Geo. 4, C. 29, S. 53., modified by the Larceny Act of 1861 ss 88,89 and 90 
(rep. ). S. 88 regards the obtaining of money, or valuables security by false 
pretences S. 89 deals with the case where any money or object is caused to be 
paid or delivered to any person other than the person making a false pretence 
and S. 90 related to inducing persons by fraud to execute deeds and other 
instruments. Besides the Larceny Act 1861, there were several statutes 
dealing with specific types of fraud e. g. S. 13 (1) of Debtors Act, 1869 (now 
rep. ), Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875 (now rep. ), and False Personation 
Act 1874 (c. 36) (now rep. ). 
The law related to fraud was then consolidated in the Larceny Act 1916, S. 32. 
Which stated: 
"Every person who by any false pretence: 
1) With intent to defraud, obtains from any other person any chattel, money 
or valuables, security, or causes or procures any money to be paid, or 
any chattel or valuables security to be delivered to himself or to any 
other person for the use or benefit or on account of himself or any other 
person; or 
2) With intent to defraud or injure any other person, fraudulently causes or 
induces any other person - 
a) to execute, make, accept, endorse or destroy the whole or any part of 
any valuable security; or 
b) to write, impress, or affix his name or the name of any other person, or 
the seal of any body corporate or society, upon any paper or parchment 
in order that the same may be afterwards made or converted into, or 
used or dealt with as, a valuable security; shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour and on conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for any 
term not exceeding five years". 
The Larceny Act of 1916 was entirely repealed by the Theft Act of 1968 which 
superseded a number of statutory offences of deception perpetrated to obtain 
property in addition to the offence under 1916 S. 32. The other offences 
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include the offence under the False Personation Act 1874 referred to above 
and a large number of offences relating to particular kinds of property. 
Examples are, personation of holders of certain stock contrary to S. 3 of the 
Forgery Act 1861 (c. 98) and producing false certificates or impersonation in 
order to obtain a pension contrary to S. 25 or 38 of the Chelsea and 
Kilmainham Hospitals Act 1826 (c. 16). (12) 
The Theft Act 1968 created three offences of securing various objectives "by 
deception" four more followed in the Theft Act 1978. They are: 
a) Obtaining property: 1968 Act S. 15; 
b) Obtaining a pecuniary advantage: 1968 Act S. 16; 
c) Procuring the execution of a valuable security: 1968 Act S. 20 (2); 
d) Obtaining services: 1978 Act S. 1; 
e) Securing the remission of a liability: 1978 Act S. 2(1) (a); 
f) Inducing a creditor to wait for or to forego payment: 1978 Act: S. 2(1) (b); 
g) Obtaining an exemption from or abalement of liability: 1978 Act S. 2(1)(c). 
The offences have the following elements in common: 
1. There must be a deception; 
2. There must be a causal link between the deception and the prohibited 
result; 
3. The accused must be dishonest. (The mens rea) 
While the nature of the prohibited result is different in these offences so, it is 
appropriate to deal with the common elements first then we will study the 
offence of obtaining property by deception under s. 15 above only as this 
offence is mostly related to the subject of this thesis . 
3.3.1.1. THERE MUST BE A DECEPTION 
The word "deception" was not used in the legislation before 1968. Until then 
the central offence in this area was that of obtaining by false pretences. (13) 
False pretence was simply a misrepresentation by act or conduct expressed or 
implied. (14) 
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In their Eight report (15) The Criminal Law Revision Committee said that (the 
substitution of "deception" for "false pretence! is chiefly a matter of language). 
The word "deception" seemed to them, as it had done to the framers of the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, "to have the advantage of 
directing attention to the effect that the offender deliberately produced on the 
mind of the person deceived in contradistinction to the words "false pretence", 
which it replaced, which "makes one think of what exactly the offender did in 
order to deceive". (16) There is a hint here that "deception" may be wider than 
"false pretence ". 
Deception is in part defined by s. 15 (4) of the Theft Act 1968 which provides. 
"For purposes of this section "deception" means any deception (whether 
deliberate or reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to law, 
including a deception as to the present intentions of the person using the 
deception or any other person". (") 
The above definition intended to clarify certain specific points. It is concerned 
partly with the subject-matter of the deception and partly with the required 
mental element. But it was unhelpful to indicate what is meant by "deception" 
itself by saying "deception means any deception ..... " 
The shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "deception" as "the action of 
deceiving", and "deceive" as to cause to believe what is false". A somewhat 
similar notion is found in Glanville Williams definition of deception as "words or 
conduct producing a mistaken belief, accompanied by the necessary mental 
element on the part of the deceiver ' ý18ý . 
Buckley J, in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd., defined 
deception in similar terms "to deceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to 
believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising the 
deceit knows or believes to be false..... More tersely it may be put, that to 
deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind.... " (19) This definition was 
approved by two members of the House of Lords in the post - 1968 case of 
D. P. P. v. Ray. (20) 
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The above definitions suggest that the essence of the concept of deception, as 
generally understood, requires the formation of a mistaken belief in the victim's 
mind by the defendant's means of inducement. Therefore, two elements must 
now be considered. 
1. The falsity; 
2. Means of inducement. 
1. The Falsity. 
In order to form a mistaken belief in the victim's mind, the defendant's means of 
inducement must be false. So the falsehood is one of the chief ingredients of 
deception. 
In R. v. Flint(21) the judges, upon a case reserved, held unanimously that a 
conviction on a charge of obtaining a horse by falsely pretending that certain 
banknotes tendered in payment for the animal were good notes must be 
quashed since the evidence was defective in not sufficiently proving that the 
notes were bad. (22) 
But if it happens that the proposition which the victim is induced to believe is in 
fact true, there is no deception; and this is so even if the defendant himself was 
convinced that it was false, (23) though in that case he could presumably be 
convicted on an attempt. (24) 
The falsity of the proposition is an element of the actus reus and must be 
proved by the prosecution. (25) 
In Ng, (26) the defendant attempted to obtain money by claiming that she was in 
a position to influence a magistrate before whom the victim was due to appear; 
the Privy Council held that it was for the prosecution to prove that she was not 
in such a position, not for the defence to prove that she was. (27) Of course what 
is true or false is generally easy to establish. Whether a person is really who 
he says he is, whether the goods he has for sale are truly as he describes 
them, or whether he is really entitled to claim what he presently seeks, can be 
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proved one way or the other with more or less difficulty. The most important 
factor is that the statement of the offender should be designed in such a way as 
to give a false impression in the victim's belief. 
Thus, it is clear that the falsity requirement in criminal deception in English Law 
is the same as the falsity requirement in fraudulent means in Iraqi Law. 
2. Means of Inducement 
In principle, no obvious legal limitation suggests itself as to the range of 
methods of deception which the law should repress. But, before the Theft Act 
1968, the law imposed limitations upon the relevant methods of deception 
which confined the element of deception within the requirement of an 
objectively false representation or pretence, but as a result of the Theft Act 
1968, English law has largely been liberated from this requirement. 
WORDS OR CONDUCT 
Subsection 4 of section 15 of the Theft Act 1968 states that deception can be 
committed "by words or conduct". The most obvious way of inducing someone 
to believe in the truth of a proposition is by expressly stating it to him, and an 
express statement should be relied upon whenever possible. 
It is not necessary for a deception to be verbal. Perhaps nothing at all is 
written or said; even if words are used, the essence of the deception may lie 
rather in the nature of the transaction. So there will be a deception where a 
person purports to sell goods which he has no right to sell. (28) Or conversely, 
sells his own goods as if they were his employer's (29) or by establishing the 
outward appearance of genuine business or enterprise and thereby inducing 
people to supply goods or to pay for non-existant goods or to invest money in a 
worthless undertaking. 
FACT OR LAW 
The falsity of the proposition in the deception may be "as to fact or as to law" as 
section 15 (4) of the Theft Act 1968 expressly provides the reference to a 
deception "as to law" is included for the avoidance of doubt. (30) It was not 
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settled whether a false statement as to law was a false pretence under the old 
law. 
Thus, a deception offence might be committed if a trader added 17.5% to a bill 
on the false pretext that VAT was payable, but, many legal disputes may arise 
of course, where the law is uncertain. In such cases it is most unlikely that an 
offence could be committed under the Act. ý31ý 
Thus, the extent of the deception as to law should be left to the court to decide 
in each case, taking into consideration the defendant's profession (such as 
lawyer or tax officer) or whether the false representations referred to professes 
to state legal rules or relates to merely personal interpretations of them. 
STATEMENTS OF OPINION 
As mentioned above, a statement alleged to constitute a deception must be 
one of fact or law, whether this is the case is a matter to be determined by the 
jury. (32) 
Usually it is easy enough to identify a fact asserted by the words used, but 
difficulty can arise in deciding whether what was offered was a statement of fact 
or a statement of opinion. A statement of opinion was not a sufficient false 
pretence under S. 32 of the Larceny Act 1916. In R. v. Bryan (33) where D 
obtained money from P by pledging with him certain spoons which D pretended 
as being of the best quality, equal to Elkington's A (this being a high quality 
silver spoon made by Messrs Elkington's. The spoons were of inferior quality 
to that represented by D. The jury found D guilty of fraudulently representing 
the goods as having as much silver on them as Elkington's A, knowing that to 
be untrue, and that in consequence of that he obtained the money. 
Nevertheless, ten out of twelve judges, (34) held that his conviction must be 
quashed on the grounds that dishonesty to exaggerate the quality of goods was 
not within the offence; insofar as there was a representation of fact - that the 
spoons pledged were silver spoons - this was true, even though they did not 
have the quality represented - Erle J. said, "whether these spoons were equal 
to Elkington's A or not, cannot be as far as I know, decidedly affirmed or denied 
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in the same way as a past fact can be affirmed or denied, but it is in the nature 
of a matter of opinion. 35) But, there is much force in the dissenting judgement 
of Willes J in this case. (36) He regarded as crucial the fact that D's 
representation was dishonestly made with intent to defraud P, and to the extent 
that D claimed his spoons had in them as much silver as Elkington's A it could 
be demonstrated, as D well knew, that they had not. This seems to be no less 
a misrepresentation of fact than that a six-carat gold chain is of fifteen carat 
gold which has subsequently been held to be a sufficient false pretence as the 
real article being different in substance from the pretended article. (37) 
The Theft Act 1968 gives no guidance as to whether a misrepresentation of 
opinion is capable of being deception. In principle, there is no reason why it 
should not be since every assertion of opinion is an assertion of a present state 
of mind. It is therefore, possible falsely to assert an opinion and to deceive 
another as to the sincerity of that opinion. 
Moreover, the express statement of opinion carries an implied statement that 
there are reasonable grounds for it. (38) 
The indefinite nature of the dividing line between opinion and fact, creates 
uncertainty as to the extent of criminal liability, however, Smith and Hogan 
argue that a knowing exaggeration of the quality of goods will not necessarily 
infer liability for the English offence of obtaining by deception because, as they 
argue: "Regard must be had to the effect produced in the mind of P. There is a 
deal of give and take in commercial transactions and P is unlikely to be 
deceived by mere puffs. On the sale of a car it is though that D would not be 
guilty of deception when he asserts that the car is "a good runner" for no-one is 
really deceived by puffs of this kind. "O9) 
But the courts are now more ready than they formerly were to hold that a 
person who expresses an opinion on a particular matter impliedly states that he 
does hold that opinion, so that if it is so clear that he could not have held it, it 
will be deception. In Robertson v. Dicicco, (40) the defendant advertised a car as 
"... beautiful car... " he sold it to W who had seen the advertisement and found 
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the car's appearance pleasing to the eye. The car proved to be not roadworthy 
and unfit for use. The defendant was charged with contravening Section I (A) 
of the Trade Description Act 1968 which states "Any person who, in the course 
of a trade or business: - 
a) Applies a false trade description to any goods; or 
b) Supplies or offers to supply any goods to which a false trade description 
is applied; shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be guilty of an 
offence. " 
The Magistrates Court dismissed the charge on the grounds that the 
description was not a false trade description, but on the appeal, the Queen's 
Bench Divisional Court held, ".... that the description 'beautiful' when applied to 
a car was at least likely to be taken as being intended to refer to not only 
outside appearance but also the quality of running of the car. " So it was a false 
trade description. 
In Hawkins v. Smith (41) where an unroadworthy car was described as being in 
"showroom condition throughout", this was held to be not merely a trade "puff', 
but a false trade description because the words "showroom condition" even 
without the word "throughout" referred to the exterior, interior and mechanical 
condition of a vehicle. 
Furthermore, the decision of Nottingham Crown Court in R. v. King (42) suggests 
that a defendant (a garage proprietor) who knows a representation, such as the 
odometer reading on a motor car, to be untrue, but who states that it "may not 
be correct" implies that so far as he knows, it is correct, and thus commits a 
dishonest deception. 
Thus, it seems from the above cases that the term "deception" frees the courts 
from the fetters of the false pretences and extends to these kinds of cases. 
PROMISES AND PREDICTIONS 
One of the traditional limitations in the former statutory offence of obtaining by 
false pretences was that which confined the pretence to a statement of present 
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fact, thereby excluding representations which where either promissory or 
predictive. Although the promissory representation is a statement of present 
intention and the predictive representation also is a statement as to the present 
since it is a statement of present belief as to the occurrence of a future event. 
In Goodhall (43) it was held, on a case reserved, that to obtain meat, promising 
to pay for it but not so intending, was not obtaining by a "false pretence" under 
s. 1 of 30 Geo. 2-C. 24 (1757). The judges said that "it was merely a promise 
for future conduct, and common prudence and caution would have prevented 
any injury arising from the breach of it". 
The issue was equally clear-cut in R. v. Dent(`) where the Court of Criminal 
Appeal rejected an argument that the rule that a false statement of intention is 
a statement of fact giving rise to civil liability applied to criminal liability also. 
Therefore, a person who undertakes to do work for another and gets money 
from him on the false pretence that he intends to buy materials for the work, 
and keeps the money but also does not do the work, is not guilty of any 
offence. For a time after Dent's case this kind of cheating was successfully 
prosecuted as obtaining credit by fraud under s. 13(1) of the Debtors Act 
1869. (45) 
But in Fisher v. Raven (46) the House of Lords overruled Ingram and held that 
"Credit" was limited to credit in respect of the payment of money and not to 
obtaining credit in respect of the Performance of Services. In this case Lord 
Dilhorne L. C. said that the result of the decision might be that "Some 
fraudulent persons may escape justice" and that possible way of "closing this 
gap in the criminal law" would be "to change the law so that a false pretence 
need no longer be a pretence as to an existing fact". (47) 
The transaction which has given rise to the most discussion in the context of 
deception is that of writing a cheque (a document which on the face of it is only 
a command of a future act), it has been held (413) that drawing a cheque implies 
at least three statements about the present: 
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1) that the drawer of the cheque has an account at the bank on which it is 
drawn; 
2) that he has authority to draw on it for that amount; 
3) that the existing state of facts is such that in the ordinary course of 
events the cheque will on its future presentment be duly honoured. If 
either of these implied statements is untrue, there is a deception. (49) But 
the cheque will often be backed by a cheque card, which operates as an 
undertaking on the part of the bank to honour the cheque if the 
prescribed conditions are fulfilled. Even if the drawer of the cheque has 
no right to use the cheque card, it is impossible to convict on the basis of 
the representation that the cheque is likely to be honoured; it will be 
here too it is necessary to rely on a further representation. viz. that the 
drawer does have the bank's authority to use the card. (50 
Although, it is clear that English law chooses to treat the bad cheque as only a 
mode of deception, Iraq, France (51) and most European countries make them 
substantive offences. 
In Iraq, it is an offence to issue or make use of a bad cheque. The mere writing 
of a cheque without actually issuing or making use of it remains outside the 
Criminal Law. However, the situation in Iraq being what it is, the Iraqi 
Legislator has also enacted further measures aimed at preventing the use of 
bad cheques. Article 459 -1 of the Iraqi Penal Code states: 
"1) whoever knowingly and with a bad faith either issues a cheque for the 
payment of money without pre-existing sufficient and available cover, or 
after issuing, withdraws all or part of the cover, or prohibits the drawee 
from paying or he deliberately wrote or signed the cheque in such a way 
as to make it unacceptable by the drawee, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and a fine not 
exceeding 300 Iraqi dinar. 
2) Whoever knowingly endorses or passes a cheque without pre-existing, 
sufficient and available cover for it shall be punished by the same 
penalty. " 
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Thus, in Iraqi law there is no need to prove that the offender practices any 
fraudulent means to commit the bad cheques offences, because the cheque is 
not an instrument of credit, it is a veritable currency and in order to achieve the 
purpose assigned to it by law, it is necessary that it inspires full confidence in 
one who receives it. Issuing a bad cheque is like circulating counterfeit money, 
a thing which is serious both from the moral and economic point of view, and 
therefore regarded as calling for the criminal sanction as a last resort. (52) 
In England, according to the view of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, (53) 
the issue of a bad cheque is a promise of payment and therefore only a mode 
of deception. They reject the need for a specific offence and also take the view 
that the Criminal Law ought not to extend beyond cases where deception is 
practised with the intent never to pay. 
believe that it is better for the English law to adopt the Iraqi approach in this 
respect and after that there is no need to search for the deception in the bad 
cheque offences. 
English law is now settled by Section 15 (4) of the Theft Act 1968 which makes 
(deception) includes "a deception as to the present intentions of the persons 
using the deception or any other person". 
Thus, it is now a criminal offence to obtain property by making a promise that 
one has no intention of keeping. To establish such an offence it is vital to 
prove that the accused did not at the time of the obtaining have the intention 
that, from his words or conduct, appeared to have. 
If the accused originally intended to keep his promise (or it cannot be proved 
that he did not) his subsequent decision to break it, however dishonest, does 
not in itself constitute deception; but he may be guilty of deception if he fails to 
communicate his decision, particularly if he so conducts himself as to convey 
the impression that his intentions are unchanged (54) but care must be taken 
that this offence is not employed against the recalcitrant debtor. Mere failure to 
pay a debt is no proof of dishonest intent . 
(56) 
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THE OMISSION 
The crucial question in the English Criminal Law of fraud is whether the 
dishonest omission to correct a mistaken belief and other kinds of dishonest 
concealment should count as deception There are at least four possible 
situations that could be provided for: 
1. A's statement is true at the time it is made but later to his knowledge 
becomes false. 
2. A's statement is false when made but believed by him to be true at the 
time but afterwards discovers that the statement is false. 
3. A's statement may be true but he may know that the person to whom he 
made it has misunderstood it. 
4. A's concealment of a material fact. 
Before trying to answer the above questions, it has been mentioned that the 
common law has long shown a remarkable reluctance to impose criminal 
liability for omissions. Such liability, it has been said, is "incongeniaf' , 
(56) and 
this seems to be right because the imposition of liability for an omission implies 
a duty to act, it is an interference with the liberty of a person who wishes only to 
mind his own business and let others get on with minding theirs. (57) For this 
reason, the common law was slow to impose liability for omissions. (58) 
As far as the Crime of Fraud is concerned, it has been pointed out that a 
person can be guilty of deception by omission only where he has a duty of 
candour; such duties may be imposed by statute, contract, or by equitable 
principles; (59) and the criminal law cannot be heard to say that there is a duty of 
candour where the civil law says that he is entitled to remain silent. It may be 
dishonest to remain silent in such circumstances, but it is not deception. (60 
In the English law of contract, the general rule is that one party is under no 
duty to disclose material facts known to him but not to the other party. (61) A 
seller of goods for example, is under no duty to disclose the fact that his price 
is exorbitant; caveat emptor. Even if he has induced the buyer to believe that 
the price approximates to the market price, in the absence of any 
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representation to that effect the contract of sale is unimpeachable. (62) To 
provide expressly that omission should be criminal only when there is a duty in 
the civil law to make disclosure would be unwelcome to criminal lawyers who 
quite properly object to legislation by reference to the civil law. (63) So if the civil 
law says that there is an obligation to disclose a material fact, (as in the law of 
insurance, the obtaining of which by deception constitutes an offence) '(64) it 
does not follow that the criminal law must arrive at the same conclusion. (65) 
It is fair to say that if a duty of disclosure is to be imposed in the criminal law, 
this should be done expressly as it is stated in the American Model Penal 
Code, Section 231 (c and d) which provides that a person commits deception if 
he: 
"(c) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or 
reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he 
stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship. " 
Section 231 (d) adds that deception occurs where a person: 
"(d) fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim or other impediment to the 
enjoyment of property which he transfers or encumbers in consideration for the 
property obtained, whether such impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a 
matter of official record. " 
Section 231 (d) above is similar to Article 457 of the Iraqi Penal Code which 
states: 
"whoever disposes of real or moveable property knowing that he is not the 
owner of it or he has no disposal rights on it. Or he disposes of this property 
knowing he has previously disposed of the same, shall be punished with 
imprisonment which may extend to five years whenever this act injures any 
person. " 
So the American Model Penal Code and the Iraqi Penal Code by the above 
approach identify particular facts about which candour is necessary. 
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Moreover, some legislation states a general rule, that the dishonest 
concealment of facts is a deception, such as Section 148 of the Swiss Penal 
Code of 1937; Section 540 of the Moroccan Penal Code of 1962; Section 241 
of the Qatari Penal Code; and the explanation A on Section 357 of the 
Sudanese Penal Code of 1983. 
Some Swiss writers believe that there is a dishonest deception by concealment 
of facts only when the law imposes on the accused a duty of disclosure such a 
duty can be imposed by contract or by the bona fides principles. (66 However, 
deception in Swiss law may be effected by silence alone, i. e. by the dishonest 
omission to correct a mistaken belief of the victim which was not brought about 
by deception in the first place, but a case like that can be characterised as a 
special crime under Article 450 of the Iraqi Penal Code. (67 
In England the Criminal Law Revision Committee were unwilling to descend to 
detail about which kinds of omission or concealment should count as 
deception, recommending that the matter be left to the common law. (68) In this 
case the common law of crime, including such relevance of the civil law as the 
common law of crime may allow. (69 
There is no authority under the Theft Act 1968 as to whether a pure omission to 
undeceive can constitute deception. As matter of civil law, silence can amount 
to a misrepresentation. In R. v. Kylsant(70) the court held that, in relation to a 
change under s. 84 of the Larceny Act 1861, a written statement could be a 
deception not only because of what it stated, but also because of what it 
concealed, omitted or implied. 
On the other hand, the omission to correct a misapprehension which was not 
brought about by deception in the first place can be regarded as a deception. 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ray. (") The defendant had ordered a 
meal in a restaurant and had consumed it with an honest state of mind to pay 
for his meal. He then changed his mind and decided not to pay and to run out 
of the restaurant. Ten minutes later he did so, when the waiter was absent in 
the kitchen. 
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The House of Lords, held that the defendant had exercised a deception by 
remaining seated in the restaurant having decided not to pay. His remaining in 
this position created the implied and continuing representation that he was an 
honest customer who intended to pay the bill, thus inducing the waiters to leave 
the dining area unattended, giving him the opportunity to run off without paying. 
The above case is better to characterise as a dishonest evasion of an 
obligation to pay rather than deception, so I agree with the Divisional Court . 
(72, 
In Iraqi Law a case like that above can be characterised as a special crime 
under Article 449 of the Iraqi Penal Code which states: 
"Whoever consumes food or drink in a place which is set up as to 
provide this service, or resides in a hotel or hires a car, knowing that it is 
impossible for him to pay for the food, drink supplied or services, or 
making off without payment shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding three months or fine not exceeding 30 dinar. 11 
It is clear from this section that deception is not an essential ingredient of this 
offence. The English Law arrived at the same conclusion by creating the new 
offence of making off without payment. 
(73)b 
DECEPTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE A REPRESENTATION 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion about deception in English Law that the 
intention of the law is that deception should mean any false belief implanted by 
the defendant in the victim's mind; and if this is so, it should make no 
difference whether it was produced by means of false statement or by what may 
genetically be called a trick, as in the case of the card-shaper who keeps an 
ace up his sleeve, or a gambler who throws with loaded dice. However, these 
particular malpractices could be dealt with as offences under the Gaming Act 
1845, Section 17, which is a comprehensive provision covering all deceitful 
practices in relation to wagering on "any game, sport, pastime of exercise. " 
Moreover, it seems that even the mere omission or concealment which may 
arise could be regarded as deception in English Law. This conclusion can be 
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understood from what the Criminal Law Revision Committee stated about this 
issue as follows: 
"..... We are also satisfied that the definition in clause 12 (4) will provide 
sufficient guidance to the courts (in particular, owing to the words "any 
deception 
... 
by words or conduct" to enable them to decide whether anv 
case of omission or concealment which may arise should be regarded as 
deception. it (74) 
Thus, by comparison between the word "deception" in English Law and all the 
means by which the criminal fraud can be committed under Article 456 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code; it seems that the word deception is wide enough to cover all 
the fraudulent means in Article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code. Furthermore, it 
may cover the mere omission which is not covered by Article 456 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code. 
3.3.1.2 The Causal Link 
The other requirement of a relevant fraud charge under ss. 15 or 16 of the 1968 
Act or ss. 1 and s. 2 of the 1978 Act is that there must be a causal connection 
between the deception and the result. The result must have been brought 
about by the deception. This requirement can be clearly identified from the 
word "by' in the phrase "by any deception" which is repeated in the above 
sections. 
An obvious consequence of this element is that the following conditions should 
be implemented. 
1. The victim must be deceived as a result of the offender's deception. 
2. The parting with property or conferring of a pecuniary advantage as a 
result of the victim having been deceived. 
3. The victim should be deceived before he parts with the property or 
confers of a pecuniary advantage. 
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These conditions need to be considered separately. 
1. The victim must be deceived as a result of the offender's deception. 
It has been decided by many authorities that "For a deception to take place 
there must be some person or persons who will have been deceived. j V5) 
This means that the victim must be induced into the affirmative belief that 
something is true which is actually false. (76 
This is not to suggest that the victim must be totally convinced of the truth of 
the accused's representation, it is enough if, although he has certain doubts 
about its truth, he nevertheless accepts it and acts on it. (") 
So if the victim knows that the statement is false (78) or he does not read or hear 
the false statement, or if the false statement in a letter fails to arrive, the 
accused is not guilty of deception in each of these cases. However, a 
conviction of attempted deception would be possible. (79 
Deceit can be practised only on a human mind, (80) it is not possible to deceive a 
machine. ý81ý 
Nevertheless, it can be larceny to get cigarettes from a machine by using a 
brass disc instead of a coin. (82) 
In contrast to the old rule of Common Law, (83) it is of course no defence to a 
charge of criminal deception that the victim, to put it bluntly, was a fool to be 
deceived. (84) 
2. The parting with property or conferring of a pecuniary advantage as 
a result of the victim having been deceived. 
According to this requirement, the belief caused by the deception should be the 
factor operating on the victim's mind as an inducement to part with the property 
or conferring of a pecuniary advantage. (85 
The question whether the deception is an effective cause of the obtaining is a 
question of fact. (86) 
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In Sullivan, (87) D's conviction was upheld where he sold dart boards advertising 
himself as the "actual maker" of them. This was a lie because he was not the 
maker but it is difficult to see how this lie would have induced the purchasers to 
buy the dart boards. 
In this case though, none of the customers gave evidence that they were 
anxious to buy dart boards from the manufacturer rather than anyone else. 
They might have been more cautious of parting with their money if they had 
known that one of the statements in the advertisement was a downright lie. (88) 
In Rashid, (89) a British Rail steward was found in possession of sliced loaves 
and a bag of tomatoes when about to board a train. On a charge of going 
equipped to cheat contrary to s. 25, the prosecution's case was that the 
accused intended to obtain money from passengers by passing off his own 
sandwiches as those of British Rail and pocket the proceeds. The conviction 
was quashed owing to various misdirections but the court was of the opinion 
that the offence could be proved only if an effective and operative deception 
was practised without which the passengers would not have purchased the 
accused's sandwiches. 
The Court of Appeal held in this case that: 
`7t would be a matter of complete indifference to a railway passenger 
whether the materials used in making a sandwich were materials 
belonging to British Rail or materials belonging to the steward employed 
by British Rail, so long as the sandwich was palatably fresh and sold at a 
reasonable price. Who knows, but the steward's sandwiches might have 
been fresher than British Rail's? '490 
But in Doukas(91) the Court of Appeal, on facts essentially similar to Rashid, 
declined to follow the opinion expressed in that case. A waiter was found 
carrying to his place of employment wine that he intended to sell to his 
employer's customers under the pretence that it belonged to the employer. He 
was convicted of going equipped to cheat, that is to say to obtain money by 
deception; and the conviction was upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal 
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scouted the notion that the customers might not have cared who supplied the 
wine they were consuming, the probability being that they would have objected 
to taking part in fraud being conducted by the waiter against his employers. 
Moreover, acute problems of causation in England have arisen in relation to 
cheque and credit card `fraud'. It will be recalled that the user of such cards 
impliedly represents that his use of the card is authorised by the bank or credit 
card company. (92) 
Where the user is overdrawn, or has exceeded his credit limit, it has been 
held (93) that his implied representation of authority is falsified, and that since the 
person from whom he is purchasing goods would not have completed the 
transaction had he known the true situation, there is criminal deception. 
The decisions in Charles and Lambie have been subject to criticism. (94 
A shop assistant, runs the argument, generally gives no thought to the question 
of the card-holder's relationship with his bank or credit card company. The 
assistant is concerned only to ensure that the shop is paid. He is induced to 
accept the cheque or credit card not by any misrepresentation, but by his 
knowledge that provided the card is not on the `stop list' of stolen cards, and 
that the correct procedures are followed, the shop will be paid. 
Moreover, in both Charles and Lambie the House of Lords did not question the 
requirement that the deception must cause the obtaining. (95) 
I think it is more practical to resolve the problem regarding cheques and credit 
card fraud, by the creation of a statutory offence regarding the misuse of 
cheques and credit cards without the need for looking for the elements of 
deception or causal link or any legal fiction. This is the solution which is 
adopted in France and Iraq as we have seen previously. 
Thus, "The deception must be a reason for the victim's action, " but it need not 
be the only reason, or even the main reason. (96) 
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In some cases, the deception is the only reason for the result. In Etim v. 
Hatfield (97) where the accused produced to a post office clerk a false 
declaration that he was entitled to supplementary benefit and was granted 
£10.60, but no post office employee gave evidence, it was upheld that the 
accused was rightly convicted because there was no conceivable reason for 
the payment other than the false statement. 
In another case, the accused obtained money from the victim by representing, 
falsely, that he holds high military rank, and by representing, truly, that the 
money is required for investment in a company. His deception may be held to 
be an effective cause of P's parting with his money since he parts with it on the 
basis that D is a man of standing. (98) 
The decisive question may arise in the deception to induce the victim to enter 
into a contract, with the effect either that property will automatically pass on to 
the offender (as under many contracts for the sale of goods) or that the victim 
will subsequently transfer property in performance of the contract, after a 
considerable lapse of time. The intervention of a contract between the 
deception and obtaining of property will not normally affect liability to a 
conviction as far as the deception was itself an operative factor at the time the 
property was transferred. (99) 
Remoteness 
In some cases deception has some effect on the chain of events leading up to 
the criminal result, the result will not have been obtained by the deception if the 
intervening events were such a predominant factor that the deception can be 
treated as merely part of the background. (100 
Thus, in R. v. Clucas('o') it was held that one who induces a bookmaker to 
accept a large bet upon a horse by falsely pretending that he is a commission 
agent acting on behalf of a number of persons laying small bets does not by the 
pretence obtain the sums paid when the horse wins. It is the backing of the 
winning horse which is "the effective cause" of the payment. 
(102) In other words, 
the pretence was too remote a cause of the obtaining to justify a conviction. 
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(But a conviction of conspiracy to defraud was obtained on the full facts of the 
case and such conduct would now amount to obtaining a pecuniary advantage 
by deception). 103) 
But in Button (104 an able runner obtained a big handicap in a race by 
pretending to be E, a runner with a poor record, and won the race. He was 
held guilty of attempting to obtain the prize by false pretences. Matthew J 
described the pretence as "not too remote; ). 
(105) 
Moreover, a person who obtains an appointment by deception cannot be 
convicted of obtaining his salary by deception; for the salary is paid to him for 
the services he has rendered and not because of his deception, which merely 
gave him the opportunity to earn the money. (106 
3. The victim should be deceived before he parts with the property or 
confers of a pecuniary advantage. 
As we have seen before, the fraudulent result should be brought about by 
deception. This obviously cannot be so if the result was obtained before the 
deception took place. So where D bought petrol, and then on being asked by 
the attendant whether it was to be charged to D's firm, replied that it was and it 
was so charged, it was held that D could not be convicted on that 
representation of obtaining the petrol by deception because D had already 
obtained ownership and possession of the petrol before the representation was 
made. (107) But in a case like that D might today be convicted of evading a 
liability (debt) by deception. 
3.3.1.3. THE GENERAL MENS REA OF FRAUD IN ENGLISH LAW 
The mens rea means the mental element which is necessary for the particular 
crime and this mental element can be either intention to do the forbidden act or 
bring about the consequence or (in some crimes) recklessness as to such act 
or consequence. It does not generally require a dishonest intent or intent to 
defraud. (108) 
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As far as the crime of fraud is concerned, the elements of mens rea which are 
common to the offences under ss. 15 and 16, of the Theft Act 1968 and ss. 1 
and 2 of the Theft Act 1978, the making of a deliberate or reckless deception 
and dishonesty. In addition, the offence under s. 15 requires an intention 
permanently to deprive and an intention to obtain the property. 
In this section, we will deal with the common elements of mens rea in fraud in 
English law and we will deal with the extra required elements when we deal 
with the crimes which involved deception separately. 
Deliberate or Reckless Deception. 
Section 15(4) of the Theft Act states that the defendant must intend to deceive 
or be reckless as to whether he deceives. 
Intentional Deception 
The intent to deceive relates to the dishonest state of mind of the accused to 
the state of mind of his victim. There is an intent to deceive within the meaning 
of the Act when the accused himself knows or believes that his statement is 
untrue but he wants it to be believed as true by his victim. Obviously whether 
or not that intention is present is a question of fact, intent in this matter at least, 
being a thoroughly subjective question. It is a question of what the accused 
intended, not of what a non-existent hypothetical reasonable man would have 
intended, though the intent may be inferred from behaviour. (109) 
The significance of the representation is therefore as an index to the intent. ("0) 
If the accused makes a representation which he believes to be untrue but 
which unknown to him is truthful, he could, despite the fact that there is in 
reality no deception, be convicted of attempting to obtain property by 
deception, on the basis that he has taken steps that he believes to be more 
than merely preparatory to obtaining property by deception. 111) 
The requirement of criminal intention in fraud may be split into two elements 
which are the intention required in relation to the false representation as 
201 
explained as above and that in relation to the result, in other words, he must 
have intended thereby to bring about the result. 
So by stipulating the deliberate deception, the crime of fraud in England can be 
regarded as `intentional crime' which brings it into line with Iraqi law. 
Recklessness 
As we mentioned shortly before, reckless deception can be regarded as a 
mental element in the crime of fraud in English law. 
Recklessness as to consequence occurs when the accused does not desire the 
consequence but predicts the possibility and consciously takes the risk. (112) 
Recklessness is like intention in that the consequence is foreseen, but the 
difference is that whereas in intention the consequence is desired, or is 
foreseen as a certainty, in recklessness it is foreseen as possibly or probably 
but not desired. It has been said that if the consequence is foreseen as morally 
certain it is taken to be intended. Recklessness occurs where the 
consequence is foreseen not as morally or substantially certain but only as 
"probable" or "likely" or perhaps merely "possible". For many crimes 
recklessness is classed with intention. (113) 
It is worth mentioning here that the Iraqi Penal Code regards recklessness in 
this concept as "probable intention" which is equivalent to criminal intention. 
Article 34 of the Iraqi Penal Code states - "The crime is said to be intentional 
crime if a person commits it intentionally or 
A. 
.......... 
B. If he expects that his act is likely to cause criminal results, nevertheless 
. 11 consciously, accepts taking the risk" 
So recklessness is the deliberate taking of an unjustifiable risk. It involves a 
ý"aý subjective awareness which is absent from negligence. 
Therefore, a negligent misstatement is an insufficient mental element in the 
crime of fraud. Furthermore, it was settled that it is inapplicable also even for 
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civil cases by the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek (15) in which 
Lord Herschell said "To make a statement careless whether it be true or false, 
and therefore without real belief in its truth, appears to me to be an essentially 
different thing from making, through want of care, a false statement, which is 
nevertheless honestly believed to be true ýý_ý116) 
In R. v Staines ("') The Court of Appeal accepted that recklessness in this 
context involved more than simple carelessness, negligence on the part of the 
defendant, and amounts to indifference as to whether a statement was true or 
false. 
Thus, in the Crime of Fraud the accused must know that his representation is 
false (or be reckless whether it is) and that he must intend the victim to be 
deceived by it (or be reckless whether he is), and the test of reckless here is 
subjective. 
(118) 
The subjective test of recklessness was given a wider concept under the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 by the House of Lords decision in R v. Caldwell. ("9) 
This decision states that "the meaning of "reckless" in Section 9 of the Act was 
that which it bore in ordinary speech, including not only deciding to ignore a risk 
or harmful consequences resulting from one's acts that one has recognised as 
existing but also failing to give any thought to whether or not there was any 
such risk in circumstances where, if any thought were given to the matter, it 
would be obvious that there was, " 
It seems from this decision that in order to decide whether there is "obvious" 
risk or not we should consider whether any ordinary, prudent person would 
have realised there was a risk, and, if he would, it makes no difference what the 
defendant thought, because he is guilty whether he realised there was a risk or 
not. So this test added an objective element to the subjective test. The 
Caldwell test for recklessness has been stated to be of general application. (120 
Accordingly, the test requires us to envisage a person who has given no 
thought to the possibility that his statement might be untrue. Such a person is, 
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according to Caldwell, reckless. In any event, it seems unlikely that a 
defendant could have failed to realise that there was an obvious risk that he 
might be deceiving another and yet at the same time be dishonest. ""' 
Under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, shady traders are normally changed, 
as the offences are primarily of strict liability, which save the prosecution the 
trouble of proving knowledge or recklessness. (122) 
DISHONESTY 
Dishonesty is an element in many crimes such as theft, robbery, abstracting 
electricity, false accounting, procuring the executing of a valuable security and 
handling stolen goods; in most cases of burglary; in all cases of obtaining 
property, services or a pecuniary advantage by deception, of evasion of liability 
by deception and of making off without payment; and whenever an intent or 
(123) agreement to defraud is alleged. 
There is no exhaustive definition of dishonesty provided by the Theft Act but we 
found in some other legal systems legal definition has been provided for 
"dishonesty' which has a general application such as Article 18 of the 
Sudanese Penal Code which states: "A person is said to do a thing 
"dishonestly" who does that thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain to 
himself or another or of causing wrongful loss to any other person.; (124) 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee felt that the word dishonesty is very 
clear by saying: 
"... "dishonesty" seems to us a better word than "Fraudulently". The 
question "was this dishonesty? " is easier for a jury to answer than the 
question "was this fraudulent? ". "Dishonesty" is something which laymen 
can easily recognise when they see it, whereas "Fraud" may seem to 
involve technicalities which have to be explained by a lawyer ... 
-x(125) 
Although some members of the Committee preferred not to define "dishonesty', 
the Committee decided on a partial negative definition, (126) for the purpose of 
offences involving theft. S. 2 of the Theft Act accordingly provides: 
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"(1) A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be 
regarded as dishonest: 
(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to 
deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or 
(b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the 
other's consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the 
circumstances of it; or 
(C) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal 
representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the 
person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking 
reasonable steps. " 
It must be noted that this partial definition of dishonesty is made to apply to 
theft only and not to the other offences of dishonesty contained in the Act. (127) 
The reason behind that is S. 2. is drafted for the purposes of theft and most of it 
has little application to the other offences - though section 2 (1) (a), the claim 
of right provision, could be applied to the offence of obtaining property by 
deception. (128) If the word "obtains" were substituted for "appropriate". It is 
submitted that although s. 2 (1)a does not strictly apply to the deception 
offences, they should nevertheless be construed in the light of it and by 
analogy with it i. e. that it is not an offence to obtain by deception something to 
which one believes oneself legally entitled. (129) And this was the intention of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee when they said: 
"Owing to the words `dishonestly obtains' a person who uses deception 
in order to obtain property to which he believes himself entitled will not 
be guilty; for though the deception may be dishonest, the obtaining is 
not. In this respect .... 
the offence will be in line with theft, because a 
belief in a legal right to deprive an owner of property is for the purpose of 
theft inconsistent with dishonesty and is specifically made a defence by 
the partial definition of `dishonestly' in [s. ] 2 (1) (a). The partial definition 
in Is. ] 2 (1) is not repeated in [s. 15 (I)]. It would be only partly applicable 
to the offence of criminal deception, and it seems unnecessary and 
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undesirable to complicate the [Act] by including a separate definition in 
[s]" (15) (130) 
And no doubt the same general considerations apply to s. 16 and to ss. 1 and 2 
of the 1978 Act. 
The claim of right is a defence based on what the defendant believes his legal 
rights to be. 
A person who believes that he has a legal right to act as he does could hardly 
be described as acting "fraudulently' in the ordinary sense of the word, and the 
law has generally accepted "claim of right" as a defence to a charge of an 
offence involving fraud. As Stephen put it: 
"Fraud is inconsistent with a claim of right made in good faith to do the 
act complained of. A man who takes possession of property which he 
really believes to be his own does not take it fraudulently, however 
unfounded his claim may be" (131) 
In the law of larceny the defence was not confined to a defendant who believed 
the property to be his own: it was sufficient if for any reason he thought he was 
entitled to take it(132) and even if it must have been obvious to him that he was 
not entitled to take it in the way he did (e. g. by force). (133) There was no need 
for his belief to be correct or even reasonable. (134) 
Ignorance of the law may not be a defence but it can hardly be a base of 
Criminal liability. (135) The question of claim of right or entitlement as a defence 
to a charge of fraud may arise, if the accused deceives someone into giving 
him his own property back, assuming for the moment that the property is 
unencumbered by pledge or lien, or into paying him money which is lawfully 
due to him. It seems in these cases that a genuine belief on the part of the 
accused that he has a right to the property so obtained, even though the belief 
is mistaken in fact or in law, should be a good defence. (136) 
There are similar cases from the Iraqi courts suggesting that it is a good 
defence to a charge of fraud on the grounds of claim of right where the 
206 
defendant employs a deception to secure the payment of a debt(137) but the 
French Appeal Court in one case decided that the creditor who steals two rugs 
from his debtor commits theft and the accused's defence that he did not intend 
to deprive his victim of his rugs but only to secure the payment of a debt was 
not acceptable, (138) and a lot of Arabic writers share the same view as the 
French court because the creditor has only a personal (civil) right towards his 
debtor and not pawn rights and the motive of the accused is irrelevant. (139 
Furthermore, it was no defence to a charge of obtaining by false pretences that 
the goods given were value for the money paid, if the goods were not what the 
victim was led to believe he was getting. (140 
Apart from the situations which are covered by the partial definition of 
dishonesty, there are other situations where the question of dishonesty may be 
said to be at large. The Theft Act offers no guidance on the matter. 
At first, the judges treated the concept of dishonesty as one of law (141) but this 
position was changed drastically and decisively by the Court of Appeal in 
Feely, (142) a theft case. Lawton J, speaking for the court, said : 
"We do not agree that judges should define what `dishonesty' means. 
This word is in common use whereas the word `fraudulently' which was 
used in section I (1) of the Larceny Act 1916 has acquired as a result of 
case law a special meaning. Jurors, when deciding whether an 
appropriation was dishonest can reasonably be expected to, and should 
apply the current standards of ordinary decent folk. In their own lives, 
they have to decide what is and what is not dishonest. We can see no 
reason why, when in a jury box, they should require the help of a judge 
to tell them what amounts to dishonesty. ' 
(143) 
It is clear that this case adopts the objective approach of the test of dishonesty 
but there is criticism of this approach as there is no such thing as "the 
standards of ordinary decent people. " Although most people will unite in 
condemning or in tolerating some forms of behaviour, there are others as to 
which considerable divergence of view will exist and that obvious difficulty the 
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juries must cope with, (1«) but Feely was on many occasions accepted by 
judges as correctly stating the law. (145) 
In Boggein v. Williams (146 a case of dishonesty abstracting electricity, contrary 
to section 13 of the Theft Act 1968, Lloyd J said that the defendant's own belief 
as to the honesty or dishonesty of his conduct as "not only relevant, but 
crucial", (147) and the other members of the court expressed agreement with his 
judgement. So the approach in this case is a subjective one. 
In Ghosh the jury must first ask whether what was done was dishonest by the 
ordinary standards of reasonable and decent people. If not the prosecution 
failed. If the conduct was dishonest by those standards, the jury had to 
consider whether the accused realised that, i. e. that what he was doing was 
dishonest by those standards. If he did realise that, his own standards were 
irrelevant. If he did not realise that, i. e. if he thought his own view coincided 
with the view of ordinary decent people, he must be acquitted. (1'18) This is a 
curious variation of the law laid down in Landy. (149) According to that case, it is 
the defendant's view of the honesty of his conduct which is crucial, the plain 
man's view is only relevant in helping the jury to establish what the defendant's 
view was. According to Ghosh, it is the defendant's belief about the plain 
man's view which matters; his own view of his honesty is only relevant in 
helping the jury to establish what that belief was. 
The solution adopted in Ghosh was a compromise between the totally objective 
approach, and the totally subjective view of dishonesty, but there is some 
criticism tf Ghosh's question as it allows a defendant to claim that he did not 
know that his conduct would be regarded as "dishonest" because he thought 
that right-thinking people would approve of it on moral grounds. (150) Moreover, 
the test is more complex than any previously devised by the courts and it does 
not provide a clarification of the Iaw, 
(151) but there are some writers who 
welcome the decision in Ghosh. (152ý 
In R. v. Price ('0) the Appeal Court held that: 
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"It was by no means in every case involving dishonesty that a Ghosh 
direction was necessary. In the majority of cases, of which the instant 
case was one it was both unnecessary and potentially misleading to give 
such a direction. It need only be given in cases where the defendant 
might have believed that what he was alleged to have done was in 
accordance with the ordinary person's idea of honesty". (154) 
The principle above was repeated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. O'Connell, 
(155) a case about obtaining mortgages from the building societies by deception 
in which the Court of Appeal held that "Although an intention to repay could not 
itself amount to a defence, it might be some evidence of honesty. " 
3.3.1.4 OBTAINING PROPERTY BY DECEPTION 
By s. 15(1) of The Theft Act 1968. The dishonest obtaining by deception of 
property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the 
other of it, is punishable on conviction on indictment with ten years' 
imprisonment. 
So in addition to proving deception as we studied it before, (156) the prosecution 
must prove that it resulted in the accused obtaining property belonging to 
another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it so each of the 
above elements requires separate consideration. 
1. Property belonging to another. 
"Property' is defined, partially at least, by section 4(1) of the Theft Act 1968: 
"Property' includes money and all other property, real or personal, including 
things in action and other intangible property. " 
The above definition is made to apply generally for purposes of the Act by 
Section 34 (1). 
Thus, whatever can be transferred by one person to another as property is in 
practice within Section 15, for deception can induce its transfer. 
209 
Real property (land) is expressly included in the term "property'. Although land 
cannot generally be stolen by the limitations imposed by S. 4 on property which 
may be stolen, this exception is not stated for the deception offence. (157) 
Consequently, it is an offence under section 15(1) to obtain a conveyance of 
land by deception, or to obtain the possession of land by deception if there is 
an intent to deprive the owner permanently. 
In this point, English Law is wider than French, (158) Iraqi (159) and Egyptian Penal 
Codes (160) because according to these codes land cannot be stolen or obtained 
by fraud but the deed which represents the title to the land, can be stolen or 
obtained by fraud as it is a moveable property. (161) 
believe English law is preferable to our law in this matter because land can be 
transferred illegally and there is no justification of excluding it from the property 
which can be stolen or obtained by fraud. (162) 
"Property" also includes "things in action and other intangible property". e. g. 
debts, company shares and intellectual property such as copyrights and 
patents. To deceive the owner of such an asset into assigning it might 
therefore amount to an offence of obtaining property by deception. 
The property obtained must be property "belonging to another" at the time of 
obtaining. The wide definition of this phrase in section 5 (1) of the Theft Act is 
also made to apply here by section 84 (1). 
Section 5(1) of the Theft Act provides: 
"Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having 
possession or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest 
(not being an equitable interest arising only from an agreement to 
transfer or grant an interest). " 
So the above definition is widely defined to include almost any legally 
recognised interest in property. H may be guilty of obtaining by deception his 
own property if another person, C, has any proprietary interest 
in it but if H 
owns the entire proprietary interest in the thing he cannot obtain it by 
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deception, H cannot obtain for himself. There is no "property belonging to 
another" for him to obtain. 
Since the law protects all interests in property, it is clear that a person with a 
greater interest in a specific property can be guilty of obtaining it by deception 
from a person with lesser interest in the same property. (163) 
Thus, an owner in the strict sense can be guilty of obtaining his own property 
by deception from one who has mere possession or custody of it. 
By comparison between English law and Iraqi law in regard to the property 
belonging to another we have seen that in Iraqi law Article 456 also demands 
that the property should belong to another in the crime of fraud but the 
difference is, the term belonging to another is not as wide as the same term in 
English law. In Iraqi law, it is not a crime of fraud for the owner to obtain by 
deception his own chattel from the person who has the mere possession or 
custody of it, because the requirement in Iraqi law in the strict sense is that the 
property in question must belong to a person other than the defendant before 
he obtains it, and in this situation it is still belonging to the defendant himself 
but if P has the possession or control of Qs goods, and D by deception induces 
P to part with the goods, intending to possess the goods himself, he will have 
committed fraud and P who is deceived here is the victim although the property 
of the goods belongs to Q. 
However, the Iraqi law takes a similar direction to the English law in regard to 
the crime of theft by extending the concept of the term belonging to another in 
the definition of the crime of theft in Article 439 to include the appropriation of 
the chattel which is under the judicial or administrative seizure or the chattel 
which the other has any proprietary interest in, even if the appropriation is 
committed by the owner of it himself but this extended meaning of belonging to 
another is not applied for the purpose of the crime of fraud in Iraqi law which I 
believe is a loophole in our law. 
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2. Obtaining 
The feature which distinguishes theft from obtaining property by deception is 
the nature of the act required on the defendant's part. In obtaining by 
deception he must obviously obtain the property. In the majority of situations 
the victims will have been deceived into consenting to the defendant taking the 
property; in some cases the defendant may even acquire a voidable title. (164 
In this respect, this crime does not cover the deceptions that are known to 
cause a loss to the victim without resulting in some obtaining of property by the 
defendant or another. (165) 
The meaning of `obtaining property' must be understood in a wide sense 
according to subsection 15(2) of the Theft Act which provides: 
"For the purposes of this section a person is to be treated as obtaining 
property if he obtains ownership, possession or control of it, and `obtain' 
includes obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain or retain. " 
Usually the defendant obtains ownership, possession and control of the 
property but the obtaining of any one of these suffices. This direction is the 
same for the fraud in Iraqi law as we have seen. (166 Thus, the offence is 
committed where the defendant induces his victim to lend property, make a gift 
of it, or sell it to him, provided the defendant has the necessary mens rea at the 
time. 
Sometimes the obtaining can be completed without moving the property from its 
place as in the cases of sale of goods. So if the defendant by deception 
induces his victim to enter into an unconditional contract to sell to the 
defendant specific goods in a deliverable state, the offence is complete 
although the goods never leave the victim's possession. The ownership of the 
goods passes as soon as the contract is made and it is immaterial that the time 
of payment and of delivery is postponed. (167 
Provided the causal connection is made out it is irrelevant that the person 
deceived is not the person from whom the property was obtained. Thus, if an 
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insurance agent deceives someone into entering into an insurance contract 
with the X insurance company, as a result of which the X company pays him 
commission, he can be charged with obtaining commission by deception. 
In some cases the defendant is lawfully in possession the victim's goods, such 
as a bailee; so if he dishonestly by deception induces the victim to sell him the 
goods the offence is complete when the ownership passes to the defendant. (168) 
Most often D will obtain the goods for himself but the offence is also committed 
where D obtains for another or enables another to obtain or retain. (169 
So there is obtaining for another, as where the accused gets money sent to a 
third party (possibly an innocent person) by deception, while enabling another 
to obtain as where the accused by deception persuades A to enter into a 
contract with B under which B receives money from A. (170) 
Or by faking his own death so that his spouse can claim on a life insurance 
ý"'ý policy. 
To enable another to retain property can be applied to the situation where the 
defendant induces his victim to allow a third party to retain some interest which 
the third party already has without transferring any new interest to him such as 
if the defendant by deception and with the appropriate intent, induces his victim 
not to terminate a third party's possession or custody of the victim's goods. (172) 
It is worth mentioning at this point that Iraqi law is similar to English law in the 
case of obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain but it is not enough 
in Iraqi law as a result for the crime of fraud to enable another to retain except 
in special cases where the offender induces his victims to hand over or transfer 
possession of debenture deed, disposal deed or deed of release or other deed 
which can be used as evidence for the property rights or any other real rights or 
uses the deception to convince the victim to sign a similar deed or revoke it, 
spoil it or modify it, as the result of this kind of fraud may lead to (enable 
another to retain the possession or custody of the victim's property. (173) 
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3. "The intention of permanently depriving the other of it". 
On a charge of obtaining property by deception it must be proved that, in 
addition to the elements of deliberate or reckless deception and dishonesty as 
a general mens rea which have been discussed before, (174) the defendant must 
at the time of the obtaining the property intended permanently to deprive the 
victim of it. The phrase: "with the intention of permanently depriving the other of 
it" is partially defined for the purpose of theft by Section 6. By section 15 (3) 
that section is made to apply also for purposes of section 15 "with the 
necessary adaptation of the reference to appropriating. " Section 6 should 
therefore be read again at this point, but as though for the word "appropriating" 
in section 6 (1) there were substituted the words "obtaining by deception. " 
Section 6(1) of the Theft Act 1968 states: 
"A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning 
the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be 
regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it 
if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of 
the other's rights; and borrowing or lending of it may amount to so 
treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in 
circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. 11 
The Theft Act by Section 6(1) preserves - with a few exceptions - the rule of the 
common law and of the Larceny Act 1916 that appropriating the property of 
another with the intention of depriving him only temporarily of its is not 
stealing. 
175) 
In general the defendant obtains the property with the intention of permanently 
depriving his victim of it as in the case of disposing of the property regardless 
of the owner's rights where he takes the victim's car and sells it to a third party. 
The offender would be deemed to have the intention of permanently depriving 
his victim, even though his only thought was of gaining money from the third 
party. (176) 
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Moreover, where the offender will only allow his victim to have his property 
back if he complies with some other condition, such as if he pays for it 
"ransom", intentions like that may be within. Section 6(10). ("') 
In the borrowing cases by deception, the borrower, by definition, intends to 
return the thing. So there is no obtaining property by deception, but the 
borrower may be regarded as having the intention of depriving the owner 
permanently, regardless of the other's rights if his intention is to treat the thing 
as his own to dispose of. In such cases there is obtaining property by 
deception in cases where the taker intends not to return the thing until the 
virtue is gone out of it. Obtaining P's dry battery, intending to return it to P 
when it is exhausted; or P's season ticket, intending to return it to P when the 
season is over. Furthermore, if D obtains Ps car by deception and intends to 
keep it for ten years then returns it to P, he has obtained it by deception 
because by this is time it can no longer be described as a car, but is scrap 
metal. 
It seems to me from the above examples that the expression "treat the things as 
his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights" is wider than the phrase 
"with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it" Thus, it is enough if 
the Act requires the first expression only as a special mens rea in theft and 
obtaining property by deception. By comparison with Iraqi law, we have 
seen (178) that some writers in Iraq adopt the French and Egyptian writers ideas 
which stipulate a special criminal intention in the crime of fraud. This is the 
intention of the victim to treat the property obtained as his own and this 
expression is better than the "intention of permanently depriving. " 
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3.3.2 SCRUTINISING MARITIME FRAUD UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
3.3.2.1 DOCUMENTARY FRAUD UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
As we have seen from the foregoing discussion about documentary fraud, (') 
this type of fraud involves the use of commercial documents related to an 
international sale transaction such as a bill of lading (B/L), certificate of 
origin or invoices, etc. which have been fabricated or altered with a view to 
misleading another party to the transaction. It will almost invariably involve 
the commission of the offences of deception discussed before in English 
Law. (2) Moreover, it is quite common that Maritime Fraud on a large scale, is 
committed by more than one person because this kind of crime usually 
requires careful planning; in such cases the crime of conspiracy or 
conspiracy to defraud in English Law could be properly charged. But the 
element of false documentation may bring other offences such as forgery 
into play - so consideration will be given to the crime of conspiracy to 
defraud then the crime of forgery and after that every type of documentary 
fraud will be scrutinised according to the above crimes. Any other relevant 
crime will be considered if it is applicable. 
CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD 
Conspiracy to defraud is one of the common law forms of conspiracy to 
survive the enactment of the Criminal Law Act 1977. (3) An agreement to 
commit a substantive criminal offence would normally be charged as a 
statutory conspiracy contrary to the 1977 Act. (4) 
This is a fact that calls into question the reason for the continued existence 
of this form of the common law offence. The Law Commission in its report(5) 
advances the view that such offences shall continue in existence at least 
until its general review of dishonesty offences is completed. 
Among the practical reasons on which the Law Commission relies are its 
usefulness as residual charge. It can be used against defendants who 
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agree upon a course of conduct which, if carried out by an individual might 
not result in a consequence actually prohibited by Criminal Law. (6 
The decision of the House of Lords in 1974 in Scott v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner (7) provides the source of the generally accepted definitions of 
conspiracy to defraud. In that case, Viscount Dilhorne said: 
"... in my opinion it is clearly the law that an agreement by two or more 
by dishonesty to deprive a person of something which is his or to 
which he is or would be or might be entitled and an agreement by two 
or more by dishonesty to injury some proprietary right of his, suffices 
to constitute the offence of conspiracy to defraud. '(8) 
It is clear from the above case that: The offence is complete when the 
agreement is made it is immaterial that nothing is done to implement the 
conspiracy or that what is done is different from what was agreed. (9) 
ACTUS REUS 
Agreement 
The parties to a conspiracy must be proved to have agreed on a course of 
conduct. Only rarely will the prosecution have direct evidence of an 
agreement, perhaps in the form of letters or tapes of telephone 
conversations, most conspirators wishing to avoid any permanent record of 
their plans coming into existence. (10 
The idea of an agreement seems to involve a meeting of minds, and there is 
no need for a physical meeting of the persons involved so long as they reach 
a mutual understanding of what is to be done. (") 
In general, the rules determining what constitutes an agreement for the 
purpose of conspiracy to defraud are similar to those relating to statutory 
conspiracy. (12) 
The mens rea of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant intended to 
agree on the commission of a particular offence, and proof of an intention 
that this agreement should be carried out. 
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The remaining ingredient of the crime of conspiracy to defraud is that the 
defendants must act dishonestly. Although the offence of conspiracy to 
defraud long antedates the Theft Act 1968, "dishonesty' has been held to 
mean the same in this context as in that Act. (13) 
Where the intended victim of the conspiracy is a public servant, it is 
sufficient that the defendants intend to deceive him into contravening his 
duty. There is no need in such cases to show any intention of causing 
economic loss to another. (14 
Earlier authorities include, e. g. Board of Trade v. Owen (1957) AC 602 
(agreement to induce a public official, by deception, to grant an export 
licence); and Terry (1984) AC 374 (the defendant used an excise licence, 
intending police officers to act on the incorrect assumption that it belonged 
to his vehicle: his intention to pay the licence fee was immaterial). 
Conspiracy to defraud is triable only on indictment. It attracts a maximum 
penalty (which was formerly at large) of ten years' imprisonment. (15) 
It seems from the foregoing discussion that there is some overlap between 
statutory conspiracy and the conspiracy to defraud at common law. So can 
the prosecution choose which form of conspiracy to charge? 
In R. v. Ayers, (16 The House of Lords held that common law conspiracy to 
defraud should only be charged where the agreement was one which, if 
carried out, would not necessarily result in the commission of a substantive 
criminal offence by any of the conspirators. 
In Cooke(") Lord Bridge recognised the need to "modify the language" he 
had used in Ayres to avoid some of the difficulties which that decision had 
caused. The House of Lords held that, where it could be shown that there 
had been an agreed course of fraudulent conduct going beyond an 
agreement to commit specific offences, it was legitimate to charge either 
conspiracy to defraud on its own or both conspiracy to defraud and a 
statutory conspiracy to commit the specific offences. 
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Following the review by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, (18) 
Parliament has reversed its earlier decision, as confirmed in Ayres, and 
provided that conspiracy to defraud can be charged, albeit that some other 
offence was committed. (19) 
There is an important safeguard for defendants in the form of guidance given 
to prosecutors by the Director of Public Prosecutions as to the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to charge conspiracy to defraud 
rather than substantive offences. The guidance appears in the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors. (20) 
The most recent version of the Code, published in June 1994, is in much 
less detailed terms than its predecessor and contains no specific reference 
to conspiracy to defraud. The promulgation of the revised Code does not, 
however, affect the approach of Crown Prosecutors in deciding whether to 
charge the offence. (21) The relevant passages in the previous version of the 
Code were as follows: 
15. 
... 
When any substantive offences are no more than steps in the 
achievement of a dishonest objective, it is open to Crown Prosecutors to 
concentrate upon that objective and to charge a single count of conspiracy 
to defraud. It may sometimes be appropriate to charge conspiracy to 
defraud where the object of the exercise was to swindle a large number of 
people and a conspiracy to commit a substantive offence is not appropriate 
and does not meet the justice of the case. Where, however, the essence of 
the offence is not really fraud at all, as in theft from shops or robbery, it 
would be wrong to charge conspiracy to defraud, relying upon the wide 
category of offences which might loosely include an element of fraud. 
The power of the trial judge to intervene, referred to in the last paragraph of 
this passage from the Code for Crown Prosecutors, was explained by the 
CLRC in the following terms. 
"As the evidence emerges at trial, it may for instance become 
apparent that an alleged conspiracy to defraud could be put more 
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simply to the jury as a case of obtaining property by deception. In 
such a case ... 
it would be right for the judge, in the exercise of his 
inherent jurisdiction to control the proceedings, to direct the 
prosecution that they should adopt that course so as to ensure that 
the defendant gets a fair trial. Or where the essence of the conspiracy 
amounted to an offence or series of offences carrying small penalties 
it might be appropriate for the judge to say that a charge of conspiracy 
to defraud would appear to be oppressive. (22) 
FORGERY 
Forgery is frequently carried out as a preparatory step to the commission of 
some other crime, such as a crime involving deception, which will result in 
some material advantage (most obviously money or other property) to the 
forger. (23) 
The offence of forgery is created by Section 1, of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981 which provided: 
"A person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the 
intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept 
it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some 
act to his own or any other person's prejudice. " 
So, forgery is committed where someone makes an instrument with the 
intention that somebody else shall be induced to accept it as genuine. 
Actus reus 
6.20 The actus reus of forgery is the making of a false instrument. This 
obviously includes the original production of an instrument which is false as 
soon as it is produced. But section 9(2) provides: 
"A person is to be treated for the purposes of this part of the Act as 
making a false instrument if he alters an instrument so as to make it 
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false in any respect (whether or not it is false in some other respect 
apart from that alteration). " 
So making `false instrument' includes also making a genuine instrument false 
and making a false instrument even more false. (24) 
The meaning of `instrument' for the purposes of Part I of the 1981 Act is 
defined by s8(1) which provides: 
"Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Part of this Act "instrument" 
means - 
a) any document, whether of a formal or informal character; 
b) any stamp issued or sold by the Post Office; 
C) any Inland Revenue stamp; and 
d) any disc, tape, sound track or other device on or in which information 
is recorded or stored by mechanical, electronic or other means. " 
The meaning of false is given an exhaustive definition by S9 (1) of the 
forgery Act which provides: 
"An instrument is false for the purposes of this Part of the Act - 
(a) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made by a 
person who did not in fact make it in that form; or 
(b) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made on the 
authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its making in that 
form; or 
(c) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made by a 
person who did not in fact make it in those terms; or 
(d) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made on the 
authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its making in those 
terms; or 
(e) if it purports to have been altered in any respect by a person who did 
not in fact alter it in that respect; or 
(f) if it purports to have been altered in any respect on the authority of a 
person who did not in fact authorise the alteration in that respect; or 
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(g) if it purports to have been made or altered on a date on which, or at a 
place at which; or otherwise in circumstances in which , it was not in 
fact made or altered; or 
(h) if it purports to have been made or altered by an existing person but 
he did not in fact exist. " 
In each of these cases set out in section 9(1) above, the instrument 
"purports" to have been made or altered by (or on the authority of) a certain 
person, or in particular circumstances. This meaning is summarised by the 
Law Commission in its report(25) which state: 
"The essential feature of a false instrument in relation to forgery is that 
it is an instrument which "tells a lie about itself' in the sense that it 
purports to be made by a person who did not make it (or altered by a 
person who did not alter it) or otherwise purports to be made or 
altered in circumstances in which it was not made or altered. Falsity 
needs to be defined in these terms to cover not only, for example, the 
obvious case of forging a testator's signature to a will, but also the 
case where the date of a genuine will is altered to make it appear that 
the will was executed later than it in fact was, and therefore after what 
in truth was the testator's last will. 11 
So the crime of forgery in English Law is wide enough by virtue of section 
9(1)(g), to be applicable in the case where the forger makes out a bill of 
lading with a date earlier (or later) than that on which the goods were in fact 
shipped, or to ante-date a deed with a view to tax evasion. (26) 
The ambit of subs (g) was considered by the Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Donelly. (27) The appellant, the manager of a jewellery store, had drawn up a 
valuation certificate in relation to jewellery which did not exist, the purpose 
being to enable another man, with whom he was collaborating, to defraud an 
insurance company. The appellant contended that the document was not 
`false' within the meaning of the Act. The court held that the certificate 
came within subs (g) because it purported `to have been made "... otherwise 
in circumstances in which it was not in fact made ... 
" On the facts it 
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purported to have been made following the examination of certain jewellery 
which did not in fact exist; therefore it told a lie about itself, the 
circumstances in which it had been made. Had the jewellery in fact existed 
and the appellant simply overvalued it for insurance purposes, the document 
would not have been false, simply inaccurate. 
Section 9(1)(h) provides for a specific example of an instrument which 
purports to have been made by a person who did not in fact make it: viz: one 
which purports to have been made by a person who did not in fact exist. 
The Mens Rea 
The first element of the mess rea of forgery is that the maker of the false 
instrument must intend that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to 
accept it as genuine. This requirement is given an extended meaning by 
Section 10(3) which provides: 
"In this Part of this Act references to inducing somebody to accept a 
false instrument as genuine, or a copy of a false instrument as a copy 
of a genuine one, include references to inducing a machine to 
respond to the instrument or copy as if it were a genuine instrument 
or, as the case may be, a copy of a genuine one. " 
So, the offence might be committed by falsifying data held in a computer file, 
even if the false instrument were not intended to come to the attention in the 
first instance of any human being but only of a machine. 
The second element of the mens rea is that the defendant must intend that 
the false instrument is to be used so as to induce the person accepting it to 
(or not to do) some act to his own or someone else's "Prejudice" is defined 
by section 10(1): 
"Subject to subsections (2) and (4) below, for the purposes of this Part 
of this Act, an act or omission intended to be induced is to a person's 
prejudice if, and only if, it is one which, if it occurs - 
(a) will result - 
(i) in his temporary or permanent loss of property; or 
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(ii) in his being deprived of an opportunity to earn remuneration or 
greater remuneration; or 
(iii) in his being deprived of an opportunity to gain a financial 
advantage otherwise than by way of remuneration; or 
(b) will result in somebody being given an opportunity - 
(i) to earn remuneration or greater remuneration from him; or 
(ii) to gain a financial advantage from him otherwise than by 
way of remuneration; or 
(c) will be the result of his having accepted a false instrument as genuine 
in connection with his performance of any duty. " 
It should be noted that forgery does not require any element of 
dishonesty. (28) 
By s. 6 of the Forgery Act, forgery is triable either way; on summary 
conviction it is punishable by six months imprisonment and/or a fine of Level 
4 and on trial on indictment by ten years imprisonment and/or a fine. 
Copying a false instrument 
Forgery Act by Section 2 creates the offence of copying a false instrument, 
which provides: 
"It is an offence for a person to make a copy of an instrument which is 
and which he knows or believes to be, a false instrument, with the 
intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept 
it as a copy of a genuine instrument, and by reason of so accepting it 
to or not to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice. " 
The maximum penalty following conviction on indictment is ten years' 
imprisonment. The section puts it beyond doubt that it is now an offence to 
photocopy a false instrument with the requisite mens rea. Which is the 
maker of the copy must "know or believe" the original to be false. 
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Using a false instrument 
The old offence of uttering a forged document is replaced by section 3 of the 
1981 Act, which provides: 
"It is an offence for a person to use an instrument which is, and which 
he knows or believes to be, false, with the intention of inducing 
somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to 
do or not to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice. " 
The offence carries the same penalties as forgery. (29) 
Where the instrument is made by one person and used by another, the 
maker will normally be guilty of forgery and the user will commit the offence 
under section 3. 
Using a copy of a false instrument 
The symmetry is completed by section 4, which provides: 
"It is an offence for a person to use a copy of an instrument which is, 
and which he knows or believes to be, a false instrument, with the 
intention of inducing somebody to accept it as a copy of a genuine 
instrument, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some 
act to his own or any other person's prejudice. " 
The offence carries the same penalties as forgery. (30 
From the foregoing discussion we can categorise documentary fraud 
according to English Law as follows: 
1. In the case of using forged shipping documents, by the seller 
(exporter), to camouflage the facts that no cargo exists. This Act can be 
characterised as forgery according to Section I of Forgery and Counterfeiting 
Act 1981 if he makes the false shipping documents himself in order that he 
or another will induce the correspondent bank to accept them as genuine. 
The maximum penalty that can be imposed following conviction on 
indictment under Section 1 above is ten years imprisonment s. 6(2). This 
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characterisation is the same in Iraqi Law as we saw earlier but the penalties 
for this kind of forgery in Iraqi law is not more than seven years 
imprisonment (Article 295 of Iraqi Penal Code). If the accused uses 
documents which are forged by somebody he can be charged under Section 
3 of the 1981 Act and the offence carries the same penalties as forgery. 
This charge can be brought up in Iraqi law also under Article 298 and the 
penalties are the same as for forgery. 
If the accused makes a copy of false shipping documents intending to pass it 
off as the original he can be charged under Section 2 of the 1981 Act. This 
offence carries the same penalties as forgery. The same charge can be 
applied in Iraqi law under Article 302-1 of the Iraqi Penal Code. If the 
accused used a copy of false shipping documents which he knows or 
believes to be false documents, with the intention of inducing someone to 
accept them as copies of genuine documents, he can properly be charged 
under section 4 of the 1981 Act and the penalties are the same as for 
forgery. 
Moreover, the use of forged shipping documents by the seller (exporter) in 
order to obtain money from the correspondent bank can be characterised as 
the crime of obtaining property by deception under Section 15 of the Theft 
Act 1968. (31) The penalty for this crime is the same as for forgery (s. 15.1). In 
Iraqi Law also this act can be characterised as fraud (under Article 456-1) 
but the penalty for fraud in Iraqi Law is no more than five years 
imprisonment. 
2. In the case of a seller inducing another person to make out the Bill of 
Lading, by leading the other to believe that the goods did exist, a forgery 
charge might be technically possible - clearly the innocent maker of the Bill 
of Lading would not be guilty of forgery unless he knows that the goods do 
not exist. (32) 
The defendant could therefore, be regarded as having made the instrument 
himself, through an innocent agent but it would be preferable, if only to avoid 
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confusing the jury, to charge him with procuring the execution of the Bill of 
Lading by deception under S. 20(2) of the Theft Act 1968 which is a less 
serious offence than forgery but represents more accurately the nature of the 
defendant's conduct. Section 20(2) of the Theft Act provide: 
"A person who dishonestly, with a view to gaining for himself or 
another or with intent to cause loss to another, by any deception 
procures the execution of a valuable security shall on conviction on 
indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven 
years... " 
The expression "valuable security" is defined by Section 20(3). It includes 
any document which - 
a) creates, transfers, surrenders or releases any right to, in or over 
property; 
b) authorises the payment of money or the delivery of any property; or 
C) evidences: 
(i) the creation, transfer surrender or release of any such 
right; 
(ii) the payment of money or the delivery of any property; or 
(iii) The satisfaction of any obligation. 
This definition clearly covers such commercial documents as Bills of 
Lading. (In Benstead and Taylor) (33) It was held to include an irrevocable 
letter of credit, because such a document confers on its beneficiary a right to 
payment and is therefore a document creating a right to property (i. e. 
money) but some writers believe that this is a questionable interpretation of 
the provision. (34) 
In Iraqi Law, we saw that the obtaining of a Bill of Lading by deception can 
be characterised as fraud (Article 456-2 of the Iraqi Penal Code) as the 
accused falsely pretended that the container contained quality goods and 
this is fraudulent means and if he receives the Bill of Lading from the Master, 
the fraud will be completed in the first stage against the Master as the Bill of 
Lading is a property deed. 
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Then if the accused used this Bill of Lading to get payment for the "alleged 
goods" from the correspondent bank he will have committed the offence of 
using a false instrument under s. 3 of the Forgery Act 1981 in English Law 
and it is also possible to charge him under S. 15 of the Theft Act 1968. In 
Iraqi Law this act can be charged as a fraud under Article 456-1 against the 
bank. 
More often the Master will insist on putting a reservation clause in the Bill of 
Lading about the content of the shipment such as "said to contain... " but this 
kind of clause may cause difficulty for the shipper to claim the money from 
the correspondent bank. So if the shipper forges the Bill of Lading by 
removing this clause he will be liable for forgery and the crime of using a 
forged document in English and Iraqi Laws. Also he can be charged with 
obtaining the selling price from the correspondent bank by deception (s. 15 of 
the Theft Act 1968) and fraud in Iraqi Law under Article (456-1). 
3. In the case of shipping goods of lesser quantity or quality by the 
seller, instead of that specified in the contract of sale with the buyer, here if 
the Bill of Lading is forged by the accused he can be charged with forgery 
(Section I of the 1981 Act). If the Bill of Lading was forged by somebody 
and the accused uses it he can be charged under S. 3 of the 1981 Act. This 
characterisation can be applied also in Iraqi Law as we saw earlier. (35) 
It is also possible to charge the accused under S. 15 of the Theft Act 1968 in 
this regard. Under the old offence of obtaining property by false pretence it 
was held in Regina v. Thomas Goss, (36) that the accused is guilty of 
obtaining property by deception when he offered cheese for sale which he 
pretended was of the same quality, flavour and taste as the samples, 
whereas they had not been so extracted, but were in fact part of another and 
better cheese. 
In Regina v. Joseph Ragg (1860)(37 the accused was convicted on an 
indictment for obtaining money by false pretences. It appeared from this 
case that the prosecutor bought from the prisoner and paid him for a quantity 
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of coal upon a false representation by him that there were 13 cwt bags, 
whereas, in fact there were only 8 cwt; but packed into the cart in which they 
were being carried in such as way as to have the appearance of a larger 
quantity. 
Sometimes the certificate of origin is very important in showing the quality 
and the origin of the goods and any false description in this regard can bring 
another charge such as applying false trade description. In the unreported 
case of R. v. Reiss and John M. Potter Ltd; decided by Barry J. at Leeds 
Assizes on December 10th 1956. (38) The accused were charged with 
causing to be applied, or applying, to goods a false trade description, 
contrary to Section 2 (1) F and (d) of the Merchandise Acts, 1887 to 1953. 
The accused, with respect to foreign goods, had falsely obtained in England 
certificates of origin showing the goods to be English. The interesting point 
was that the goods to which the certificates of origin referred were at no time 
in the United Kingdom but were taken directly from one foreign country to 
another. 
Such practices of fraud regarding weight of a quantity or quality of goods are 
normally prosecuted now by trading standards officers under the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968. S. 1(1) which states: 
1. (1) Any person who, in the course of a trade or business, - 
(a) applies a false trade description to any goods; or 
(b) supplies or offers to supply any goods to which a false 
trade description is applied; 
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be guilty of an offence. 
The definition of Trade Description is given by S. 2 of the Act which provides: 
2. - (1) A trade description is an indication, direct or indirect, and by 
whatever means given, of any of the following matters with respect to any 
goods or parts of goods, that is to say: 
(a) quantity, size or gauge; 
(b) method of manufacture, production, processing or 
reconditioning; 
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(c) composition; 
(d) fitness for purpose, strength, performance, behaviour or 
accuracy; 
(e) fitness for purpose characteristics not included in 
the preceding paragraphs; 
(f) testing by any person and results thereof; 
(g) approval by any person or conformity with a type 
approved by any person; 
(h) place or date of manufacture, production, processing or 
reconditioning; 
(i) person by whom manufactured, produced, processed or 
reconditioned; 
(j) other history, including previous ownership or use, 
(2) The matters specified in subsection (1) of this section shall be 
taken: 
(a) in relation to any animal, to include sex, breed or cross, 
fertility and soundness; 
(b) in relation to any semen, to include the identity and 
characteristics of the animal from which it was taken and 
measure of dilution. 
(3) In this section "quantity" includes length, width, height, area, 
volume, capacity, weight and number. 
The Act contains some more elaborate definitions of what is meant by 
"applies", false. Other sections create other offences of false statements for 
business purposes. The offences are normally tried summarily (s. 19(3)), but 
it can be punished on indictment, by a fine or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years or both. The offences are primarily of strict liability, but 
certain defences of mistake, accident, etc. are allowed (s-24, of the Act). 
The penalties for the offences of false trade description (which is for the 
protection of local buyers) are not adequate, and were not intended to deal 
with large scale of International Maritime Fraud. So in the "counterfeiting of 
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goods" cases. It seems that these cases are better demonstrated if the 
offenders are charged with conspiracy to defraud if possible because that 
reflects the seriousness of the alleged wrong-doing 
Counterfeiting in this sense of the term involves a fraud on the manufacturer 
of a genuine product. It also involves a fraud on the purchasers of the 
product (whether as trader or ultimate consumer), unless of course it is 
bought with knowledge that it is a counterfeit product. 
A recent instance involved the manufacture and supply of fake Chanel 
products. In Pain, Jory and Hawkins (39) the defendants were originally 
charged with conspiracy to defraud Chanel Limited. At their trial, it was 
successfully argued on their behalf that the counts were bad since the 
carrying out of the conspiracy involved substantive offences under the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968. Moreover, because the conspiracy would have 
involved the selling of the Chanel abroad the prosecution took the view that 
no charges of conspiracy to obtain by deception would have been justiciable 
in England and Wales. 
There are, however, a number offences which can be used when a 
commercial product is copied. Thus, the Copyright Act 1956 provides for 
offences in respect of dealings in items which infringe copyright. The Act 
was amended in 1982 to extend its protection to sound recordings and 
cinematograph films, (40 and the penalties were substantially increased in 
the following year in an attempt to stem the huge growth in video piracy. (41 
In 1985, the Copyright Act was extended to cover computer programs. (42) 
A breach of the Copyright Act does not necessarily involve fraud, but clearly 
it may do. 
Moreover, in general, Section 458 of the Companies Act 1985 provides for 
criminal sanctions against any person who was knowingly a party to 
"fraudulent trading", that is to say, any business of the company carried on 
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for any fraudulent purpose, the penalty for this offence can be up to seven 
years imprisonment. 
4. In the case of the insertion of a false date of shipment in the Bill of 
Lading by the seller or a third party to show that the shipment has been 
made in time, can be categorised as forgery s. 9(1) (g) of 1981 Act if the 
seller forged the Bill of Lading himself. If it was forged by a third party and 
used by the seller he can be charged with the crime of using a forged 
document s. 3 of the 1981 Act. 
Moreover, the accused can be charged with obtaining property by deception 
(s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968) as the correspondent bank would not hand over 
the money to the shipper if the bank had known the real date of shipment. 
This categorisation is the same in Iraqi Law. 
5. The case of selling the same cargo more than once by the shipper, 
can be committed usually when the shipper has four or more original sets of 
Bills of Lading. As only one original is required to obtain delivery of the 
goods the seller may use the other sets to deceive the other buyer(s). 
The categorisation of this kind of conduct depens upon the type and terms of 
each individual contract. As we have seen earlier (43) there is a considerable 
variety of international sale contracts used in carriage of goods by sea and 
the most commonly used, and in which the documents take on a much 
greater importance than in other types of contract, these are the free on 
board (FOB) and Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) and Cost and Freight (C&F). 
In all these contracts the seller's duties regarding the goods finishes when 
the goods pass the ship's rail in the port of shipment and he is under no 
obligation to deliver them to the intended port of destination. So long as the 
goods are loaded according to contract, the seller will not generally be liable 
if they are later lost or damaged on the voyage. 
The seller is under duty in CIF, C&F and some types of FoB contract to 
deliver to the buyer the Bill of Lading (as a document of title to the goods) 
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with other relevant documents. Generally, the buyer must pay the price in 
exchange for these documents, but in practice payment will often be made 
through a bank by means of a letter of credit, and the documents are in this 
case sent to a bank and not to the buyer direct. (") 
In CIF contracts the delivery of the Bill of Lading transfers the property and 
the possession in the goods to the transferee and the same rules can be 
applied for FoB and C&F contracts as the property usually passes when the 
documents are transferred in exchange for payment of the price. (45) 
So if the property of the goods passes to the buyer then the seller uses the 
other set of the Bill of Lading to sell the same goods to a bona fide second 
buyer he will have committed the offence of obtaining property by deception 
(s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968) towards the second buyer although the second 
buyer will receive a good title of the goods. The seller also can be charged 
with theft (s. 1 of Theft Act) because he has clearly appropriated the property 
of another (The First Buyer). ""' 
If the seller is using a Bill of Lading which was forged by him or a third party 
he will have committed the forgery or using forged documents offences 
respectively. 
As we saw earlier the Iraqi law reaches the same results. (47) 
6. In the case of the shipper indemnifying the carriers against the 
consequences of making false representation in the B/L so as to deceive a 
third party (e. g. the correspondent bank) the carrier here is an accomplice to 
the offence of obtaining property by deception (s. 15 of the Theft Act) as he 
clearly operated in bad faith, and the shipper and the carrier also can be 
convicted with the crime of conspiracy. (48) 
7. In the case of fraudulent sub-sales of the cargo by the buyer to more 
than one party or pledging the cargo before selling it and concealing the 
previous disposition, this can be categorised in the same way as in number 5 
above. 
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8. In the case of the buyer's fraud through using a forged Bill of Lading 
to induce the carrier to part with the goods, this act may be categorised as 
forgery if the Bill of Lading was forged by the buyer himself, and the offence 
of using forged a instrument if it was forged by a third party. 
9. In the case of a buyer's fraud by obtaining delivery of goods without 
production of a Bill of Lading and then selling the Bill of Lading to an 
innocent party. The obtaining of goods sometimes against a letter of 
indemnity and this practice is legally correct, but the selling of the Bill of 
Lading later to an innocent buyer, is obtaining property by deception (s. 15 of 
the Theft Act) because the Bill of Lading here expresses a lie about the 
existence of the goods with the carrier. 
10. In the case of the buyer and the seller conspiring to defraud a third 
party (e. g. correspondent bank) by using forged shipping documents, this act 
can be categorised as obtaining property by deception (s. 15 of the Theft 
Act), the crime of conspiracy s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, Forgery, 
(s. 1 of the 1981 Act) and using forged instruments (s. 3 of the 1981 Act). 
Fraudulent collaboration between a buyer and a seller to contravene 
exchange control regulation is not a crime in the UK because there is no 
such control regulation but the British seller who collaborates with the buyer 
to contravene the exchange control regulation in the buyer's country can be 
regarded as an accomplice to the fraud in the buyer's country against these 
regulations and a party to the crime of conspiracy in the buyer's country. 
On the other hand, when the purchase price is fraudulently decreased by the 
seller, in the commercial invoice in order to enable the buyer to pay less 
customs duty on imports, questions arise as they do in a similar pattern like 
the whole series of frauds against the European Community which involves a 
trader importing to the EC prime beef from South America, described as offal 
in order to evade import levies and exporting offal declared as prime quality 
beef in order to obtain export refunds. 49) 
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In such cases, if the fraud is to be committed abroad it is not punishable in 
England. (50) But if it is intended to be committed in England this type of fraud 
can be characterised as an offence of evading liability by deception contrary 
to Section 2 of the Theft Act 1978, which states: 
"... where a person by any deception: - 
(a) dishonestly secures the remission of the whole or part of any existing 
liability to make a payment, whether his own liability or another's; or 
(b) with intent to make permanent default in whole or in part on any 
existing liability to make a payment, or with intent to let another do so, 
dishonestly induces the creditor or any person claiming payment on 
behalf of the creditor to wait for payment (whether or not the due date 
for payment is deferred) or to forgo payment; or 
(C) dishonestly obtains any exemption from or abatement of liability to 
make a payment; 
he shall be guilty of an offence. " 
A person convicted on indictment of an offence under section 2 is liable to 
five years imprisonment (s. 4(2)). (51) 
If there are any forged documents involved in this kind of fraud there is even 
the possibility of a charge of forgery. (52) 
Moreover, the accused in these cases can be guilty of cheating the revenue. 
Hawkins (53) defined cheating as "deceitful practices, in defrauding or 
endeavouring to defraud another of his own right by means of some artful 
device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. " 
The common law offence of cheating still retains some importance because 
though S. 32(1) of the Theft Act abolishes cheating (along with common law 
offences against property) it does so only "except as regards offences 
relating to the public revenue. " The punishment is imprisonment and/or a 
fine without limit. 
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Moreover, the accused in these cases can be charged with conspiracy to 
defraud, as in Blake and Tye (54) where the defendants were charged with 
various conspiracies which in sum amounted to agreements to evade the 
payment of customs dues on certain goods imported into the United 
Kingdom. 
In addition, to the above general offences there are some offences under the 
tax legislation the most important of these are under the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979, offences of evading VAT and car tax. Section 167(1) 
of the 1979 Act regard false documents and statements states: 
"If any person knowingly or recklessly - 
(a) makes or signs, or causes to be made or signed, or delivers or causes 
to be delivered to the Commissioners (55) or an officer, any declaration, 
notice, certificate or other document whatsoever; or 
(b) makes any statement in answer to any question put to him by an 
officer which he is required by or under any enactment to answer, 
being a document or statement produced or made for any purpose of any 
assigned matter, which is untrue in any material particular, he shall be guilty 
of an offence under this subsection and may be detained ... " 
The offence is punishable on conviction on indictment with two years' 
imprisonment or a penalty of any amount, or both. (56) 
Another possible charge is under Section (170)(2) of the 1979 Act, it is an 
offence to be in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion, or 
attempt at evasion of any duty chargeable on any goods. This offence is 
punishable on conviction on indictment with two years imprisonment or a 
penalty of any amount (s. 179(3). 
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3.3.2.2 CHARTER PARTY FRAUD 
UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
A. Charterer's Fraud 
As we have seen previously, (57) this fraud can be committed by the charterer 
who has decided from the outset not to honour his obligations which he 
undertook in the charter party, he usually charters a vessel on time or bare 
boat basis and the hire is to be paid normally monthly or twice a month in 
advance. Then the charterer either sub-charters the vessel out on a voyage 
basis as the disponent owner or opens a liner servic. Whatever he 
chooses, he holds himself out as ready to carry the goods of others. Once 
the goods are loaded, the charterer issues the Bill of Lading to the shippers 
of cargo or their agents against freight due for transportation to its 
destination. Such freight will very often be payable in total upon signing the 
Bill of Lading. The charterers therefore may collect the freight from the 
cargo owners while only paying a month or half a month's hire to the 
shipowner - the charterer after paying the initial payment of the hire and, of 
course, having collected all the freight defaults on further hire payments - the 
usual modus operandi is for the charterer to disappear, as he has no further 
interest in the ship, or to go into liquidation. A case like the above can be 
categorised first as obtaining the services of the ship by deception under 
s. (1) of the Theft Act 1978(58) as the shipowner permits the performance of 
the charter party by the charterer's deception. This kind of fraud is similar to 
so-called "long firm fraud" which involves obtaining large quantities of goods 
on credit and absconding without intending to pay for them. (59 
But in the Iraqi Penal Code, obtaining services by deception is not fraud, 
except in some special legislations. (60 
Second, when the charterer collects the freight from the cargo owners 
although he intended from the outset not to honour his obligation as a 
carrier, he can be charged as obtaining the freight by deception under 
s. 15(1) of the Theft Act, because the charterer in this case presented himself 
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in a "false front", - reputable and creditworthy carrier when in fact he is 
neither, and that is deception. 
In fact, it seems that anyone who makes any contract is implicitly 
representing that he intends to perform at least the major obligations 
undertaken and has a reasonable prospect of being able to do so. The 
precise content of this representation in any given case will naturally depend 
on the terms of the contract, expressed or implied, and therefore on what is 
expected in a particular commercial context. 
Moreover, the charterer can be charged also under s. 15(1) above if he 
knows that he is unlikely to be in a position to deliver the cargo to its 
destination because he is on the brink of insolvency. (61 
B. 1. When the charterer absconds after collecting the freight, especially in 
time charter party, the shipowner as carrier is generally bound by the terms 
of the Bill of Lading to deliver the cargo to its destination unless there are 
exceptions about his liability as mentioned before. (62) So if the shipowner 
dishonestly demands ransom from the cargo interest against delivery of the 
cargo to its destination his action can be characterised as theft of the cargo 
(S. 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968) because the act of holding the cargo to 
ransom can be regarded as sufficient intent permanently to deprive the 
cargo interest from it and amounts to treating the cargo as his own to 
dispose of regardless of the other's rights. (63) 
While in Iraqi law the shipowner's action cannot be categorised as theft 
because he has possession of the cargo as a bailee and the possessor 
could not steal. However, he can be charged with the offence of breach of 
trust under Article 453 of the Iraqi Penal Code because he is entrusted with 
the cargo, but then dishonestly fails to fulfil that obligation. (64 
If the shipowner manages to get the ransom from the cargo interest, he can 
be charged with the crime of extorting money under Article 452-1 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code. (65) 
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However, the shipowner may sell the cargo en route to recoup his lost hire 
and this action can be categorised as theft in English Law s. 1(1) of the Theft 
Act. This action reveals the offender's sufficient intent to deprive the victim 
permanently of his cargo by treating it as the offender's own to dispose of 
regardless of the victim's rights. (66) 
Again in Iraqi law the shipowner's action can not be categorised as theft but 
as the offence of breach of trust (Article 453 of the Iraqi Penal Code). 
2. In the scenario of the shipowner acting as a carrier and collecting 
freight from the shippers against issuing a Bill of Lading, then the vessel 
puts into a convenient port on the pretext of urgent repairs etc. During its 
stay in port, the ship is arrested by an "accommodating creditor" for unpaid 
bills. The ship is sold by a court in order to meet the claim which is very 
exaggerated. The buyer then demands additional freight from cargo 
interests to complete the voyage, but in fact in this scenario, the previous 
shipowner, the accommodating creditor and the new owner are all working in 
conspiracy to defraud the cargo interest. Such cases can be categorised 
first as theft from the moment of the unjustifiable deviation for the convenient 
port (s. 1(1)) of the Theft Act 1968. (67) 
Moreover, the whole scenario can be categorised as the crime of 
conspiracy (68) against the cargo interest. 
The charge of criminal conspiracy is possible also in Iraqi law (Article 55 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code) but the shipowner can be charged as well as with the 
offence of breach of trust and not theft. 
3. When the shipowner resorts to unjustifiable deviation in order to sell 
the cargo for his own benefit, this action can be characterised first as 
obtaining property by deception (s. 15(1) of the Theft Act). From the moment 
of loading the cargo on board the ship, (69) if the shipowner intended from the 
outset to appropriate the cargo and used deception to reach such ends (e. g. 
set up shipping business as "false front"). 
247 
The same categorisation can be applied in Iraqi law. (70) 
But if the shipowner is a professional carrier and he did not practice 
deception from the outset, but he intended to appropriate the cargo either 
from the beginning when the cargo passed the ship's rail or in the later 
stage, in these cases he may have committed theft (s. 1(1) of the Theft Act) 
but the important issue is when and where the theft is committed. Section 
3(I) of the Theft Act provides that: 
"..... any assumption by a person of the right of an owner amounts to 
an appropriation and this includes where he has come by the property 
(innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to 
it by keeping or dealing with it as owner -". 
In: R v. Skipp, (") the appellant was charged in one count with the theft of 450 
boxes of oranges and 50 bags of onions. The appellant and his brother-in- 
law agreed to steal as many loads of fruit and vegetables as they could. To 
this end, they obtained a bogus "Goods in Transit" insurance certificate, they 
bought an old lorry and obtained haulage contracts with two firms. They 
obtained instructions to collect three loads from different places in London 
and delivered them to customers in Leicester. Having collected the goods 
they made off with them. 
Stephenson U said in this case ".... if the owner had been asked - certainly 
up to the point of loading; probably up to the point when the loads were 
diverted from their destination - "Have these men stolen the goods? " 
He would say quite properly - "No, they are in control and possession of my 
goods with my authority and consent" (12) It was held that though, the 
accused may have had dishonest intentions permanently to deprive the 
owner at the time they received each load, they had done nothing 
inconsistent with the rights of the owner by loading the goods and probably 
until they diverted the goods from their proper destination. So an 
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assumption of the rights of an owner over property did not necessarily take 
place at the same time as an intent permanently to deprive the owner of it. 
The same principle can be found in Grundy (Teddington) Ltd. v. Fulton. (73) 
The plaintiffs employed a number of lorry drivers to transport the goods from 
their premises at Fulwell to their factory at Ashford and they alleged that 
over a period of six months between the beginning of December 1976 and 
the end of May 1977, out of 37 loads, a total of eight loads containing 23,000 
circles of aluminium valued at £140,000 disappeared. The plaintiffs claimed 
under their insurance policy contending that the theft had occurred when the 
lorry was being loaded since the driver had formed the intention at that time 
of taking the goods and the goods were therefore stolen from the yard, such 
thefts being covered under the policy. The defendant's insurer contended 
that the theft had occurred when the driver had deviated from his normal 
route. It was held that where goods were put into the employer's lorry or one 
hired from an independent haulier for the purpose of carriage in the ordinary 
course of business, there had to be some act as opposed to merely an 
intention, which amounted to the assumption of rights of an owner; i. e. some 
act which was inconsistent with the owner's right and there, no such act 
occurred until the driver had deviated from his proper course, so no theft of 
the goods took place in the yard. (74) 
A case like that can be categorised as breach of trust (Article 453 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code) and not theft, from the time of deviating the vessel en route. (75) 
3.3.2.3 MARINE INSURANCE FRAUD 
A. Frauds committed in order to obtain an insurance policy 
This fraud usually involves fraudulent misrepresentation or non-disclosure to 
the insurer of a material fact, usually concerning the value or the condition 
of the ship in hull insurance or the value or the condition of the cargo in 
cargo insurance. The aim of the insured in committing such frauds is often 
either to induce the insurer to accept the risk at a smaller premium than he 
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would otherwise require, by impressing him with a more favourable view of 
the risk, or securing from him insurance which would otherwise be refused. 
In English Law the obtaining of insurance policy by deception can be 
charged as fraud under s. 16 (2)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 which stated: 
"(7) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains for himself or 
another any pecuniary advantage shall on conviction on indictment be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. r's 
(2) The cases in which a pecuniary advantage within the meaning of this 
section is to be regarded as obtained for a person are cases where 
(b) he is allowed to borrow by way of overdraft, or to take out any policy 
of insurance (77) or annuity contract, or obtains an improvement of the 
terms on which he is allowed to do so; or ...... " 
Moreover, as we saw before, (78) any person who effects a contract of marine 
insurance should have an insurable interest in the subject matter insured. If 
he has no such interest he can recover nothing under the policy, for he has 
suffered no loss and the insurer is under no duty to indemnify him. So in the 
cases of the non-existent cargo in the documentary fraud the insurer is able 
to contend that as the goods insured and claimed for were never shipped, 
the assured has no insurable interest, the policy never attached and the 
insured was never at risk at all, any insurance contract without insurable 
interest is void because it is regarded as wagering or gaining contracts of 
insurance. However, this fact would not perhaps in itself deter people from 
attempting such policies or planning fraud, and the courts have power to 
order imprisonment, fines, and forfeit of any money received (under the 
Marine Insurance [Gambling Policies] Act 1909) where: 
"Any person effects a contract of marine insurance without having any 
bona fide interest, direct of indirect, either in the safe arrival of the ship 
in relation to which the contract is made, or in the safety or 
preservation of the subject matter insured, or a bona fide expectation 
of acquiring such an interest. '«9) 
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The reasoning behind the Act was to place further obstacles in the way of 
gambling on the safety of ships; to allow otherwise would put property and 
lives at sea at great risk. The consent of the Attorney General is required for 
(80) prosecution. 
B. Frauds committed after the conclusion of the insurance contract. 
The obtaining of the insurance policy by fraud may be the first step which 
may lead to fraudulent claims. To stage such fraudulent claims, the 
arrangements for the total loss of the vessel with its cargo or without it by 
scuttling or arson is quite common and sometimes can take the form of 
barratry. So the total loss of the vessel through these activities will be 
considered below. 
SCUTTLING 
Scuttling is the wilful casting away of a vessel with the connivance of the 
owners. The aim of the shipowners is usually to claim hull insurance (Hull 
Frauds). 
So the accused in a case like that can be charged with the crime of 
conspiracy(81) because in these cases there is usually agreement between 
the shipowner and the crew to scuttle the vessel 
Moreover, the arrangement of the total loss of the vessel by scuttling in order 
to obtain money from the underwriters under the policy can be categorised 
as obtaining property by deception (s. 15 of the Theft Act) if the accused 
succeeds in obtaining the money. (82) 
In some cases the assured shipowner is not interested in any claim against 
the underwriters after he scuttled the ship as he is interested in the cargo 
only and after he sells it for his own interest he scuttles the ship to 
camouflage his previous appropriation of the cargo. This is what happened 
in the Salem case (83) in this case because the crooks from the beginning had 
no intention of fulfilling their obligation and they used a fraudulent company 
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to achieve their objective, we think that the fraud was committed in Kuwait 
when they received the cargo and not from the time when Salem changed 
course for Durban, not in Durban itself. In this case, although the Salem was 
insured for $24 million, the crooks never filed a claim for a hull insurance. 
They must have realised that any claim would be challenged, as the 
circumstances were surely suspicious, and they also wanted to avoid 
prosecution for insurance fraud. But in this case Shell International claimed 
against the cargo insurers for about $56 million as the loss was caused by 
the insured peril "Taking at Sea" in this case the Court of Appeal held: (84) 
"i. e. That in order to establish a taking at sea, there must be a change 
in possession. A change in the character of possession was not 
enough, therefore, the cargo was `taken' not when Salem changed 
course for Durban, but at Durban, when the oil was pumped ashore. 
That taking obviously was not taking at sea, and therefore Shell must 
fail to recover, from underwriters, compensation from that part of the 
cargo which was pumped ashore at Durban. " 
It seems that the peril "taking at sea" is different from the peril of "theft" 
because we saw in the peril of "theft', theft was held to be committed from 
the time when the carrier deviated from his normal route. (85) 
The important question in insurance fraud is whether the act of scuttling the 
vessel is sufficiently proximate to the complete offence of obtaining property 
by deception to be capable in law of constituting an attempt to commit the 
offence? In Robinson, (") the Court of Criminal Appeal held that staging a 
burglary with intent to claim insurance monies was not sufficiently proximate 
to be an attempt to obtain by false pretences. 
Comor v. Broomfield (87) went further. The defendant wrote to his insurance 
company, falsely stating that his van had been stolen and enquiring if he 
could make a claim. The Divisional Court held that the magistrates were right 
in saying that the letter did not of itself constitute an act sufficiently 
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proximate to the obtaining of compensation under the policy to amount to an 
attempt to obtain it. 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse. (88) The defendant, a man 
prominent in English public life, soon after having insured his life in England 
for the benefit of his wife, fabricated the appearance of his death by 
drowning abroad. He was charged in England with attempting to obtain in 
England, property by deception. At his trial, the judge in directing the jury 
told them, not that the conduct of the defendant could constitute an attempt, 
but that it did. The jury convicted the defendant and the Court of Appeal 
upheld the conviction. In this case there was no communication or 
attempted communication with the insurers but it was assumed that the 
insurers must have been aware of the reported drowning by the media which 
can be regarded as the accused's innocent and unwilling agents to inform 
his wife and the insurers in London of his death by drowning was 
undoubtedly an essential part of his attempt dishonestly to enable his wife to 
recover the insurance money. (89) 
We believe that the legal principle in this case can be applied in scuttling 
cases because scuttling incidents usually attract the media. So scuttling the 
vessel itself can be regarded as an attempt to commit the offence of 
obtaining property by deception. Furthermore, the act of scuttling the vessel 
itself is a crime under the Malicious Damage Act 1861. So any person who 
unlawfully and maliciously does anything leading to immediate loss or 
destruction of any ship, vessel or boat, is guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life or for any shorter term. (90 
Moreover, under s. 58 of the Merchant Shipping Act. 1995, it is an offence if 
the Master of or any seaman employed in a ship registered in the United 
Kingdom or registered under the law of any country outside the United 
Kingdom; and is in a port in the United Kingdom or within United Kingdom 
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waters while proceeding to or from any such port; while on board his ship or 
in its immediate vicinity - 
1. does any act which causes or is likely to cause the loss or destruction 
of or serious damage to the ship or its machinery, navigational 
equipment, or the loss or destruction of or serious damage to any 
other ship or any structure, or the death of or serious injury to any 
person; or 
2. omits to do anything required to preserve the ship or its machine, 
navigational equipment or safety equipment from being lost, 
destroyed or seriously damaged, or to preserve any person on board 
his ship from death or serious injury, or to prevent his ship from 
causing the loss or destruction of or serious damage to any other ship 
or any structure, or the death of or serious injury to any person not on 
board his ship. 
Also the act or omission is deliberate, or amounts to a breach or 
neglect of duty, or he is under the influence of drink or a drug(91) at the 
time of the act or omission, he is liable on conviction on indictment to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both and 
on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum. (It is worth remembering here that if the scuttling of the 
vessel was committed by the Master or crew without the consent or 
privity of the owner this crime may be called barratry. )(92) 
Moreover, in a case like The Salem (93) there was some oil discharged from 
the vessel by the crew, and was seen on the water to avoid any suspicions 
about the cargo theft. The act of discharging any oil or mixture containing oil 
from a vessel by the owner of the vessel or Master in the United Kingdom 
territorial waters is an offence and a person who is guilty under this offence 
can be liable on conviction ta fine not exceeding £50,000. (94) 
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ARSON 
The arrangement for the total loss of the vessel with its cargo or without it by 
Arson in order to claim under the insurance policy is an alternative way of 
scuttling. Therefore, what we have said about scuttling can be applied here 
as well. Furthermore, Arson itself is a crime s. 1(3) of the Criminal Damage 
Act 1971 states: "An offence committed under this section by destroying or 
damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson, " and by s. 4 it is 
punishable by imprisonment for life. 
It is worth mentioning that s. (1) of the Criminal Damage Act create another 
two general offences. The first offence of simple damage of any property 
belonging to another without lawful excuse s. 1(1) and the offence of 
dangerous damage which regards the destroying or damage of any property, 
whether belonging to the accused or another with the intention of 
endangering the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of 
another would be thereby endangered. S. 1(2) 
It seems to be that sl (3) is a separate offence. It follows that there are two 
forms of arson; one under subsection (1) and another under subsection (2), 
combined in each case with subsection (3). (95) 
The general features of arson are the same as for the offences under s. 1(1) 
and s. 1(2) except that the destruction or damage be by fire. For the offence 
to be complete, the property must be destroyed or damage by fire and the 
accused must intend or be reckless as to, destruction or damage by fire. 
The word property in s. (1) above may include the vessels (96) but under s. 43 
(repealed) of the Malicious Damage Act 1861 it was a separate offence, 
setting fire to ships to prejudice the owner or underwriters. 
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3.3.2.4 MISCELLANEOUS FRAUDS UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
Mortgage Fraud 
This kind of criminal act may be committed by the shipowner, as the 
mortgagor, who fails to meet the mortgage payments and intentionally avoids 
the jurisdictions where the ship might be subject to arrest by the mortgagee. 
As part of such frauds, the ship may be registered in a new country, 
particularly one that does not require a de-registration certificate from the 
previous country of registration (which usually would require notice to the 
mortgagee before being granted). Such registration in a new country without 
being subject to any recorded mortgages will make the ship appear free of 
encumbrances allowing the unscrupulous shipowner to sell the ship to an 
unsuspecting buyer for the entire benefit of the shipowner or, for that matter, 
the obtaining of additional funds by taking out a new mortgage. (97) 
In these cases, the dishonest selling of the ship to an unsuspecting buyer or 
the taking of a new mortgage can be charged as obtaining property by 
deception under s. 15 of the Theft Act. Because the victims here were bona 
fide and did not have any knowledge, actual or constructive, of the previous 
mortgage. Moreover, if the ship is unregistered the buyers of unregistered 
ships could have unregistered mortgages enforced against them, even 
though they did not know that a mortgage existed. (98) 
In order to obtain a new mortgage the accused sometimes forges a 
certificate of registry, surveyor's certificate or builder's certificate in such 
cases he could be charged also with forgery under s. 1 of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act (1981). If there are two persons involved in committing 
this offence the crime of criminal conspiracy could be properly charged. 
Under s. 66 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, it is an offence if any person 
forges, or fraudulently alters, or procures to be forged or fraudulently alters 
some shipping documents such as a certificate of registry, or certificate of 
mortgage or sale. The penalty for this crime may be as much as seven 
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years imprisonment. Any false declaration in the presence of or produced to 
a registrar related to the above documents is an offence also by s. 67 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
Partial conversion of cargoes of crude oil 
This kind of activity can happen when the shipper delivers the oil to the 
tanker, but part of it is diverted through hidden pipes. When the delivery is 
completed the Master may challenge the amount loaded claiming that it fell 
short of the figures specified in the Bill of Lading. This act can be charged 
as theft in English Law (5.1 (1) of the Theft Act), because the offender here 
intends permanently to deprive the victim of part of his cargo by treating it as 
the offender's own to dispose of regardless of the victim's rights. The theft 
here is committed at the time of diverting the oil to the hidden pipes whether 
that happens at the time of loading or shortly after that. Section 3(1) of the 
Theft Act provides that: " ... any assumption by a person of the right of an 
owner amounts to an appropriation and this includes where he has come by 
the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, and the later assumption 
of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner... " but we saw in Iraqi 
Law this act is not theft because the shipowner has lawful possession of the 
cargo as a bailee and the bailee could not steal. 
Some unscrupulous tanker operators reduce their costs by burning stolen 
crude oil as fuel. This practice presents a serious source of danger to ships 
and personnel both at sea and in port installations which service tankers (99 
so this act can be charged as an offence under s. 58(a) of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995. (100) 
Maritime Agents Fraud 
As intermediaries between two parties, the shipping agents generally are in 
a position to allow fraudsters to continue by describing them as completely 
trustworthy or aiding dishonestly. In such a case, the agents who have been 
involved may be held liable as "principals in the second degree" to the fraud. 
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These were traditionally described as aiders, abettors, counsellors and 
procurers, and as accessories before and after the fact. (101) 
Due to the maritime agent's position of confidence, he will frequently be the 
conduit for large sums of money or will be in a position to direct their 
disposal, whether as part of charter hire payments, or in the case of agents 
for a liner service, as prepaid freight. In these cases, if the maritime agent 
dishonestly directs this money to his own account he may be charged with 
theft under s. 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968 but in Iraqi Law this act can be 
categorised as the offence of breach of trust. (102) 
In cases of tariff manipulation, the practice whereby a freight forwarder as 
agent, obtains money from the shipper and causes loss to the shipowner by 
either describing the goods as one thing to the shipping company and 
paying less freight but subsequently describing them in a different way to the 
shipper and claiming higher freight reimbursement. So the freight forwarder 
obtains more from the shipper than he actually paid to the shipping 
company. In a case like this the freight forwarder can be charged with 
obtaining property by deception (s. 15) towards the shipper. 
If the freight-forwarder, as agent, gives the shipping company short 
measures of cargoes on which freight is charged by volume but when he 
claims reimbursement from the shipper the freight is charged on correct 
cubic measurement, he will be committing the offence of obtaining services 
by deception from the shipping company under s. (1) of the Theft Act 1978 
which provides: 
"(1) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains services from 
another shall be guilty of an offence. 
(2) It is the obtaining of services where the other is induced to confer a 
benefit by doing some act, or causing or permitting some act to be 
done, on the understanding that the benefit has been or will be paid 
for. " 
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In the meantime, the freight-forwarder commits the offence of obtaining 
property by deception from the shipper (s. 15) although the shipper paid the 
freight forwarder for the correct cubic measurement, but as we saw earlier("') 
obtaining services by deception in general is, civil fraud in Iraq and not a 
criminal one. 
In the cases where the maritime agent groups dissimilar items (possibly in a 
container) under one name to induce the shipping company to charge freight 
at one rate for all the items, to their detriment when claiming reimbursement 
from the shipper, the freight is charged at the correct rate for each item and 
thereby the maritime agent obtains more money from the shipper than he 
actually paid to the shipping company. It seems that these practices are not 
an offence against the shipping company because the agent paid for the 
container as one unit in the correct freight rate but he may be charged with 
obtaining property by deception from the shipper (s. 15) because he 
deceived him into paying more than he actually paid to the shipping 
company. 
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PART FOUR 4 
THE JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME FRAUD 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It may be observed from the outset of this thesis that Maritime Fraud is, by its 
very nature, international in character which is practised in many different and 
ingenious forms. This kind of dishonesty often involves complex operations 
designed to conceal dishonest conduct and to make detection and conviction 
as difficult as possible and the planning, preparation and execution of the many 
operations which are involved in a complicated Maritime Fraud frequently take 
place in several different countries. In many cases of Maritime Fraud either the 
perpetrator, the victim, the medium for the commission of the offence, the 
proceeds, the evidence or the confederates will be beyond jurisdiction. The 
ICC Guide to prevention of Maritime Fraud provides examples of relatively 
simple frauds, including up to five different States. (') 
It has been asserted that the major reason for Maritime Fraud being the "nearly 
perfect crime" is its international nature. (2) 
Having regard to the profound problems that exist in obtaining evidence 
overseas, let alone in imposing jurisdiction on the perpetrator, there is a very 
strong temptation on the part of the injured parties and investigators simply to 
give up. In this connection, a large number of jurisdictions in the world pose 
particular problems in the administration of justice and criminal proceedings in 
the international context. (3) 
As has been said, 
"The diversity in today's frauds affects virtually all parties to an 
international trade transaction, with the involvement of anything between 
four and ten countries, thus, hampering investigation, extraction and 
prosecution of offenders. 4) 
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Similarly, as has been pointed out by the Secretary General of the Greek 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine. 
"... [W]e have been unable to prosecute grave offences committed 
against Greek citizens and Greek ships because the criminal acts were 
committed by foreign persons outside Greek territory. This criminal 
activity, which in terms of financial losses, far exceed the losses involved 
in all the cases we are presently investigating, remains to my knowledge, 
not prosecuted and not punished. 5) 
Thus, taking into consideration the international character of Maritime Fraud, 
those States with at least an interest in prosecuting the perpetrator of Maritime 
Fraud are likely to be the following: 
State 1- The State where the offence is committed; 
State 2- The State where the offence was planned or set in motion; 
State 3- The Flag State of the vessel which is the instrument of damage; 
State 4- The State where the vessel docks with the offender on 
board immediately after the offence was committed; 
State 5- The State of which the offender is a national; 
State 6- The nationality of the owner or charterers of the vessel; 
State 7- The State of nationality of the person injured; 
State 8- The State whose national interest is injured; 
State 9- The State having custody of the offender (perpetrator of the 
fraud). 
According to the findings of research work in intentional law by the Harvard 
Law School in 1935, (6) there are five general principles on which States base 
their claim to criminal jurisdiction: 
1. the territorial principle; 
2. the nationality principle; 
3. the protective principle; 
4. the universality principle, and 
5. the passive personality principle. 
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In another study of the legal systems of the member States of the Council of 
Europe the conclusions were. 
(a) The rules governing jurisdiction in the various member States are based 
on broadly analogous concepts. 
(b) Almost every one of their legislations recognises the following grounds 
on which jurisdiction may be determined: the place of the offence, the 
nationality of the offender and the need to protect the State from 
offences against its sovereignty or security and universal jurisdiction. 
Some legislations recognise also the nationality of the victim and the 
habitual residence of the offender. 
(c) Territorial jurisdiction remains the fundamental form of jurisdiction; the 
concept of territory appears to be gradually widened. 
(d) The nationality of the offender is recognised as a ground of jurisdiction 
by almost all legislations, but in many cases it is of a secondary 
character being subject to procedural conditions and proceedings may 
be barred if the case has already been heard elsewhere. 
(e) The need to protect the State from offences against its sovereignty or its 
safety is always recognised as a principal ground of jurisdiction. 
(f) Universal jurisdiction is recognised for certain offences only. 
(g) The nationality of the victim is not recognised as a ground of jurisdiction 
by all countries; the procedural conditions to which it is usually subject 
tend to make it a secondary ground. 
(h) Jurisdiction based on the offender's habitual residence is recognised by 
some States. (7) 
Referring to the list of possible States with a `prosecuting interest'. 
(8) 
It is the intention of this part to examine the question of whether Iraq or 
England can be accorded jurisdiction as one of the above 
States with a 
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`prosecuting interest' over Maritime Fraud cases, according to the general 
principles of criminal jurisdiction in both laws. Moreover, in view of the 
difficulties experienced in obtaining jurisdiction over offenders or having them 
extradited to a country prepared to prosecute them, it would be necessary to 
investigate the feasibility and desirability of establishing greater jurisdictional 
capabilities of countries affected by designated acts of Maritime Fraud. The 
extension of the criminal jurisdiction in some international conventions related 
to some international crime will be studied as a possible solution for the 
jurisdiction problem over Maritime Fraud. 
As far as this study is concerned, the notion of the jurisdiction of a State is "its 
competence under International Law to prosecute and punish for crime. " (9) 
Which has three aspects: executive jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction and 
judicial jurisdiction. (10) 
4.2 JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME FRAUD IN IRAQI LAW 
The Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, in its general part, sets the general 
principles on which Iraq bases its claim to criminal jurisdiction over any crime. 
Those principles are: 
1. The territorial principle; (11) 
2. The protective principle; (12) 
3. The nationality principle; (13) and 
4. The Universality principle; (14) 
Let us now examine whether the Iraqi court, by using the above principles, can 
accorded jurisdiction as one of the states with a `prosecuting interest' over 
Maritime Fraud which have been mentioned before. 
(15) 
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1. The State where the Offence is Committed. 
The Iraqi Penal Code is very clear from this point according to the Territorial 
Principle, Article 6 of this Code states "Every offence committed in Iraq will be 
subject to the provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code 
.... " Article 7 of the Code 
stipulates the meaning of the Iraqi territory by saying: 
"The Iraqi Territory consists of the land of the Republic of Iraq and every 
place under its sovereignty which includes also the Iraqi territorial waters, 
the airspace above it, and also the foreign land which is occupied by the 
Iraqi army as to the offences against interests and security of the 
army.... " 
Thus, the above article states the territorial principle which is universally 
recognised that States are competent, in general, to punish all crimes 
committed within their territory. (16 
So the Iraqi Penal Law is binding on all Iraqi nationals or foreigners, who are in 
Iraqi territory, saving the exceptions prescribed by the domestic public law or 
by international law. The fundamental justification for the territorial principle 
derives from the sovereign powers exercised by a state within its own 
territory. (17 
However, although the principle is in essence uncontested, its interpretation 
gives rise to questions to which answers may appear to vary. Such questions 
relate to the method of determining where an offence has been committed and 
to the implications of extraterritorial elements, but in this matter the Iraqi Penal 
Code also makes it clear by Article 6 which states that "... the offence is 
considered to be committed in Iraq when an act constituting one of its 
constituent elements occurred therein, or when the event which is the 
consequence of the action took place or intended to take place therein .... " 
Thus, the place of commission, in Iraqi law, is determined on the basis of what 
is known as the doctrine of ubiquity, it means that an offence as a whole may 
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be considered to have been committed in the place where only a part of it has 
been committed. (18) 
So, if any part of the conduct of Maritime Fraud or any of its results forbidden 
by such crime takes place in Iraq, the Iraqi Court will have the jurisdiction. 
Therefore, if the prohibited conduct, but no part of the prohibited result, occurs 
in Iraq, the Iraqi court has jurisdiction. That means those who, when in Iraq 
commit criminal fraud against people abroad will not get away with it and they 
will be punished under Iraqi Law. 
So, Iraqi territory is not a safe haven for the planning or preparation of 
criminally dishonest acts abroad. This legal principle may be illustrated by 
reference to the American Case - People v. Adams(19) which dealt with the 
offence of obtaining by false pretences. The accused in Ohio had made false 
representations through an innocent agent in New York whereby money was 
obtained fraudulently in New York from a New York firm. The New York Courts 
held that they had jurisdiction although the accused had been at all times 
during the commission of the offence in Ohio. The New York Supreme Court 
said: 
"The fraud may have originated and been concocted elsewhere, but it 
became mature and took effect in the city of New York, for there the 
false pretences were used with success ... 
The crime was therefore 
committed in the city of New York .... 
Personal presence, at the place 
where a crime is perpetrated, is not indispensable to make one a 
principal offender in its commission. " (20) "This in no sense affirms or 
implies an extension of our laws beyond the territorial limits of the state. 
The defendant may have violated the law of Ohio by what he did there, 
but with that we have no concern ... 
He was indicted for what was done 
here, and done by himself. True, the defendant was not personally 
within this state, but he was here in purpose and design and acted by 
his authorised agents ... 
Here the crime was perpetrated within this state 
and over that our courts have an undoubted jurisdiction. This 
necessarily gives them jurisdiction over the criminal. "(21) 
271 
Moreover, it is interesting to see some of the legislation in the United States go 
farther than Iraqi Law in this matter, for example, a number of states of the 
United States expand the definition of larceny to include possession within the 
state of property stolen outside the state. (22) That means a person who shall 
steal; or obtain by robbery the property of another in any foreign country and 
shall bring the same into the state, may be convicted and punished for larceny 
in the same manner as if such property had been feloniously stolen or taken in 
the state. In: Hammaker v. State. (23) Arising under the Missouri Legislation, 
goods having been stolen on an ocean vessel in New Orleans harbour and 
later brought within the state jurisdiction to prosecute for larceny was 
sustained. 
The writer thinks that such legislation is needed in Iraqi Law in regard to 
Maritime Fraud to bring to justice those who have obtained property or goods 
abroad and brought them into Iraqi territory. 
Questions concerning the implication of extraterritorial elements in criminal acts 
have been recognised in connection with participation (accessorship, aiding 
and abetting, complicity). In many cases, this matter is approached from the 
pragmatic point of view that the actions associated with the principal act form 
an indivisible whole with that act and that the unity of the offence leads to a 
unity or jurisdiction and procedure. This approach has been adopted by Article 
6 of the Iraqi Penal Code which states: 
"... whoever becomes an accomplice to an offence committed fully or 
partly in Iraq may be prosecuted and tried according to the provisions of 
this code even though his complicity in the offence was from abroad. " 
2. The State where the Offence was Planned or Set in Motion. 
The planning and preparation of criminal dishonesty, if it is committed by one 
person is not an offence unless it itself constitutes an independent crime such 
as forgery, but if more than one person planned and agreed to commit fraud 
they may be charged with criminal conspiracy. 
(24) 
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Moreover, if the planning for the commission of the fraud goes further and set 
in motion but fails to achieve the result, this may be described as criminal 
attempt. Conspiracy and attempt are known as inchoate offences since they 
may be committed notwithstanding that the substantive offence to which they 
relate is not committed. 
Therefore, the crime of conspiracy and attempt to commit fraud are Iike any 
other crimes in Iraqi Law, as far as the jurisdiction is concerned. Thus, Iraq has 
jurisdiction with respect to any conspiracy or attempt to commit fraud in Iraq 
and those crimes can also be considered to be committed in Iraq when they are 
committed within the territory of Iraq and directed against victims outside the 
Iraqi territory because part of them was within the territory. As regards 
conspiracy or attempted conspiracy, outside the Iraqi territory to commit a crime 
within Iraq, in these cases Iraqi courts still have jurisdiction according to Article 
6 of the Iraqi Penal Code which states " ... the offence is considered to be 
committed in Iraq ... when its result occurs in Iraq or is intended to occur 
therein. " So the intention of the offenders to target a victim in Iraqi territory is 
the important element in exercising this extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Iraqi 
court. Moreover, there is no need for the offender to be present in Iraq to make 
him subject to the Iraqi Criminal Jurisdiction. 
3. The Flag State of the Vessel which is the Instrument of Damage. 
Whatever its theoretical basis, the jurisdiction of the flag State over its 
seagoing vessels, public and private, is a well established principle in 
international law. (25) 
Regardless of whether ships are deemed to be national territory, or are 
considered as such, or are considered as independent entities, all states claim 
jurisdiction over offences committed on board vessels flying the national flag, 
irrespective of the nationality of the offender. (26) 
The flag in this respect is the sign of the ship's nationality. 
(27) Unlike most 
privately owned chattels a vessel is capable of having a quasi-national 
character. When it is said that a vessel has nationality, it merely means that 
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the vessel is connected jurisdictionally with some sovereign state. Usually the 
nationality is that of the country which registers the vessel and permits her to fly 
its flag. (28) 
The flag is also significant in that it affords the vessel navigating the high seas 
extensive protection against interference by others. This navigational freedom 
is enjoyed by all ocean-going vessels sailing under the flag of a recognised 
state. 
(29) 
The importance of a vessel's national flag is emphasised in the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas. (30) Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Convention 
provides: 
"Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, 
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may 
not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the 
case of a real transfer of ownership change in registry. " 
As far as Iraqi Law is concerned, Article 7 of the Iraqi Penal Code states: 
".... The offences which are committed on board an Iraqi aircraft or 
vessel are subject to the Iraqi territorial jurisdiction even when the aircraft 
or the vessel is outside Iraqi territory. " 
Thus, this Article considers an Iraqi vessel as if it is a national territory, for the 
purposes of jurisdiction. As a result of that, Iraq has criminal jurisdiction if an 
offence occurs on board an Iraqi ship on the high seas. Therefore, the 
scuttling of an Iraqi vessel on the high seas, or the issue of false bills of lading 
when the Iraqi vessel is not within the territory of any State, can be dealt with 
by Iraqi Law. Moreover, Iraq still has jurisdiction over the offences on board 
Iraqi vessels even when the vessel is within foreign waters regardless of the 
nationality of the offender. 
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4. The State where the vessel docks with the offender on board 
immediately after the offence was committed 
In this case we must distinguish between the Iraqi vessel and the foreign 
vessel. The Iraqi vessel is subject to the Iraqi jurisdiction wherever she goes 
as we stated before. Thus, if an Iraqi vessel docks in an Iraqi port with the 
offender on board after the offence was committed, the offender will be subject 
to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction. 
In the case of a foreign vessel, we must distinguish between two types of 
cases, the first one is related to the cases where the offence was committed on 
board a foreign vessel outside the Iraqi territorial waters then the vessel docks 
in an Iraqi port with the offender on board. In such cases Iraq has no 
jurisdiction over this offence because the offence was committed outside Iraqi 
territory and the docking of the vessel in the Iraqi port after the offence was 
committed does not make a sufficient link between the offence and Iraqi 
territory. In this case the jurisdiction belongs to the flag state of the vessel. 
The second group of cases are related to the cases where the offence was 
committed on board a foreign vessel inside the Iraqi territorial water then the 
vessel docks in an Iraqi port with the offender on board. In such a case, 
although the crime is within the Iraqi territorial jurisdiction, Iraq will not exercise 
its jurisdiction over the foreign vessel lying in its ports unless under certain 
conditions referred to by Article 8 of the Iraqi Penal Code which states: 
"The provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code will not apply for offences which 
are committed on board a foreign vessel in an Iraqi port or territorial 
waters unless the peace and good of the port or the territorial water is 
likely to be affected or when either the alleged offender or victim is an 
Iraqi National or the assistance of the Iraqi authorities has been 
requested by the captain of the vessel or by the Consul of the country 
whose flag the vessel flies. " 
It seems that Iraqi law is similar to the French System, which it is claimed, 
serves the ends of justice by ensuring due punishment by the law of the flag 
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State for crimes and offences committed, and promotes the interests of 
navigation by preventing avoidable detention of the vessel. (31) 
The above system was criticised from the point of view of what test is laid 
down to determine whether public order in a port has been disturbed so that the 
local jurisdiction is competent, and who is to be the judge of this point, if not the 
local authority; itself a necessarily interested party? (32) 
Thus, Iraq by exercising its jurisdiction in certain cases only over the foreign 
vessel, gives the flag State the chance to exercise its jurisdiction too in the 
other cases. 
But some problems may arise in this respect when the ships are flying flags of 
convenience, a flag of convenience has been defined by Boczek as "... the flag 
of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled 
vessels under conditions which for whatever the reasons, are convenient, and 
opportune for the persons who are registering the vessels. °"(33) 
For ships operating under flags of convenience, it would seem that even 
supposing no `genuine link' exists between the ship and the registering State, 
(34) 
flags of convenience State is nevertheless competent to exercise jurisdiction 
over the offence on board such vessels. But in practice they may not exercise 
their right. As a result of that the criminals may get away with their offences. 
As for Maritime Fraud, it should be regarded as a crime constituting a threat to 
International trade and transportation, especially in the cases which involve 
scuttling and can cause disturbance to the law and order of the port in order to 
give the Iraqi Court Jurisdiction over it. 
Competing claims to jurisdiction occur in cases where ships are sailing in the 
territorial waters of another State at the time of the commission of the offence, 
there is no evidence of general international law rules for allocating 
competence among states, one of whom claims flag jurisdiction(35) but it seems 
that, in the absence of any controlling treaty provision and in the cases of major 
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crimes, affecting the peace and tranquility of the port, the jurisdiction asserted 
by the sovereignty of the port must prevail over that of the vessel. 
5. The State of which the Offender is a National. 
The competence of the State to prosecute and punish its nationals on the sole 
basis of their nationality without regard to the place of the offence is 
internationally accepted as grounds for jurisdiction. (") 
The underling principle is described as the principle of nationality or "active 
personality principle" . 
(37) 
By virtue of such jurisdiction the State is enabled to prosecute its nationals 
while they are abroad and to execute judgements against them upon property 
within the State or upon them personally when they return, or the State may 
prosecute its nationals after they return for acts done abroad. 
It has been said that the rational explanation behind the principle is, among 
other things, that since most states ban the extradition of nationals, having the 
power to prosecute them for offences committed abroad means that such 
offences do not remain unprosecuted. Solidarity is the principle motivator in 
such cases. (38) 
The "active personality principle" has been adopted by the Iraqi Penal Code 
which distinguishes among three kinds of Nationals. The ordinary nationals, 
the public servant, and Iraqi Diplomat. As for the ordinary national Article 10 of 
the Code states: "Any Iraqi national who outside the territory of Iraq renders 
himself guilty of an act, either as perpetrator of as accomplice, qualified as a 
felony or misdemeanour by Iraqi law may be prosecuted and tried by Iraqi 
courts if he is found in Iraq and the act is punished by the legislation of the 
country where it was committed... it 
Thus, in order to apply the above article, the offender should be an Iraqi 
national and what he did should be regarded as offences of a certain degree of 
seriousness qualified as a felony or misdemeanour by Iraqi law. 
(39 
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Moreover, the offences must also be punishable by the lex loci delicti "double 
criminality' and the offender must be found in Iraq. 
There are considerable differences of opinion concerning the question of 
whether proceedings may be instituted on the basis of this principle against 
persons who acquired the nationality of the prosecuting state or who lost it after 
the commission of the offence but in this matter the Iraqi Penal Code provides 
a clear answer in Article 10 which states: "... the provisions of this Article are 
applicable to the perpetrator of an act who has become an Iraqi National only 
after the act is imputed to him or he was Iraqi at that time but he lost his 
nationality after that action. " 
Thus, the acquisition of Iraqi Nationality or loss of it after the commission of the 
offence will not protect an Iraqi National from being prosecuted by the Iraqi 
court for an offence committed abroad prior thereto 
Accordingly, as Maritime Fraud can be regarded as a misdemeanour by Iraqi 
Law, any Iraqi national who commits it abroad can be prosecuted in Iraq if he is 
found in Iraq and what he did is regarded as a crime by the law of the country 
in which the fraud was committed Lex Loci delicti. 
The second category of Iraqi nationals are the public servants, by Article 12-1 
of the Iraqi Penal Code "Any Iraqi public servant who outside the Iraqi territory, 
in the course of his duties or in his duties related action, renders himself guilty 
of an act qualified as a felony or misdemeanour by Iraqi Law may be 
prosecuted and tried by Iraqi courts. " It is noticeable from the above article that 
there is no need to check whether what the public servant did is regarded as a 
crime by the law of the country in which the fraud was committed. In other 
words, the double criminality is irrelevant. Most important is what he did is 
punishable as a felony or misdemeanour by Iraqi Law and what he did abroad 
was in the course of his duties, or in his duties related action. Moreover, there 
is no need for the accused to be present in Iraq in order to exercise this 
jurisdiction by the Iraqi Court. 
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The third category of Iraqi nationals are the Iraqi diplomats. By Article 12-2 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code: "Any Iraqi diplomat who outside the Iraqi territory, renders 
himself guilty of an act qualified as a felony of misdemeanour by Iraqi law may 
be prosecuted and tried by Iraqi courts". 
It is obvious from the above Article that there is no need to check that the crime 
which was committed by the Iraqi diplomat abroad is connected with the 
discharge of his functions, the rest of the Article is the same as for the Iraqi 
public servant. 
Thus, Iraqi nationals, whether ordinary national, public servant or diplomat are 
subject to the Iraqi jurisdiction if they commit Maritime Fraud abroad when all 
the conditions stipulated above by the Iraqi Law are met 
6. Nationality of the Owner or Charterers of the Vessel. 
As previously mentioned, (40) the Iraqi Penal Code extends Iraqi territorial 
jurisdiction to include Iraqi ships wherever they go and the nationality of the 
ship is determined by its flag and not the nationality of the owner or charterers. 
In the case of a vessel owned or chartered by an Iraqi national but registered in 
a foreign country and flying its flag, the vessel is not an Iraqi vessel as far as 
the jurisdiction is concerned, but has the nationality of the country which 
registered her and permits her to fly its flag even though, sometimes there is no 
genuine link between the vessel and the country of registration. As a result of 
that the Iraqi court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Maritime Fraud committed 
on board such a vessel on the basis of the Iraqi nationality of the owner or 
charterers unless the fraud is committed by such owner or charterer and in this 
case jurisdiction can be claimed by the Iraqi court on the basis of "active 
personality principle" .. 
(41) 
7. The State of Nationality of the Person Injured 
This principle is derived from the idea of "protection" by the state of its 
nationals wherever they may be. In a sense it is a corollary of the principle of 
security and endows jurisdiction upon the State whose national is the victim of 
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the offence committed abroad. This principle is recognised by many 
continental Penal Codes such as German, Greek, Romanian and Swiss, (42) 
although it is one of which, in legal literature, is often considered to be highly 
controversial. (43) 
In cases where there are several victims of different nationalities, the fact that 
one of them possesses the nationality of the State claiming jurisdiction is 
usually considered sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction by that State. (44) 
The principle of passive personality has found no place in Iraqi law. 
Nevertheless, by applying the territorial principle, Iraqi courts have the 
jurisdiction over Maritime Fraud which is committed from abroad against victims 
in Iraq whether they are Iraqi nationals or residents. (46) but if the victim was 
outside the Iraqi territory when the fraud was committed against him, the Iraqi 
court has no jurisdiction to protect him. Some Iraqi writers believe that Iraqi law 
should fill this gap by adapting the principle of passive personality to protect 
the Iraqi National abroad. (46 
8. The State whose National Interest is Injured 
All states have in one way or another reserved the right to take cognisance of 
offences committed abroad with the intention of damaging their fundamental 
interests. The primary motive for extraterritorial jurisdiction established for this 
purpose is the idea that the protection of such interests cannot be left to other 
states or that other states do not consider that such interests require the 
protection of the criminal law. The typical features of jurisdiction established on 
the basis of this principle are therefore that the requirement that the offence be 
punishable in both countries is not imposed, and the jurisdiction is declared 
applicable to certain specified offences and not to whole categories. Thus, the 
basis of such jurisdiction is the nature of the interest injured rather than the 
place of the act or the nationality of the offender. 
(47) 
The application of this principle displays a great deal of variation. 
In some 
countries the group of offences to which it applies is extremely 
limited, in others 
very large. (48) 
280 
The Iraqi Penal Code has adapted this principle by Article 9 which sites: "Any 
person who has committed outside Iraq: 
1. Offences against the external or internal security of Iraq, its form of 
government, its bonds, titles, stamps which is issued by law, or forgery of 
its public documents, or 
2. The crime of counterfeiting of currency used legally or customary in Iraq 
shall be subject to the provision of this code. " 
Section 1 of the above article may be related to Maritime Fraud, especially if 
the fraudster forges any Iraqi public documents to facilitate the commission of 
the Maritime Fraud. In such a case, he will be subject to the Iraqi Law 
regardless of his nationality and the place of commission of the fraud. 
Moreover, there is no need to check that this fraud is punishable by the law of 
the country in which it was committed. Furthermore, there is no need for the 
accused to be present in Iraq in order to exercise the jurisdiction by the Iraqi 
court. 
There seems to be a tendency in some countries to stretch the concept of 
"essential' interests to include such interests as the capital market, national 
shipping and aviation, the environment and certain industrial and commercial 
interests. (49) 
It is worth mentioning here that some developing countries regard Maritime 
Fraud as a serious crime which can cause great damage to the interests and 
economy of the State. (50 
9. The State having Custody of the Offender (Perpetrator of the Fraud) 
According to this category of states, it is presumed that there is no connection 
between Maritime Fraud, the offender, the vessel which was the vehicle of the 
fraud, and the State of custody apart form the presence of the perpetrator in the 
territory of that State. In this situation the State having custody of the offender 
can not exercise its jurisdiction over Maritime Fraud which he committed 
outside its territory unless what he had done abroad is regarded as one of the 
crimes which permits the State to assert its jurisdiction over it by applying the 
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Principle of Universitality which reflects the concern over offences creating a 
common danger in numerous states, e. g. piracy. Then all states with a 
prosecuting interest would have a basis for exercising jurisdiction. 
The Iraqi Penal Code introduces the Principle of Universitality in Article 13 
which states: "Apart from the cases provided before in Articles 9-10-12 
whoever outside the Iraqi territory renders himself guilty as perpetrator or 
accomplice, of one of the following crimes: 
damaging or obstruction of the International Telecommunications and 
Transporting System, traffic of woman, children, slaves or in narcotic 
drugs shall be subject to the provision of the Iraqi Penal Code. " 
It is clear from the above article that Iraqi law confined the range of the 
universal principle to a limited range of acts which apparently do not include 
Maritime Fraud, but as we have seen before (51) the scuttling or destruction of 
the vessel in order to commit insurance fraud, itself is a crime under Article 354 
of the Iraqi Penal Code and this act can be regarded as damaging or 
obstruction of the International Transporting System. Therefore, the Iraqi Court 
can exercise jurisdiction over this type of Maritime Fraud only according to the 
Universal Principle. The other types of Maritime Fraud will not be subject to the 
Iraqi Universal Principle of jurisdiction. 
Finally, by Article 14.1 of the Iraqi Penal Code, no proceedings for any offence 
committed outside Iraq shall be instituted against the alleged offender in Iraq, 
except by or with the consent of the Minister of Justice and no prosecution is 
appropriate if the accused was definitively tried abroad and acquitted by the 
court, or in the case of conviction, that the punishment has been suffered or 
has been extinguished by the State of limitations or he has obtained clemency 
according to the foreign law. 
Moreover, by Article 14.2 of the Iraqi Penal Code, the proceedings for any 
offence committed outside Iraq may be instituted against the alleged offender in 
Iraq, if he was convicted by the foreign court but the punishment has not been 
fully applied upon him. 
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It seems that the Iraqi law has recognised the foreign judgement in Article 14.1 
above while it has refused to recognise the foreign judgement in Section 14.2 
above if the punishment has not been fully applied. Some Iraqi writers rightly 
believe that Iraqi law should recognise the foreign judgement in all cases 
without the above distinction. (62) 
Furthermore, the Iraqi Court must take into consideration in the case of 
conviction, the period of time which the accused spent in prison or custody 
abroad for the same offence. 
53) 
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4.3 THE JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME FRAUD IN ENGLISH LAW 
Referring to the lists of possible states with a "prosecuting interest', (') this 
section will examine the question of whether England (2) can be accorded 
jurisdiction as one of the states with a "prosecuting interest" over Maritime 
Fraud. 
1. The State where the Offence is Committed. 
Before the recent legislation of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the rules 
governing criminal jurisdiction over fraud where those of the common law, 
which are territorial in character: That is to say, the conduct constituting the 
offence must have taken place within the territory of England and Wales. Only 
in exceptional circumstances can a person be punished in England for things 
done by him outside the territorial limits of England and Wales, (3) but in fraud 
cases, it is clearly possible for the deception to be effected in one place and 
the obtaining in another. If one of these elements occurs in England and the 
other elsewhere, is there an offence under English law? 
The courts have preferred to apply the basic principle referred to above, that 
there is no offence under English law unless the offence is committed within the 
jurisdiction; and they have taken the view that, since the offence is not 
committed until the benefit in question is obtained, it is committed where the 
benefit is obtained. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the deception occurs in 
England if the benefit is obtained elsewhere. (4) 
Lord Griffiths stated, as the rationale of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, 
that: 
it... the criminal law is developed to protect English society and not that 
of other nations which must be left to make and enforce such laws as 
they see fit to protect their own societies ... 
It was for this reason that the 
law of extradition was introduced between civilised nations so that 
fugitive offenders might be returned for trial in the country against whose 
laws they had offended. " (5) 
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The application of the territorial principle under the Common Law was 
explained by the Home Secretary in the Commons, by the following example. 
"Let us imagine that a criminal in London places an advertisement in The 
Times inviting people to invest in a non-existent factory in Japan by 
paying money into a Tokyo bank account. A victim responds to the 
advertisement, and instructs his bank to transfer money to Tokyo. When 
the criminal retrieves his money, he has no need at all to flee to South 
America - unless he wishes to escape from our winter weather, or has 
some other purpose - because as things stand he has committed no 
offence under English Law and cannot be prosecuted here. That is 
because the last element of the crime - obtaining of the proceeds in 
Tokyo - did not occur here. So, if the victim can be induced to part with 
his money outside this country then our courts will not have 
jurisdiction. "(6) 
The above principle applies at common law whether the full offence is either a 
so-called "conduct' crime being of a defined type, e. g. theft) or a "result crime" 
(e. g. where a particular result must flow from the actors conduct e. g. obtaining 
property by deception). In the latter, the obtaining had to occur in England or 
Wales and it was not sufficient to prove that the deception took place there. (7) 
However, where part of the result was performed in England, such conduct 
would be sufficient to found jurisdiction. (8) In the cases of the criminal attempt, 
there was authority for the proposition that the courts have jurisdiction in 
relation to a charge of attempt which is intended to have, and has, "an effect' in 
England and Wales. (9) While an attempt made in England to do abroad what, if 
done in England, would constitute an offence, is not triable in England. ('o) 
Similarly, the same principles apply both to the offence of conspiracy to commit 
a substantive offence ("statutory conspiracy)(") and to the common law 
offence, conspiracy to defraud. (12) 
The law was not entirely clear on jurisdiction over conspiracies formed abroad 
to commit offences, or to defraud, in England. However, it would appear at 
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least possible that the English Courts do not have jurisdiction to try such 
conspiracies unless something has been done in England and Wales in 
concert and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
13) 
English courts have no power to try a charge of statutory conspiracy entered 
into in England to commit an offence of fraud that would not itself be triable in 
England because it takes place abroad; and no power to try a charge of 
common law conspiracy to defraud where the intended fraud is to operate 
abroad, (14) and this principle applies even though this conspiracy causes 
damage within England. In: Attorney General's Reference (No. 1 of 1982)(15) 
where fraudsters made an agreement in England to sell to customers in the 
Lebanon whisky falsely purporting to be the product of X, an English company. 
They were charged, in the event unsuccessfully, with conspiring to defraud X, 
because X was the only person to whom the implementation of the conspiracy 
would even arguably cause damage within England and Wales. As Lord Lane 
CJ remarked of the case: (16 
"Had it not been for the jurisdiction problem, we have no doubt the 
charge against these conspirators would have been conspiracy to 
defraud potential purchases of whisky, for that was the true object of the 
agreement. " 
Thus, the nature of the problem of jurisdiction in Maritime Fraud can be 
illustrated by example. Assume that an owner (0) and a charterer (C) conspire 
to scuttle a vessel outside the Britlish territorial waters. They thereafter 
envisage making a fraudulent claim on, let us say, Spanish underwriters. As 
we understand the common law, they cannot be prosecuted in England, even 
though both 0 and C may reside in England and indeed may cheerfully 
continue in a similar line of business. 
The question of determining where the prescribed result of the fraud has in fact 
occurred, or is intended to occur, frequently fails to provide a complete and 
easy answer to the question of jurisdiction. In Harden, (") for example, the 
deception was contained in documents posted by the accused in England to a 
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company in Jersey. In response, the company posted cheques to the accused 
which he received in England. It was held that because he had invited the 
company to send the cheques by post, he had "obtained' them when they were 
received by the postmaster in Jersey: and that accordingly the court did not 
have jurisdiction. 
In R. v. Tirado, (18) however, the appellant had obtained money from victims in 
Morocco by dishonestly promising them jobs in England. The appellant had 
suggested to his victims that they might make use of a Moroccan bank, which 
could transmit their payments to him in England by banker's draft. If this had 
meant that the bank was his agent, the appellant might have relied upon R. v. 
Harden, since, as in Harden's case, the property would then have been 
obtained abroad. The Court of Appeal, however, decided that the bank could 
not have been his agent, since he had not suggested to the victims that they 
would obtain jobs merely by handing the required sum to the bank. On the 
contrary, he had required the money to be delivered to him personally, and had 
merely suggested the bank as being one possible method of delivery. His 
conviction was therefore upheld. 
In Baxter, (19) the accused posted letters in Northern Ireland to football pools 
promoters in England, falsely claiming that he had correctly forecast the results 
of football matches and was entitled to winnings. He was charged with 
attempting to commit an offence under s. 15 of the 1968 Act. Sachs U. who 
delivered the judgement of the Court of Appeal, observed that if the attempt 
had succeeded, the obtaining (and hence the offence) would have taken place 
within the jurisdiction of the English Court. (20) 
Thus, as the cases show and, the Law Commission also noted, the common 
law rules as to jurisdiction of offences had become "increasingly difficult, 
complicated and controversial to apply" resulting in a loss of court time dealing 
with technical legal arguments. ý21ý 
Moreover, the Law Commission noted that the common law rules by permitting 
international criminals to plan in England to defraud the individual or 
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companies of another country, have become unacceptable. The same idea 
was stressed by Lord Diplock in Treacy v. DPP when he said: (22) 
"There is no rule of comity to prevent Parliament from prohibiting under 
pain of punishment persons who are present in the United Kingdom, and 
so owe local obedience to our law, from doing physical acts in England, 
notwithstanding that the consequences of those acts take effect outside 
the United Kingdom. Indeed, where the prohibited acts are of a kind 
calculated to cause harm to private individuals it would savour of 
chauvinism rather than comity to treat them as excusable merely on the 
ground that the victim was not in the United Kingdom itself but in another 
state. " 
The above observations are pertinent to the problem of Maritime Fraud. (23) 
The Law Commission also observed that it is particularly important that the UK, 
as a leading international finance centre, should have (and be seen to have) an 
effective and straightforward way of tackling fraudulent conduct connected with 
this country, the Commission stated: 
"We also have in mind, in considering questions of policy, that London is 
one of the world's principal financial centres, and that it is in the national 
interest for it to remain so. Should it be thought that large-scale frauds 
could be carried out here with impunity, confidence in London as a major 
international centre would rapidly be undermined. These considerations 
would appear to lend added force to the need for this country to be seen 
as vigilant in proceeding against international fraudsters. The traditional 
approach, it seems to us, fails to take into account these significant 
considerations. ' 4) 
The above common law rules of jurisdiction are so well established that it would 
need legislative action to change them. (25) With respect to a list of offences 
against property, this has been done by Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993. (26) The explanation for the change is that it will enable the English courts 
to try transnational offences of a fraudulent kind which are planned here but 
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executed abroad, activities made the easier by technological changes, 
particularly electronic transfer of money from one state to another. Part one of 
the 1993 Act particularises these offences to which the new provisions in 
respect of jurisdiction apply and empowers the Secretary of State to modify the 
list by way of a statutory instrument laid before Parliament. (17) 
Part one lists two groups of offences to which this part applies, Group A lists 
some substantive offences, and Group B relates to inchoate offences. 
The Group A Offences are: 
"(a) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968 - 
section 9 (theft); 
section 15 (obtaining property by deception); 
section 16 (obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception); 
section 17 (false accounting); 
section 19 (false statements by company directors, etc. ); 
section 20(2) (procuring execution of valuable security by deception); 
section 21 (blackmail); 
section 22 (handling stolen goods); 
(b) an offence under either of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1978 - 
section 1 (obtaining services by deception); 
section 2 (avoiding liability by deception); 
(c) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981 - 
section I (forgery); 
section 2 (copying a false instrument); 
section 3 (using a false instrument); 
section 4 (using a copy of a false instrument); 
section 5 (offences which relate to money orders, share certificates, 
passports, etc. ); 
(d) the common law offence of cheating in relation to the public revenue. '(28) 
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The Group B Offences are: 
"(a) conspiracy to commit a Group A offence; 
(b) conspiracy to defraud; 
(c) Attempting to commit a Group A offence; 
(d) incitement to commit a Group A offence. " 
As we have seen before (29) Maritime Fraud in English Law can be classified 
sometimes as theft, obtaining property by deception, forgery, common law 
cheating in relation to the public revenue or conspiracy to commit the above 
offences or conspiracy to defraud, thus Group A and B above are wide enough 
to cover most of those possibilities. 
It was necessary to provide two separate lists because the rules applicable to 
determine jurisdiction in respect to either a Group A or B offence differ. For the 
commission of a Group A offence there must be proof that a "relevant event" 
took place in England even if the result occurred abroad. (30) "Relevant event" 
in relation to any Group A offence, means "any act or omission or other event 
(including any result of one or more acts or omissions) proof of which is 
required for conviction of the offence. '431) 
Thus, where the definition of the offence forbids conduct producing a certain 
result, the English courts would have jurisdiction if any part of the conduct, or 
any part of the defined specified result, took place in England. Similarly, the 
English courts would have jurisdiction over crimes the definition of which 
relates only to the accused's conduct (as in theft) if any part of the conduct 
forbidden by the definition of the offence took place in England. The offence 
shall be deemed to be committed in England whether the person charged with 
offence was in England or not at the time of the act, omission, or event or 
whether or not he was a British citizen at any material time. 
(32) 
Thus, English Law in this regard becomes similar to Iraqi Law, (33) although Iraqi 
Law is still wider than English Law because the jurisdictional rules in Iraqi Law 
apply to any offence and not only to a list of offences as in English Law. 
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In respect of Group B offences, different rules apply depending on whether the 
inchoate offence is a conspiracy or an attempt, and whether the inchoate 
offence relates to an offence to be committed in England (s. 3) or abroad (s. 5). 
According to s. 3(2) "on a charge of conspiracy to commit Group A offence, or 
on a charge of conspiracy to defraud in England and Wales the defendant may 
be guilty of the offence whether or not - 
(a) he became a party to the conspiracy in England and Wales; 
(b) any act or omission or other event in relation to the conspiracy occurred 
in England and Wales. " 
While in the cases of an attempt s. 3(3) states "on a charge of attempting to 
commit a Group A offence, the defendant may be guilty of the offence whether 
or not - 
(a) the attempt was made in England and Wales; 
(b) it had an effect in England and Wales. " 
In regard to the conspiracies which relate to contracts to be performed abroad 
s. 5(2) states. " 
An agreement falls within this section if - 
(a) a party to it, or a party's agent, did anything in England and Wales in 
relation to it before its formation; or 
(b) a party to it became a party in England and Wales (by joining it either in 
person or through an agent); or 
(c) a party to it, or a party's agent, did or omitted anything in England and 
Wales in pursuance of it..... " 
Moreover, according to the amendment to the Criminal Law Act 1977 
(introduced by Section 5(1)), this deems that a Group A type of offence will be 
justiciable in England and thus tried as such by virtue of subsection (5) even 
though that offence cannot be tried directly under s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 
1977 because the agreement relates to conduct to be performed abroad and 
which would not therefore (strictly speaking) "necessarily amount to or involve 
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the commission of any offence" in England (s. 1(1), and s. 1(4) of the Criminal 
Law Act 1977). 
In the House of Lords, the Minister of State for the Home office, suggested that 
conspiracies and attempts "which are formulated in this country but which are 
intended to take effect overseas will be treated as though their objective had 
been in this country. 34) 
Even in the cases in which the agreed course of conduct would be an offence 
by English Law, it must also be an offence under the law in force in the country 
where the conduct was intended to take place, (35) and the courts will look to see 
whether the conduct is "punishable" in that foreign country whether or not that 
country calls it an "offence" or not. (36) The question whether s. 6 is fulfilled is to 
be determined by the judge alone. (37) 
Similar considerations apply to the provision in relation to attempts and 
incitement. In respect for determining certain jurisdictional questions relating to 
the location of event s. 4 of 1993 Act state: 
"In relation to a Group A or Group B offence - 
(a) there is an obtaining of property in England and Wales if the property is 
either despatched from or received at a place in England and Wales; 
and 
(b) there is a communication in England and Wales of any information, 
instruction, request, demand or other matter if it is sent by any means - 
(i) from a place in England and Wales to a place elsewhere; or 
(ii) from a place elsewhere to a place in England and Wales. " 
As we have seen earlier, the obtaining of property by deception is a "result 
crime" in the sense that the "obtaining" is the result of the deception formerly, 
jurisdiction (for the full offence) required proof that the result occurred in 
England. (38) 
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If the deception occurred abroad but property was despatched from England to 
a victim in France then (without s. 4(a)) it could be argued that the "obtaining" of 
the property also occurred abroad . 
(39) 
Section 4(a) resolves that issue. Similarly, the transmission of information, and 
the other activities referred to in s. 4(b), are now to be read as occurring both in 
the place where the information originated and the place where it was 
received. (40) 
2. The State where the Offence was Planned or Set in Motion. 
The topic of planning, preparing and the attempt to commit fraud can be dealt 
with under the so-called inchoate offences, and in order to avoid any 
unnecessary repetition, what has been said before with respect to the 
jurisdiction of the state where the offence is committed in regard to inchoate 
offences equally applies here. (41) 
3. The Flag State of the Vessel which is the Instrument of Damage. 
British ships have been described as "floating islands'ý42) and as such 
notionally to be regarded as extensions of the territory of England. This 
picturesque metaphor is not well founded in legal principle. 
43) 
The reason for the application of English criminal law to offences committed on 
British ships afloat(4) is that they fall under the protection of Her Majesty, so 
that all persons aboard, whatever their national status, are subject to her laws. 
This common law principle corresponds with the now accepted rule of 
international law that the law of the ship's flag applies. Indictable offences 
committed on British ships on the high seas are covered by section 1 of the 
Offences at Sea Act 1799 and are punishable at common law. (45) 
Moreover, the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 contains an important body of 
legislation dealing with some offences on board British ships. Section 281 of 
the Act provides: 
"Where any person is charged with having committed any offence under 
this Act then - 
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(a) if he is a British citizen and is charged with having committed it - 
(i) on board any United Kingdom ship on the high seas; 
(b) if he is not a British citizen and is charged with having committed it on 
board any United Kingdom ship on the high seas; 
and he is found within the jurisdiction of any court in any part of the United 
Kingdom which would have had jurisdiction in relation to the offence if it had 
been committed on board a United Kingdom ship within the limits of its ordinary 
jurisdiction to try the offence that court shall have jurisdiction to try the offence 
as if it had been so committed. " 
Thus, the above section is similar to Article 7 of the Iraqi Penal Code (46) and 
both of them are applications to the accepted principles of international law, 
aliens aboard a ship on the high seas are governed by the law of the flag. So 
any Maritime Fraud committed on board an English ship is subject to English 
Law. 
4. The State where the Vessel Docks with the Offender on Board 
Immediately after the Offence was Committed. 
Like Iraqi law, (47) if the above vessel is British, the offence will be subject to 
English Law whether the offence was committed in the high seas or in British 
territorial waters. (48) 
In the cases of the offences such as frauds committed on board a foreign 
vessel in the high seas then the vessel docks in England with the offender on 
board. In such cases English Courts have no jurisdiction over these offences 
unless there is some "relevant event" in relation to the frauds which took place 
in England. 
In the case of an offence committed on board a foreign ship within the English 
territorial waters, the English view holds that every country, in the absence of 
any treaty stipulation, has the right to enforce its own criminal law within its 
ports. The English courts have asserted unlimited port criminal jurisdiction over 
foreign vessels and their crews. In. Regina. v. Cunningham, 
(49) three 
Americans were convicted for assaulting a seaman on an American vessel 
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anchored off the British Coast on the grounds that the offence occurred in 
British territory. 
The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1870. Section 2 provides: 
"An offence committed by a person, whether he is or is not subject of 
Her Majesty, on the open seas within the territorial waters of Her 
Majesty's dominions, is an offence within the jurisdiction of the Admiral, 
although it may have been committed on board or by means of a foreign 
ship and the person who committed such offence may be arrested, tried 
and punished accordingly. " 
The limits of the territorial waters of the United Kingdom are defined by s. 7 of 
the Act as: 
"Such part of the sea adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom, or the 
coast of such part of Her Majesty's dominions, as is deemed by 
international law to be within the territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty; 
and ... any part of the open sea within one marine league of the coast 
measured from low water line shall be deemed to be open sea within the 
territorial waters of Her Majesty's Dominions. " 
Moreover, in regard to conduct endangering ships, structures or individuals, 
section 58-(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1995 provides: This section 
applies - 
"(a) 
(b) to the master of, or any seaman employed in, a ship which - 
(i) is registered under the law of any country outside the United 
Kingdom; and 
(ii) is in a port in the United Kingdom or within United Kingdom waters 
while proceeding to or from any such port. " 
More general provision about jurisdiction over ships lying off coasts can be 
found in section 280(1) of the same Act which states: 
"Where the area within which a court in any part of the United Kingdom 
has jurisdiction is situated on the coast of any sea or abuts on or projects 
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into any bay, channel, lake, river or other navigable water the court shall 
have jurisdiction as respects offences under this Act over any vessel 
being on, or lying or passing off, that coast or being in or near that bay, 
channel, lake, river, or navigable water and over all persons on board 
that vessel or for the time being belonging to it. " 
By comparison, between Iraqi and English Law in regard to jurisdiction of the 
state of the port over offences committed on board foreign ships, it seems that 
in Iraqi Law the state has only limited control over criminal acts committed on 
board foreign vessels within its ports and it interferes only in certain conditions 
(50) in this matter, the Iraqi view is the same as the French one (51) 
While the English system does not declare in advance in what cases the 
jurisdiction will or will not be exercised, the writer thinks that the English system 
may give more power to the courts to practice jurisdiction in Maritime Fraud. In 
the case of criminal acts committed aboard British vessels in foreign ports, the 
English courts will exercise concurrent jurisdiction if the littoral state does 
not, (52) while in Iraqi Law there is no such condition. (53) 
5. The State of which the Offender is a National 
In general, the common law rule is: 
"no British subject can be tried under English Law for an offence 
committed on land abroad, unless there is a statutory provision to the 
contrary. ') 
There is today an increasing body of statutory exceptions by which Parliament 
has extended the jurisdiction of the English courts to acts or omissions 
committed outside England and Wales. See for example, s. 9 of the Offences 
against the person Act 1861 and s, 2(1), 3(1), 9(1), 22(1)a, 22(1)b, of the 
Sexual Offences Act 1956. 
With regards to the Crown Servants Abroad: - The jurisdiction of the English 
courts was extended by the Criminal Justice Act (C. J. A. ) 1802 to the acts and 
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omissions of all Crown servants abroad. Thus, section 1 of that Act provided 
that - 
".... if any person who now is, or heretofore has been, or shall hereafter 
be employed by or in the service of His Majesty, his heirs or successors, 
in any civil or military station, office, or capacity out of Great Britain or 
shall have committed, or shall commit, or shall have heretofore been, or 
is, or shall hereafter be guilty of any crime, misdemeanour, or offence, in 
the execution, or under colour, or in the exercise of any station, office, 
capacity or employment as aforesaid, every such crime, offence or 
misdemeanour may be prosecuted or enquired of, and heard and 
determined 
... 
here in England 
.... 
" 
The preamble to the Criminal Justice Act 1802 explained the necessity for this 
extension of jurisdiction: 
"Whereas persons holding office and exercising public employments out 
of Great Britain often escape punishment for offences committed by 
them for want of courts having a sufficient jurisdiction in or by reason of 
their departing from the country or place where such offences have been 
committed, and that such persons cannot be tried in Great Britain for 
such offences as the law now stands, inasmuch as such offences cannot 
be said to have been committed within the body of any country. " 
The C. J. A. 1802 however, can today more usefully be read together with the 
Criminal Justice Act 1948. The latter enactment gave the English court 
jurisdiction to deal with offences committed by "Any British subject employed 
under His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the service of the 
Crown 
... in a 
foreign country, when acting or purporting to act in the course of 
his employment ... 
'455) Together, these two enactments enable the English 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil servants and members of the diplomatic 
service who commit criminal offences whilst stationed abroad. Thus, an 
English court may be able to deal with an offender who, by virtue of diplomatic 
immunity, could not be dealt with in the courts of the place of acting. This 
jurisdiction is however, restricted to such acts which are offences by English 
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Law. Thus a British diplomat who violates the local law of the place where is 
he stationed can only be dealt with before the English courts if the offending 
acts are also contrary to English Law. It would appear he could also be dealt 
with for an act or omission which is a criminal offence in English law even 
though such an act may be perfectly lawful and unobjectionable by the law of 
the place where committed. 
Thus, as in Iraqi Law the double criminality is irrelevant. (56) As for the ordinary 
citizens s. 281 of Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides: 
"Where any person is charged with having committed any offence under this 
Act then: 
(a) if he is a British citizen and is charged with having committed it - 
(i) on board any United Kingdom ship on the high seas, 
(ii) in any foreign port or harbour, or 
(iii) on board any foreign ship to which he does not belong; or 
and he is found within the jurisdiction of any court in any part of the United 
Kingdom which would have had jurisdiction in relation to the offence if it had 
been committed on board a United Kingdom ship within the limits of its ordinary 
jurisdiction to try the offence. That court shall have jurisdiction to try the offence 
as if it had been so committed. " 
The offences considered under the above section are only those under the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and not any other offences and aimed only at 
British subjects, provided the offender is found within the jurisdiction of the 
English courts and the offences referred to are criminal acts and omissions 
under English Law. 
It is today universally accepted that prima facie the "law of the flag" governs 
everything which occurs on board ship. However, the above section extending 
the jurisdiction of English courts over offences committed by a British subject 
whilst temporarily on board a foreign ship seems to contradict this old rule that 
the law of the flag prevails. (67) 
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So it has been suggested that jurisdiction over offences on board ship should 
not be extended to criminal conduct by the United Kingdom citizens on board 
foreign ships on the high seas. (58) 
Thus, if a Crown servant abroad commits Maritime Fraud, he may be subject to 
the English Law, while the ordinary British subject may not be subject to the 
English Law for fraud committed outside the UK unless his act can be regarded 
as an offence under a statutory provision such as Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
In this point English Law is different from Iraqi Law because in Iraqi Law there 
are general rules of the nationality principle for all the offences and not to 
59) specific offences (known by name). 
6. Nationality of the Owner or Charterers of the Vessel 
As in Iraqi Law the nationality of British vessels is determined by its registration 
in the United Kingdom (60) and can be identified by its British flag (61 and not by 
the nationality of the owner or charterers. 
So in the case of a vessel owned or chartered by a British subject but 
registered in a foreign country and flying its flag, the vessel is not a British 
vessel as far as the jurisdiction is concerned. Therefore, it is not subject to 
English Law. 
Thus, the British nationality of the owner or the charterer of the vessel is not a 
basis of extra-territorial jurisdiction under the English Law and does not put 
England on the same footing as the state of registration of the vessel. 
However, if the British subject who owns or charters a foreign vessel commits 
Maritime Fraud, he may be subject to the English law according to the active 
personality or the territorial principles, previously discussed if applicable. 
7. State of Nationality of the Person Injured 
As we have seen, the passive personality principle protects the nationals 
wherever they may be. Nevertheless as far as Maritime Fraud is concerned, 
it 
seems that English Law had not considered applying the principle 
like Iraqi 
Law, but the British subject can be protected by other principles such as the 
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territorial one, if the fraud is committed from abroad against victims in 
England. (62) 
8. The State whose National Interest is Injured 
As we have seen before, the basis of such jurisdiction is the nature of the 
interest injured rather than the place of the act or the nationality of the 
offender. (63) 
Although in most national penal codes, with few exceptions, this national 
interest, without being defined, can be related to the security, territorial integrity 
or political independence of the state and the falsification or counterfeiting of 
the seals, currency or public documents issued by the state. In many 
developing countries Maritime Fraud may be regarded as a serious crime 
against their national interest and can cause great sabotage to the state's 
economy, especially when the economy depends upon a single product such 
as oil or coffee and the fraud targets this main national product, but in the 
industrial countries such as the United Kingdom, this may not be the same. 
As far as the above jurisdiction is concerned, English law belongs only to the 
group of states which base their penal competence almost exclusively upon the 
territorial and personal principles, and it generally confines the application of its 
protective law to nationals, while occasionally asserting a claim of jurisdiction 
over aliens for specific offences. (64) While Iraqi Law belongs to the those states 
which apply their protective laws, with certain exceptions, to aliens as well as to 
nationals. 
Thus, no British subject can be tried under English Law for an offence 
committed on land abroad, unless there is a statutory provision to the 
contrary. (65) Such as British subjects who commit murder abroad. (") Nor is a 
foreigner liable for any act committed on land outside England, although the 
consequences of the act may subsequently take place in England. 
(67) 
Moreover, it has been held that where a conspiracy entered into in England 
was to be carried out abroad the fact that its performance would injure a person 
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or company in England by causing him or it damage abroad did not make the 
conspiracy indictable in England. (68) 
Although the Attorney General in this case argued unsuccessfully that the 
protection of economic interests in England against injury by fraud here or 
abroad is a legitimate and proper function of the Criminal Law. (69 
A foreigner can be liable under English Law for an offence committed on land 
abroad in exceptional cases such as in the case of treason, where the foreigner 
had previously resided within the dominions of the Crown and at the time of the 
treasonable act still owes allegiance to the Crown e. g. by being in possession 
of a British passport. (70) 
There is also a possible exception in the case of a person who within the 
previous three months has belonged to the crew of a British Merchant Ship, in 
regard to any act relating to property or persons, done in or at any place 
(ashore or afloat) outside the United Kingdom, which if done in any part of the 
United Kingdom, would be an offence under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom, this act shall be treated for the purposes of jurisdiction and trial, as if 
it has been done within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England. (") 
Moreover, among the other exceptional cases is Section 92 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983. It is an offence to use any television or 
other wireless transmitting station abroad to influence votes at a parliamentary 
election. (72) 
Thus, in Maritime Fraud cases the national interest itself is not a basis for 
English jurisdiction but the English Court may have the jurisdiction or another 
basis such as the territorial one when the fraud is operated from abroad against 
a victim in England, but in cases where the damage which could have resulted 
from the fraud in England would have been a side-effect or incidental 
consequence of the fraud, and not its object this may not be enough basis for 
the English court to exercise its jurisdiction. (73) 
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9. The State having Custody of the Offender (Perpetrator of the Fraud) 
in those cases, the only link between offender and the state having the custody 
of him, is in the presence of the offender in its territory. 
In such cases the universality principle is the only option for the state to 
exercise its jurisdiction. In this regard English courts exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of certain international crimes and acts which violate the generally 
accepted standards of behaviour recognised by civilised nations. The 
"international crimes" over which the English courts do exercise jurisdiction can 
be categorised as crimes against international laws dealt with as an exception 
to the common law rule (piracy) or by statute (slavery) as part of the United 
Kingdom's responsibility under conventional international law. 
Piracy is a particularly heinous crime, equally troublesome to all nations for this 
reason it has become accepted that piracy is a crime against international law 
and can be dealt with by any state which can set hands on the pirates. (74 
By Slave Trade Acts (1824) - 73 Certain acts done for or towards the 
trafficking in slaves are illegal and gave the British authorities the right to stop 
and arrest vessels engaged in the Slave Trade, (75) whether such acts are 
committed in the United Kingdom or Her Majesty's dominions elsewhere, or on 
the high seas. 
Moreover, English Law extends its universal principles to cover more offences 
such as under the Tokyo Convention Act 1967, giving effect to the Tokyo 
Convention of 1963(76) and in the protection of Aircraft Act 1973, s. (1) which 
gave effect in England to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation made in Montreal in October 1971 and 
in 
the Hijacking Act. 1971, "ý which gave effect in the United Kingdom to the 
Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, made at the 
Hague in December 1970. 
As for Maritime Fraud, it is not regarded as an international crime covered by 
the universal principle. Thus, a foreigner cannot 
be indicted in England for 
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casting away a foreign ship in foreign waters, if the act does not amount to 
piracy; but may be indicted in England for a conspiracy in England to commit 
such an offence where the conspiracy is not limited to doing the act abroad. (78) 
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4.4 THE EXTENSION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION IN SOME INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
A number of international conventions had dealt with jurisdiction over crimes on 
board aircraft, (') hijacking, (2) attacks on civil aviation, (3) attacks on 
internationally protected persons, (4) taking of hostages, (') unlawful acts against 
the safety of Maritime Navigation , 
(6 and piracy. (7) 
Most of the problems relating to criminal jurisdiction that are relevant to 
Maritime Fraud frequently appear in various matters similar to the above 
crimes. It is therefore, particularly interesting to examine the solutions adopted 
in the above conventions and to study the feasibility of an international 
convention on jurisdiction for Maritime Fraud. 
1. Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft (signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963) (The Tokyo 
Convention) 
The Tokyo Convention deals mainly with offences committed on board aircraft 
in general. In this Convention, articles 3 and 4 in Chapter II are devoted to 
"jurisdiction". 
Article 3 provides that: 
"1. The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise 
jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board. 
2. Each contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences 
committed on board aircraft registered in such State. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law. " 
It is thus, clearly apparent that the Tokyo Convention recognises that the law of 
the flag applies, even extraterritorially. Each contracting State must take the 
measures to establish its jurisdiction as a flag state. 
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The basis of the exercise of jurisdiction is the nationality of the aircraft. This is 
in accordance with customary international law, which permits the flag state to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on board ships and aircraft 
registered in that State on the basis of assimilation of ships and aircraft to 
territory. (8) 
The same principle exists in Iraqi Law and English Laws. (9) 
Article 4 of the Tokyo Convention provides that: 
"A contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with 
an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an 
offence committed on board, except in the following cases: 
(a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State, 
(b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent 
resident of such State, 
(c) the offence is against the security of such State, 
(d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the 
flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State, 
(e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any 
obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement. " 
Thus, Article 3 of the Tokyo Convention recognises the jurisdictional 
competence of the flag State and the claims of jurisdiction of other States 
based on various legal principles, while Article 4 imposes restrictions on States 
which might wish to interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. 
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(signed at The Hague, on 16 December 1970) (The Hague 
Convention) 
While the Tokyo Convention deals mainly with offences committed on board 
aircraft, The Hague Convention of 1970 attempts to deal specifically with 
aircraft hijacking. After the adoption of the Tokyo Convention, when 
it 
appeared that hijacking incidents were occurring with great frequency, 
it was 
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generally felt that the Tokyo Convention could not meet the problem, 
particularly because of the weakness of its provisions on criminal jurisdiction. 
The Hague Convention of 1970 contains some provisions on criminal 
jurisdiction in it article 4, which seem more satisfactory: 
"Each contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against 
passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection with the 
offence, in the following cases: 
(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that 
State; 
(b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its 
territory with the alleged offender still on board; 
(C) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew 
to a lessee who has principal place of business or, if the lessee has no 
such place of business, his permanent residence in that State. 
2. Each contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where 
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him 
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this 
article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law. " 
It would appear from the above article that the state of registration of aircraft 
again can exercise its jurisdiction over the offence of aircraft hijacking as in the 
Tokyo Convention. 
Moreover, a Contracting State on whose territory a hijacked aircraft lands with 
the hijacker still on board is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the offence, 
according to Article 4, para 1(b), of the Hague Convention 
hijacker, try him and imprison him. 
It can arrest the 
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The State of landing, it would appear from the wording of the provision, can 
exercise jurisdiction irrespective of whether or not the hijacking occurred in its 
airspace. 
There is no apparent link between the offence and that State, except for the 
landing in its territory. (10 
Article 4, para 1(c) of the Convention gives the State, where a charterer of an 
aircraft has his principal place of business or his permanent residence, the right 
to exercise jurisdiction over the hijackers of such an aircraft whether the 
offence is committed in the airspace of that State or outside it. The provision 
seems to put this State on the same footing as the State of registration of the 
aircraft and the State of landing. This kind of extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
something new which does not fall under the traditional basis of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction under international law, (') but perhaps it may be assumed that it is 
closely based on the passive personality principle. 
This is a very useful innovation and an interesting development in this sphere 
of international law, which can considerably help to fill the gap in jurisdiction in 
cases of aircraft charter, where otherwise hijackers may go unpunished, simply 
because of lack of jurisdiction. (12) 
According to Article 4.2 of The Hague Convention, all contracting States may 
have jurisdiction if the offender is found in their territory, no matter how he 
came to be found there, if the State where the offender is found does not 
extradite him, it has to exercise jurisdiction over the hijacking. The principle 
underlying this provision is similar, though not identical, to the principle of 
un ivers ital ity. 
(13) 
It is a new principle in the sphere of extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
international law, as there seems to be no connection between the offence of 
hijacking, the offender, the hijacked aircraft and the State entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction, apart from the presence of the perpetrator in the territory of that 
State. (14) 
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The intention behind the new principle is to close all possible gaps in 
jurisdiction through which hijackers may escape punishment. 
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation (Signed at Montreal, on 23 September 1971). (The 
Montreal Convention) 
The Montreal Convention was concluded in 1971 to cope with some acts 
endangering the safety of civil aviation, such as attacking or planting bombs on 
board aircraft which, strictly speaking, are not hijacking. 
As concerns criminal jurisdiction, some rules are laid down in Article 5 of the 
Convention: 
"1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: 
(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
(b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered 
in that State; 
(C) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its 
territory with the alleged offender still on board; 
(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased 
without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the 
lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that 
State. 
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in 
Article 1, paragraph 1(a), (b), and (c) and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so 
far as that paragraph relates to those offences, in the case where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him 
pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of 
this Article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law. " 
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This jurisdictional provision is identical with those contained in The 
Hague Convention. There are only slight differences between them. It 
may be observed that, in addition to what has been provided in The 
Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention provides that each 
Contracting State shall also take the appropriate measures to establish 
its jurisdiction over offences "when the offence is committed against or 
on board an aircraft registered in that State. '(15) 
This provision is pertinent to the circumstance of sabotage against aircraft, 
since the offender may not be on board the aircraft. 
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
(adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, at New York, on 
December 14,1973) (The New York Convention) 
This Convention deals with prevention and punishment of crimes against 
Internationally protected persons such as Heads of State, Heads of 
Government or a Minister of Foreign Affairs whenever any such person is in a 
foreign State, any representative or official of a State or any official or other 
agent of an international organisation who is entitled to special protection from 
any attack of his person, freedom or dignity. (Article 1) 
The Convention gives in Article 2a list of crimes punishable under the 
provisions of the Convention: murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the 
person, violent attack upon official premises, private accommodation, means of 
transport, a threat or an attempt to commit any such attack, etc. 
Article 3 of the Convention contains jurisdictional provisions which, in some 
respects, are similar to those contained in the Montreal Convention of 1971. 
Article 3 of the Convention on Protected Persons provides that: 
"1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in article 2 in the 
following cases: 
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory of that State or on board a 
ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
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(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) when the crime is committed against an internationally protected person 
as defined in Article I who enjoys his status as such by virtue of 
functions which he exercises on behalf of that State. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction of these crimes in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him 
pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of 
this Article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with international law.. " 
5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979) 
The problem of the taking of hostages had been of great international concern 
and continues to be so. 
There was, accordingly, a need for an international convention to govern acts 
of hostage-taking everywhere, following the precedents set by the Conventions 
on jurisdiction over crimes on board aircraft, aircraft hijacking, attacks on civil 
aviation and attacks on internationally protected, persons; for although those 
Conventions had dealt with criminal acts akin to hostage-taking, there were still 
gaps to be filled. ('6) 
Article 1 of the Convention against Hostage-Taking defines the offence as 
follows: 
"1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the 
`hostage) in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an 
international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person, 
or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit 
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of 
taking of hostages (`hostage-taking) within the meaning of this 
Convention. 
2. Any person who: 
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(a) Attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or 
(b) Participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to 
commit an act of hostage-taking; 
likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention. " 
Hostage-Taking has been made an international offence by the Convention. 
The Convention, in its Article 5, provides a number of bases for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by States Parties to it: 
"9. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in Article I 
which are committed: 
(a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State, 
(b) By any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by those 
stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its territory; 
(c) In order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or 
(d) With respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State 
considers it appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in Article 
I in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it 
does not extradite him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of 
this Article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with internal law. " 
This provision is similar in structure to Article 4 of The Hague Convention 1970, 
Article 5, of the Montreal Convention 1971 and Article 3 of the New York 
Convention 1973. 
It may be observed that Article 5 of the Convention against Hostage-Taking is 
wider in scope than the corresponding provisions in the Hague, Montreal and 
New York Conventions, in that it has created new bases of jurisdiction which 
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were not included in the latter Conventions. These bases are: the jurisdiction 
of the State where a stateless person is habitually resident; (Article 5.1(B)) 
Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons 1954 defines a stateless person as It.... a person who is not considered 
as a national by any State under the operation of its laW'. (") 
Thus, the Convention has created this new basis of jurisdiction, which for these 
purposes assimilates resident stateless persons to nationals. 
No similar basis exists under the Tokyo Convention 1963, The Hague 
Convention 1970, The Montreal Convention 1971 or the New York Convention 
1973. 
Moreover, the Convention against Hostage-Taking gives the State which is 
required to do or abstain from doing something the right to exercise jurisdiction 
over the hostage-taker. 
It may be observed that no similar provision exists under the Tokyo Convention 
1963, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971 or the New 
York Convention 1973. 
Also, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 (d), of the Convention, the 
national State of the Hostage is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the 
person who perpetrates the act of hostage-taking against him, if that State 
considers it appropriate. 
The basis of jurisdiction under this provision is similar to that under 
international customary law, namely, (18) the passive nationality principle. 
This principle has found no place in the English and Iraqi laws, 
(19) and there is 
not similar provision in the Tokyo Convention 1963. The Hague Convention 
1970, the Montreal Convention 1971 or the New York Convention 1973. 
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6. International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. 1988 
This Convention deals with the suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation. This may involve, among other things, the seizure or 
exercise of control over a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other form of 
intimidation; or where an act of violence is performed against a person on 
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; or 
destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship, or destroys or seriously damages 
maritime navigational facilities. (20) This convention in Article 6, provides a 
number of bases for the exercise of jurisdiction by states party to it: 
"1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in Article 3 when the 
offence is committed: 
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time 
the offence is committed; or 
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or 
(c) by a national of that State. 
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence 
when: 
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is 
in that State; or 
(b) during its commission a national of that State is seized, 
threatened, injured or killed; or 
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain 
from doing any act. 
3. Any State Party which has established jurisdiction mentioned in 
paragraph 2 shall notify the Secretary-General of the International 
Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary- 
General'). If such State Party subsequently rescinds that jurisdiction, it 
shall notify the Secretary-General. 
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4. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in Article 3 in cases 
where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not 
extradite him to any of the State Parties which have established their 
jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs I and 2 of this article. 
5. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law. " 
It would appear from the above Article that the jurisdictional provision is 
identical with those contained in the Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages. (21) 
Piracy 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) in Article 101, 
provides that Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
"(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it is pirate ship or aircraft; 
(C) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub- 
paragraph (a) or (b). " 
The above definition of piracy is too restrictive because it refers only to acts 
committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state, 
and the definition of piracy in the Convention refers only to acts committed 
against another vessel. Consequently, acts committed within the territorial sea 
of a state, as well as acts by the crew or passengers against other persons or 
property on the same ship, may not be considered as piracy. 
(22) 
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From the point of view of criminal jurisdiction, piracy constitutes an offence for 
which all States assert jurisdiction. Article 105 of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea provides that: 
"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft 
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons 
and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried 
out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or 
property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. " 
The international law of piracy constitutes an exception to the general 
prohibition against interference by States with ships flying the flag of other 
States, and it also constitutes an exception to the general principle that the 
object of international law is to regulate the legal relations of States rather than 
those of individuals. By the recognition of the high seas as the domain of all 
nations, it is accepted that all States have jurisdiction to prosecute pirates. 
Pirates have been defined as "persons plundering indiscriminately for their own 
ends" and are generally described as hostes humani generis (enemies of the 
human race) and regarded as a threat to shipping and world trade. It is this 
threat which has led international law to recognise that all States may exercise 
extraordinary jurisdiction over pirates. (23) 
THE FEASIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON 
JURISDICTION FOR MARITIME FRAUD 
There have been repeated appeals for the problem of jurisdiction and 
extradition in Maritime Fraud to be solved through new international 
conventions. For example, in originally bringing the problem to the IMO, the 
Government of Lebanon stated: "we consider that it would be useful to 
prepare an international convention for the suppression of criminal barratry and 
the unlawful seizure of ships and their cargoes. "424) 
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Also, the Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine has 
stated: 
"It would be useful to prepare a binding international legal instrument 
permitting the national authorities of the signatory countries to prosecute 
and punish persons of every and all nationality, who commit criminal acts 
against a ship and/or her cargo, independently of where, when and how 
such act or acts have taken place. '(25) 
On 12 February 1985, during a debate in the British Parliament, Mr Richard 
Ottaway, MP, discussed the problems relating to International Maritime Fraud 
and referring to the work undertaken within UNCTAD and its ad hoc 
intergovernmental Group on Maritime Fraud. (26) 
He observed that: 
"The second part of the UNCTAD resolution calls for action at 
intergovernmental level to examine in depth the various proposals put 
forward before and during the UNCTAD meeting, which included the 
possibilities for international co-operation in the investigation of fraud and 
subsequent legal action. If any progress is to be made at that level, the 
only satisfactory solution would be an international convention on 
Maritime Fraud and a parallel international convention on jurisdiction and 
extradition. a7 
Moreover, in the Report of the ad hoc intergovernmental group to consider 
means of combating all aspects of Maritime Fraud, including piracy on the 
second session held in Geneva on 23 October to 1 November 1985, (28) the 
spokesman for the group of 77 and for Group D (USSR) seemed to favour an 
international instrument to combat Maritime Fraud as the discussion had shown 
that states had inadequate jurisdictional capacity effectively to apply sanctions 
to Maritime Fraudsters. (29) 
While in the same report, the spokesman for Group B (France) said that the 
elaboration of an international convention on jurisdictional competence and 
extradition did not appear necessary because in most countries, criminal courts 
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already were competent to deal with offences committed outside their national 
territory, by virtue of provisions establishing extra-territorial competency. 
Moreover, there was no multilateral conventional aimed solely at defining a 
legal concept and requesting States to provide severe penalties. That would 
constitute an international "precedent' which would not improve the situation of 
the victims of Maritime Frauds. The concept of Maritime Fraud was so broad 
and vague that it was difficult to define it. 
In the view of Group B, the question of penalties should be left to individual 
States, which could, nevertheless, be urged to provide for severe penalties in 
cases of serious Maritime Fraud . 
(30) 
Furthermore, Group B believed that the repression of Maritime Fraud was 
fundamentally different from combating aircraft hijacking. In the Hague, 
Montreal and New York conventions the offences were about national security 
and concerned crimes aimed to blackmail States and linked to terrorism. 
International public order had been jeopardised and those conventions had 
been done in response to the threat. While in Maritime Fraud there is a doubt 
that commercial interests alone could exert the necessary pressure regarding 
the prevention of commercial fraud. (31) Moreover, there are certain objections 
to the proposal for a convention on barratry (32) and unlawful seizure of ships, to 
treat such offences in the same way as piracy and authorising the boarding of 
the offending ship. (33) 
As a matter of practicality if states are to be granted greater rights to interfere 
with ships flying the flag of another state which is the result of the above 
suggestion, then it should be clear when such acts have been committed so as 
to avoid unnecessary interference with shipping operations on the high seas. It 
is believed that the problem of seizure of vessels, to which reference has been 
made, in fact involves deviation fraud. (34) But in these cases it can be argued 
that the deviation is perhaps at most a violation of the contract of transport and 
it is not always a crime. (35) 
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So will the intervention by vessels of other states be practical? And is such an 
expansion of jurisdiction is warranted by the problem of deviation frauds? And 
is the increased interference with international shipping outweighed by the 
benefits of redirecting this type of fraud? All these questions have to be 
answered. 
First it seems that the argument of Group B is not very strong because not all 
the states have adequate extra-territorial provisions to deal with Maritime Fraud 
as example: 
The English courts before 1993 had no jurisdiction over the fraud which was 
committed from England against victims abroad. (36 
Moreover, the universal principle is not applicable in Maritime Fraud cases in 
Iraq and England although some of these cases are very serious. 
As for the definition of Maritime Fraud; it is not necessary that the convention 
should contain a precise definition of Maritime Fraud; it is quite possible to 
elaborate a broad general definition and to list offences covered by it as 
example, The Hague convention of 1970 does not define the Crime of 
"hijacking" but merely enumerates the constituent elements of the offence. The 
Montreal Convention of 1971 also describes in Article 1, the constituent 
elements of the "offence". 
A different approach, however, is adopted in the Convention on Protected 
Persons of 1978, in which Article 2 enumerates the various "offences" that are 
the subject of the convention. 
Thus, there are two possibilities which might be envisaged: 
- The convention on Maritime 
Fraud should specify a list of offences which 
must all be incorporated into the national law of the different States that 
become parties to the convention; 
- the convention should define the 
"offence" in question and lay down its 
constituent elements. 
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A convention which provides a list of offences of Maritime Fraud must also 
contain some provisions relating to penalties. 
It might be very difficult politically to achieve international agreement on the 
appropriate penalties to be imposed in respect of offences. Most States would 
probably regard such a provision as an infringement upon their national 
sovereignty. The Hague Convention of 1970 merely provides for "severe 
penalties" in Article 2. Similarly, the Convention on Protected Persons provides 
for "appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature" of the 
offence. 
(37) 
As for the other argument of Group B which states that Maritime Fraud does 
not jeopardise the international public order but only commercial interests so it 
does not warrant an international convention to deal with it. This argument is 
not acceptable in my view because first there is no legal definition for the 
"International Public Order" It is a political rather than legal term. Moreover, 
some Maritime Fraud can cause devastating consequences to the states 
economies of the third world countries. Thus, it is not a simple commercial 
interest but one of the top national interests targeted by the fraud, thus, 
because the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern it is in the 
interest of the international community to act against it by an international 
agreement. Moreover, from previous experience we saw that the international 
community acts against the unlawful acts against the safety of maritime 
navigation by 1988 convention (38) and we see no reason why the international 
community should not do the same to combat Maritime Fraud. 
Thus, it seems that Group B, which represents the Industrial Countries, has no 
political will to support a convention on Maritime Fraud. The reason behind 
their objection may be because they are not the usual victims of such crimes. 
The most frequent victims of it are people and government bodies from the third 
world countries. If this interpretation is right, this policy is against the purposes 
and principles of the charter of the United Nations concerning the promotion of 
friendly relations and co-operations among states. 
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It is worth mentioning that Group B is in favour of making use of existing 
national and international agencies to combat Maritime Fraud*t39 
As for the extension of Criminal Jurisdiction to fraudulent deviation it seems to 
us that this extension may be possible with the existence of an international 
ship monitoring system. The exercise of the jurisdiction can be limited to the 
cases when the ship is not only deviated from its normal route but it also took 
steps to dispose of the cargo or to change its identity and in such cases it is 
apparent that the ship is involved in the committing of a crime and not a mere 
violation of the contract of transport. 
Finally, although the proposal of an international convention failed to see the 
light of day, agreement had been reached on some of the measures proposed 
by the secretariat in its documentation, such as improving access to available 
information and developing minimum standards for shipping aspects. Also, 
creation of an education programme and package would facilitate awareness of 
the complexity of the subject. There appeared, on the other hand, still to be 
reluctance concerning measures to enhance co-operation in the investigation 
and prosecution of Maritime Fraud, but the secretariat would continue to search 
for ways forward. (40) The agreement reached adequately reflected Group B's 
stress on education, information and awareness as weapons to prevent 
Maritime Fraud. 
The writer still believes that the most significant step that governments can take 
could be the negotiation of an international convention designed to deal with 
Maritime Fraud, dealing specifically with jurisdiction and extradition. Such a 
convention must expand the jurisdiction and should list those acts of Maritime 
Fraud which are to be covered by the convention. Expansion of the 
jurisdictional capabilities of state should also be linked to extradition 
requirements so that a state must either prosecute an offender in its custody or 
extradite him to a requesting state. By introducing such alternative obligations 
upon a state the fear of a particular country becoming a haven for international 
criminals, would be eliminated. As we have seen before, this approach 
has 
been adopted by The Hague Convention of 1970, 
(41) Montreal Convention of 
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1971, (42) New York Convention of 1973 (43) and the Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages, 1979, (44) and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
45) 1988. 
Moreover, the other basis of criminal jurisdiction which has been adopted by 
Article 5 of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979 and the Article 
6 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation can be used as a model for the possible future convention 
on Maritime Fraud. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, the subject of international Maritime Fraud is one of great 
topicality and importance. 
International Maritime Fraud is regarded as a developed form of the crime of 
fraud which is well known since immemorial history. 
Maritime Fraud is a generic term and has been used without a convincing 
legal definition although there are some proposed definitions but most of 
these definitions give a list of crimes which are, strictly speaking not 
fraudulent according to the definition of fraud in general. We conclude in 
this study that the term of international Maritime Fraud would appear to 
connote any fraudulent means used by any party to the international 
commercial transaction and carried out in a maritime environment in order to 
obtain money, services, property in the goods, or a pecuniary advantage 
from the other party to this transaction and the fraudulent means can include 
committing another independent crime to facilitate the final fraudulent 
objective. So the fraudster may have committed the crime of forgery, theft 
scuttling ships or arson as a means to commit insurance fraud. In Maritime 
Fraud cases its not unusual to charge the offender with more than one 
offence. 
This study reveals also that the main reason behind committing Maritime 
Fraud is the greed, and profit making quicker than honest trade permits and 
the depression of the shipping industry especially in the late 1970s was 
another factor to encourage fraud. Political unrest or economic sanctions in 
one part of the world or another often offer opportunities and temptation to 
take advantage of local demands for goods by dishonest means and some 
fraudsters were no doubt tempted to indulge in unlawful activities. 
Moreover, this study reveals that the fraudsters always seek advantage from 
loopholes and inadequacies in the existing legal structures in which 
international shipping and trade are carried on. 
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As for the features of Maritime Fraud the study shows that this crime is a 
commercial crime. The primary victims of it being the less sophisticated third 
world countries and this can cause economic sabotage to those countries. 
The impact of these crimes is however, felt to an extent in the western world 
such as in the United Kingdom as much of the insurance for the losses 
suffered is carried by Lloyds. Moreover, any financial turmoil in the third 
world countries caused by such crimes may affect the whole global economy 
and cause instability in the world market. 
As for the classification of Maritime Fraud, we saw that this concept has 
been classified in a number of ways which are descriptive with a 
considerable amount of overlap among the various classes. The methods 
employed in this study cover the majority form of mainstream Maritime 
Fraud. 
The fraudster may use more than one type of Maritime Fraud to achieve his 
result and in such cases the different types of Maritime Fraud can overlap 
Documentary fraud in the maritime field happens when a party to the 
international fraud and transaction uses a forged and/or falsified document 
related to this transaction to obtain money, or goods or a pecuniary 
advantage unjustly, from the other party. 
In most cases, the contract of sale is in c. if or c&f terms., and the payment by 
means of irrevocable documentary credit and the victims have no recourse 
against the underwriters or carriers. 
In the case of charter party fraud by unjustifiable deviation in general. It is 
not easy for a shipowner to enter a port and illegally sell the cargo. 
However, there are certain countries where it is easier than others to do so. 
These countries are usually racked by political turmoil, civil disorders in 
which the port areas are not under close supervision and control by the 
government, as in Lebanon during the civil war, and/or rampant corruption. 
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Marine insurance fraud is the kind of fraud committed by anyone connected 
with a marine trade transaction against the underwriters directly or indirectly. 
The underwriters become clearly involved when either the perpetrators of 
fraud or the victims of fraud make a claim against them under the insurance 
policy, scuttling, barratry and arson are strongly linked with insurance fraud. 
Scuttling can be defined as the willful casting away of a vessel with the 
connivance of the owners 
Some features were revealed from some scuttling cases. In some cases the 
aim of the shipowners is to claim hull insurance. The shipowners were in 
financial difficulties; there is no collusion with the cargo owners, the vessels 
were grossly over-insured. In the seventies scuttling fraud involves an old 
ship which had reached the end of its economic life and may well be less 
valuable than the insurance monies which represent it and sometimes the 
vessels allegedly carrying higher value, general cargoes, vessels under a 
flag of convenience. Cases of suspected scuttles have only rarely been 
brought to count by insurers, mainly because of the immense problems often 
presented in producing enough evidence to prove the cause of the loss and 
who knew about it. In some cases the vessel was scuttled in a very deep 
and inaccessible area in the ocean which made the investigation thereafter, 
a waste of time and a considerable waste of money. 
"Barratry" has been defined as; 
Every wrongful act willfully committed by the master or crew to the prejudice 
of the owner, or, as the case may be the charterer. 
While arson is, the willful destruction or damage of property by fire with the 
intent to defraud the insurers. 
As for the fraud in general, in Iraqi law the study reveals that Iraqi law like 
the French law gives a fairly exact description of the means which must be 
used by the perpetrator. The reason behind that is to make a 
distinction 
between what is regarded as criminal fraud and civil fraud, as civil 
fraud can 
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be committed by merely lying. Although lying in criminal and civil fraud is of 
the same nature, we saw that only lying with specific conditions is regarded 
by Iraqi law as criminal conduct. Although there is a limitation to what is 
regarded as fraudulent means, it seems that it is still broad enough to cover 
endless fraudulent activities. 
As for scrutinising Maritime Fraud under Iraqi law, the study shows that in 
documentary fraud cases these acts can be classified as fraud and may 
involve other crimes such as forgery, using forged documents or the crime of 
cheating in a commercial transaction or the crime of criminal conspiracy, 
depending on the circumstances of each case. 
In charterparty fraud, the cases can be classified as fraud when the 
charterer intended to defraud from the outset by false pretence as an honest 
carrier in order to obtain the freight from his victim with no intention of 
honouring his obligation. 
While in the cases of the shipowner obtaining ransom from the cargo interest 
against delivery of the cargo to its destination, after the charterer absconds. 
This act can be characterised as a crime of extortion in Iraqi law and not 
fraud. Moreover, if the shipowner sells the cargo in route to recoup his lost 
hire, he will commit the crime of breach of trust in Iraqi law and not fraud. 
Scuttling of a ship in order to claim against the underwriters can be regarded 
as fraud. Moreover, scuttling a ship itself is a crime against the safety of 
transport and the means of public transport. If fire is used to dispose of a 
vessel this act can be characterised as the crime of arson in Iraqi law 
besides the crime of fraud in the cases of partial conversion of cargoes of 
crude oil. We found that this act forms the crime of breach of trust in 
Iraqi 
law, moreover, as the use of crude oil as fuel is a serious source of danger 
to ships and personnel both at sea and in port, this practice can 
be 
categorised as a crime against the safety of transportation. 
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As for the crime of fraud in general in English law, the study shows, 
historically in common law it did not constitute an indictable offence to effect 
cheats upon private individuals by a more false affirmation or a bare lie 
unless the lie came with false token or device of a tangible character on 
which common prudence would not have guarded against. The false token 
in this respect is very similar to the `external appearance' which should 
support the false pretence to fulfill the fraudulent means in both Iraqi and 
French law. 
The Theft Act of 1968 uses the term "deception", which is wider than `False 
pretence' in the previous law. The word deception has the advantage of 
directing attention to the effect that the offender deliberately produced on the 
mind of the person deceived, which makes one think of what exactly the 
offender did in order to deceive. 
The falsity of the proposition is an element of the actus reus and must be 
proved by the prosecution. The falsity requirement in criminal deception in 
English law is broadly the same as the falsity requirement in fraudulent 
means in Iraqi law. 
By the Theft Act 1968 English law has largely been liberated from legal 
limitation and sets out the range of methods of disception which the law 
should have repressed before this Act. Deception in English Law means 
any false belief implanted by the defendant in the victim's mind. Thus, by 
comparison between the word `deception' in English law and all the means 
by which the criminal fraud can be committed under Article 456 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code, it seems that the word deception is wide enough to cover all the 
fraudulent means in Article 456 of the Iraqi Penal Code. Furthermore, it may 
cover a mere omission which is not covered by Article 456 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code. 
In the crime of obtaining property by deception in English Law and the crime 
of fraud in Iraqi Law the offender must obtain property ` belonging to another' 
at the time of obtaining. We find that the English Law gives a wide 
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definition of this phrase. Accordingly, property shall be regarded as 
belonging to any person having possession or control of it or having in it any 
proprietary right or interest (not being an equitable interest arising only from 
an agreement to transfer or grant an interest). 
Thus, an owner in the strict sense can be guilty of obtaining his own property 
by deception from one who has mere possession or custody of it. While in 
Iraqi Law this is not the case. But, Iraqi Law takes a similar direction to the 
English Law in regard to the crime of theft by extending the concept of the 
term "belonging to another" in the definition of the crime of theft. We think 
that the extention of the concept of the term belonging to another should 
cover the crime of fraud in Iraqi Law also in order not to leave any loopholes 
in our law. 
As for scrutinising Maritime Fraud under English law, the study shows that in 
documentary fraud cases, this act can be classified as the offence of 
obtaining property by deception in the Theft Act and, like the Iraqi Law, 
documentary fraud involves the committing of the crime of conspiracy or 
conspiracy to defraud or forgery depending on the circumstances of each 
individual case. 
In Charter Party Fraud if the charterer obtains the services of the ship from 
the shipowner by deception, he will commit an offence under s. (1) of the 
Theft Act 1978 but in Iraqi Penal Code, obtaining services by deception is 
not fraud, except in some special legislations. Thus, the writer believes that 
obtaining services by deception should be regarded as fraud in the Iraqi 
Penal Code, like English Law. 
In the case of the shipowner, when he dishonesty demands ransom from the 
cargo interest against delivery of the cargo to its destination, his action can 
be characterised as theft of the cargo according to (s. 1(1)) of the Theft 
Act 
1968, but we saw that this act is breach of trust in Iraqi Law and not theft, 
also if the shipowner manages to get the ransom from the cargo 
interest he 
will be charged with the crime of extorting money under 
Iraqi Law. 
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However, if the shipowner sells the cargo en route to recoup his lost hire he 
will have committed Theft in English Law s. 1(1) of the Theft Act, while we 
saw the same act is regarded as breach of trust in Iraqi Law. So neither 
Iraqi Law nor English Law regards this Act as fraud. 
Insurance fraud can be categorised as obtaining property by deception in 
English Law. We believe that in scuttling cases, scuttling incidents usually 
attract the media and through it the insurers will be aware of the scuttling. 
Thus, scuttling the vessel itself can be regarded as sufficiently proximate to 
be an attempt to commit fraud. The act of scuttling alone is an offence 
under the Malicious Damage Act and the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
The arrangement for the total loss of the vessel with its cargo or without it by 
arson in order to claim under the insurance policy is an alternative way of 
scuttling. Arson itself is a crime under s. 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 
1971. 
In Mortgage Fraud it is an offence under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 to 
forge or fraudulently alter some shipping documents such as certificate of 
registry or certificates of mortgage or sale also any false declaration in the 
presence of or produced to a registrar related to the above document is an 
offence. 
Partial conversion of cargoes of crude oil may be charged as theft in English 
Law. But this act is not theft in Iraqi Law but breach of trust. Moreover, 
burning crude oil as fuel for the ship itself can be charged as an offence 
under s. 5 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
In Maritime Agent Fraud, if the Maritime agent dishonestly directs the money 
such as charter hire payments or a prepaid freight to his own account he 
may be with charged theft but in Iraqi law his act is breach of trust. 
Moreover, fraud regarding weight of a quantity or quality of goods is normally 
prosecuted by Trading Standards Officers under the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968. In England. This offence is normally tried summarily. 
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Thus, the classification of the type of Maritime Fraud in Iraqi and English 
Law shows similarities in some cases and different classifications in some 
other cases. So what so-called `Maritime Fraud' is not necessarily regarded 
as a crime of fraud in Iraqi or English Law. 
Moreover, the crimes of fraud, theft, forgery and conspiracy and their 
penalties in English and Iraqi law are usually designed for the protection of 
local people and are inadequate, and not intended to deal with large scales 
of International Crimes. Their use in practice is therefore uncertain. 
Jurisdiction 
In Iraqi Law, according to the territorial principle which is universally 
recognised, every offence committed in Iraq will be subject to the provisions 
of the Iraqi Penal Code. The place of Commission in Iraqi Law is determined 
on the basis of what is known as the doctrine of ubiquity, it means that an 
offence as a whole may be committed in the place where only a part of it has 
been committed. So if any part of the conduct of Maritime Fraud or any of it 
results forbidden by such a crime takes place in Iraq, the Iraqi Court will 
have the jurisdiction. That means those who when in Iraq commit Criminal 
Fraud against people abroad will not get away with it and they will be 
punished under Iraqi Law. So Iraqi territory is not a safe haven for the 
planning or preparation of criminally dishonest acts abroad. That includes 
conspiracy and attempt. 
The writer thinks that the territorial principle in Iraqi Law can be expanded 
further to include possession within the state of property stolen outside the 
state. By such expansion we can bring to justice those who have obtained 
property or goods obtained by Maritime Fraud and then brought them into 
Iraqi territory. We saw that such expansion has occurred in some states in 
the United States. 
Iraqi Law recognises the jurisdiction of the flag state. Thus, Iraq has 
jurisdiction over the offence on board Iraqi vessel even when the vessel is 
within foreign waters, regardless of the nationality of the offender. 
In regard 
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to the crime of fraud which was committed on board a foreign vessel which 
docks in an Iraqi port with the offender on board immediately after the 
offence was committed we saw that the Iraqi Law is similar to French law in 
which Iraq will not exercise its jurisdiction over the foreign vessel unless 
under certain conditions; such as the alleged offender or victim is an Iraqi 
national or the assistance of the Iraqi authorities has been requested. In 
such a system, Iraqi Law gives the flag state the chance to exercise its 
jurisdiction too. But this may not be the case in practice if the vessel flies the 
flag of convenience state. In practice, such states may not exercise their 
right as a result of that the criminals may get away with their offences. 
Iraq recognises the active personality principle of jurisdiction, by virtue of 
such jurisdiction. Iraq can prosecute its nationals while they are abroad and 
can execute judgement, against them when they return to Iraq for fraud done 
abroad. This principle is very useful as Iraq bans the extradition of its 
nationals having the power to prosecute them for offences committed abroad 
means that such offences do not remain unprosecuted. Solidarity is the 
principle motivating such cases. Iraqi law does not recognise the nationality 
of the owner or charterers of the vessel as a basis of jurisdiction unless the 
fraud is committed by such owner or charterer and in this case, jurisdiction 
can be claimed by the Iraqi court on the basis of `active personality principle' 
if applicable. 
The principle of passive personality (the state of nationality of the person 
injured), has found no place in Iraqi law, as a basis for jurisdiction and we 
believe that Iraqi Law should fill this gap by adapting the principle of passive 
personality to protect the Iraqi national abroad. 
Iraqi Penal Code has adapted the protective principle by which Iraq can 
exercise its jurisdiction to protect the Iraqi national interest. We found that 
this kind of jurisdiction may be related to Maritime Fraud especially if the 
fraudster forges any Iraqi public documents to facilitate the commission of 
Maritime Fraud. In some countries, the concept of essential interests include 
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national shipping and aviation and certain industrial and commercial 
interests. 
Iraqi Law confined the range of the universal principle to a limited range of 
acts which apparently do not include Maritime Fraud. Thus, having the 
custody of the offender of Maritime Fraud is not enough for the Iraqi court to 
exercise its jurisdiction, but some kind of Maritime Fraud which involves 
scuttling or destruction of the vessel can be regarded as damaging or 
obstruction of the International Transportation System and in such cases the 
Iraqi courts can exercise jurisdiction over this type of Maritime Fraud 
according to the universal principle. Other types of Maritime Fraud will not 
be subject to the Iraqi universal principle. 
In English Law, common law rules as to jurisdiction of offences were difficult, 
complicated and controversial to apply resulting in a loss of court time 
dealing with technical legal arguments. Moreover, the common law rules 
permitted international criminals to plan in England to defraud the individual 
or companies of another country. Britain was a safe haven for the 
fraudsters. But by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the jurisdiction of English 
Law become similar to Iraqi Law, although Iraqi Law is still wider than 
English Law because the jurisdiction rules in Iraqi Law apply to any offence 
and not only to a list as in English Law. 
English Law like Iraqi Law recognises the princicple of the flag state as a 
basis for criminal jurisdiction. 
The English courts have asserted unlimited port Criminal Jurisdiction over 
foreign vessels and their crews within its territorial waters. 
By comparison, between Iraqi and English Law in regard to jurisdiction of the 
state of the port over offences committed on board foreign ships, it seems, 
that in Iraqi Law the state has only limited control over criminal acts 
committed on board foreign vessels within its ports and it interferes only 
in 
certain conditions. In this case, the Iraqi view is the same as 
the French, 
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while the English system does not declare in advance in what cases the 
jurisdiction will or will not be exercised. The writer thinks that the English 
system may give more power to the courts to practice jurisdiction in Maritime 
Fraud which is committed in a foreign vessel in the English territorial waters. 
As for the nationality of the offender, the common law rule is no British 
subject can be tried under English Law for an offence committed on land 
abroad, unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary and in this case. 
English Law is not wide enough to cover Maritime Fraud committed abroad 
by British subjects while Iraqi Law is wider in this point because in Iraqi Law 
there are general rules of nationality principle for all the offences and not to 
specific offences known by name. 
Like the Iraqi Law, the nationality of the owner or charterers of the vessel 
and the nationality of the person injured is not recognised as a basis for 
jurisdiction in English Law. Moreover, Maritime Fraud is not regarded as 
one of the crimes which is covered by the universal principle in English Law. 
Thus, although the English and Iraqi Law jurisdiction is wide enough to cover 
some types of Maritime Fraud both laws are not adequate to deal with all 
aspects of Maritime Fraud. 
Some international conventions related to hijacking, attacks on civil aviation, 
taking of hostages which we studied before expanded the international basis 
of jurisdiction by creating a new basis of jurisdiction. So this kind of 
expansion of jurisdiction can be adopted as a model to combat Maritime 
Fraud. As examples of these bases, some conventions give the state where 
a charterer has his principal place of business, or his permanent residence, 
the right to exercise jurisdiction over the offender. This kind of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is something new which does not fall under the traditional basis 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law this is a very useful 
innovation and an interesting development in this sphere of international law. 
344 
Some conventions give the contracting states jurisdiction if the offender is 
found in their territory, no matter how he came to be found there. If the state 
where the offender is found does not extradite him it has to exercise 
jurisdiction over the offender. This principle is similar, though not identical, 
to the principle of universality. 
The Convention Against Hostage Taking created new bases of jurisdiction. 
These bases of jurisdiction of the state where a stateless person is habitually 
resident. This principle has found no place in the English and Iraqi Laws. 
Thus, we support the suggestion for proposing an international convention 
on jurisdiction and extradition. Maritime Fraud is a worldwide problem which 
needs a worldwide solution. 
It is not necessary that the convention should contain a precise definition of 
Maritime Fraud; it is quite possible to elaborate a broad general definition 
and to list offences covered by it. 
Each contracting state should impose severe penalties in Maritime Fraud 
cases taking into account the grave nature of the offence. 
Dealing specifically with jurisdiction and extradition, such a convention must 
expand the jurisdiction or capability of states. Expansion of the jurisdictional 
capabilities of states should also be linked to extradition requirements, so 
that a state must either prosecute an offender in its custody or extradite him 
to a requesting state. By introducing such alternative obligations upon a 
state the fear of a particular country becoming a haven for international 
criminals would be eliminated. 
Some provisions would be required in a convention on Maritime Fraud as 
regards the procedure to be adopted by the contracting states when an 
offender or alleged offender is present within their jurisdiction. 
As the victims of Maritime Fraud are usually most concerned about recovery 
of their losses, adequate legislative tools to enable law enforcement officials 
to trace, seize, freeze and cause the forfeiture of proceeds from Maritime 
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Fraud is needed. In this connection, reference may be made to the 
successful developments in identifying, tracing and seizing the assets 
derived from drug trafficking. In the light of the above observations the most 
appropriate and effective means of deterring fraud by reducing the 
attractiveness of Maritime Fraud is prosecution, possibly coupled with 
revenue seizure and forfeiture of assets so as to ensure that the guilty 
parties lose all the proceeds. 
In many cases the difficulty in getting witnesses from abroad and in 
examining them. The cost of doing so is a big problem. One solution to this 
problem may be an international subpoena. However, the fact remains that 
having trials with witnesses from abroad is going to be very costly and 
Governments must be prepared to increase their budgets for prosecutions if 
they wish to make progress in this field. 
Maritime Fraud is closely dependent on the co-operation of criminal 
authorities of other states. A possible solution in this respect is the 
conclusion of an international convention on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters. This convention should contain, among other things, some 
provision about the execution of letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter, 
emanating from another state for the purpose of procuring evidence or 
transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or document. Also, 
the procedure to be employed for requests for mutual assistance, etc. 
Such a convention was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe 
on 20 April 1959 - So such existing legal structures, in the International Co- 
operation Against Criminality might be used as a model, especially within the 
framework of preventative work. 
The study shows that the developing countries are in favour of an 
international convention in Maritime Fraud cases, because they are the 
direct victims of it, but the industrial countries are against such proposals 
and have no political will to form a convention on Maritime Fraud. The 
reason behind their objection may be because they are not the usual direct 
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victims of such crimes. If this interpretation is correct, this policy is against 
the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations concerning 
the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among states. 
In order to avoid unnecessary interference with shipping operations on the 
high seas, a party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel 
exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international law and 
flying the flag or displaying marks of registry of another party is engaged in 
Maritime Fraud may so notify the flag state, request confirmation of registry 
and, if confirmed request authorisation from the flag state to take appropriate 
measures in regard to that vessel. Such a solution is adopted by the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 1988 (Article 18 (3)). 
Finally, although the proposal of an international convention failed to come 
into being, agreement had been reached on some of the measures proposed 
to improve access to available information and developing minimum 
standards for shipping aspects. 
Despite this, the writer still believes, that the most significant step 
governments can take could be the negotiation of an international 
convention designed to deal with Maritime Fraud, dealing specifically with 
jurisdiction and extradition and the developing countries should not stop 
pressing in the United Nations to achieve such an objective. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS ON MARITIME FRAUD 
1. International Symposium on Crime in Port & Dock Areas organised by 
International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL). Saint Cloud, 
France, 4th -6th November 1975 
2. Seminar on Prevention of Shipping Fraud. Sponsored by the Institute 
of Chartered Shipbrokers. Organised by the Shipbroker, London, 
1 0th may 1979. 
3. Seminar on Prevention of Shipping Fraud Sponsored by the Institute 
of Chartered Shipbrokers & the Association of Shipbrokers & Agents 
Inc. USA. Organised by the Shipbrokers, New York, 26th-27th June 
1980. 
4. Lost at sea? A Conference on the Prevention & Control of Maritime 
Fraud. Organised by Oyez International Business Communications 
Ltd. & ICC International Maritime Bureau, London, 2nd February 
1981 
5. Conference on Security, Marine Fraud & Terrorism. Held at the 12th 
Annual Conference of International Association of Ports & Harbours, 
Nagoya, Japan, 25th-30th May 1981. 
6. Maritime Fraud, Piracy, & Prevention of Conspiracy and Connivance 
in Port Crimes. Held at 12th Annual Conference of the International 
Association, Airport & Seaport Police, Seoul, Korea. 8th June 1981. 
7. Conference on Marine Insurance Claims & Frauds, organised by AGS 
Management Consultants pte, Ltd., Singapore. 9th, 10th November 
1981. 
8. Seminar on International Maritime Risk. Organised by Oyez 
International Business Communication Ltd. London, 27th April 1982. 
9. Fraud in Transportation. Fifth Colloquium of the Axel Axson Johnson 
Foundation for Maritime Law. Hasselby Castle, Sweden, 14th-16th, 
June 1982. 
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10. IUMI Cargo Workshop on Crime in International Trade, organised by 
the International Union of Marine Insurance, Amsterdam, 13th & 14th 
September 1982. 
11. Crime in International Trade, organised by the Swedish National 
Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce & The 
Chamber of Commerce of Western Sweden, Gothenburg, 13th April 
1983. 
12. Conference on Maritime Fraud & Piracy. Organised by The Marine 
Librarians Association, London. 13-15th, April 1983. 
13. Conference on Fraud & Evasion. Organised by the Laboratory of The 
Government Chemist & British Academy of Forensic Sciences, 
London 14th April 1983. 
14. Seminar on Maritime Fraud. Organised by The European Transport 
Law, Antwerp. 24th November 1983. 
15. International Commercial Crime Symposium. Organised by The 
Commonwealth Secretariat, ICC International Maritime Bureau & The 
Centre For Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 
Cambridge. 3rd-7th July 1984. 
16. Economic Crime in the Asia - Pacific Region - Discussion & Analysis 
of Major Fraud Issues. A Workshop organised by The Crown Agents 
& ICC International Maritime Bureau with the support of the British 
Institute of Securities, Las, Singapore. 7th-11th January 1985. 
17. Seminar on International Maritime & Commercial Frauds. Organised 
by The All Indian Shippers Council in collaboration with the ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, The Indian National Committee of the 
International Chamber of Commerce & the Western India Shipper's 
Association, Bombay. 8th-9th March 1985. 
18. The London International Conference on Maritime Fraud. Organised 
by Oyez Legal Studies & Services Ltd. In co-operation with United 
Nations Conference on Trade & Development & Seadocs Registry 
Ltd., London. 29th-30th April 1985. 
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19. Conference on Protection against Shipping & Cargo Fraud, held: 
Hong Kong, 25th April 1980. 
20. Seminar on Maritime Fraud. Held: Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia, 30th & 
31st March 1982. 
21. Seminar on Maritime Fraud. Held in Kuwait, 17th-20th April 1983. 
22. Seminar on Maritime Fraud , 
held in Al- Damam, 16th - August 1984. 
23. Seminar on International Maritime and Commercial Crimes, 
Organised by the Iraqi National Insurance Company, Baghdad. 22nd- 
23rd March 1987. 
24. First International Maritime Crime Conference. Organised by The 
Arab Maritime Transport Academy, Alexandria. 20th-23rd May 1990. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Some International and National organisations that have either a direct or 
indirect involvement in combating Maritime Fraud. (*) 
1. International Maritime organisation IMO. 
2. Arab Federation of Shipping . 
3. Baltic and International Maritime Conference BIMCO. 
4. Baltic Mercantile and Shipping Exchange. 
5. Commonwealth Secretariat. 
6. Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for 
Arab Gulf Countries. 
7. General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
for Arab Countries. 
8. Gulf-Co-operation Council. 
9. International Association of Airport and Seaport police 
10. The International Cargo Handling Co-ordination association (ICHCA). 
11. International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) 
12. International Union of MARINE Insurers. 
13. The League of Arab States. 
14. Protection and Indemnity Clubs 
15. Salvage Association (U. K) 
16. Information agencies. 
17. Lloyd's Shipping Information Services (U. K). 
18. Maritime Data Network Ltd. 
* For more details about these organisations see, UNCTAD report, 
TD/B/C. 4/2, op. cit, pp13-20 
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APPENDIX 3 
The ways in which maritime fraud could be committed in P. Kapoor's 
definition. 
a. Issuance of forged or falsified documents pertaining to the goods or 
the ship said to be carrying such goods; 
b. Concealment or misrepresentation of material facts; 
c. Substitution of rubbish/poor quality goods for proper goods; 
d. Short loading/short landing of goods; 
e. Failures of charter-parties/breach of contract; 
f. Deliberate insolvency; 
g. Scuttling of ship to obtain insurance on over-valued hull and/or non- 
existent or high value cargo substituted with poor quality 
goods/rubbish; 
h. Sending goods on non-existent ships; 
i. Pilferage by stevedores; 
J. Diversion of ships for selling off cargo dishonestly/illegally; 
k. Making improper demands for additional freight; 
1. Demanding inducement for preferential stowage; 
M. Issuing letters of indemnity to obtain clean bills of lading; 
n. Signing blank bills of lading or issuing two separate sets; 
0. Cube-Cutting; 
p. Theft; 
q. Barratry; 
r. Using an established and reputable/firms telex to induce a contract; 
S. Signing false receipts for stores/dunnage received, or work carried 
out by shore labour on board; 
t. Setting up a paper company or a worthless company with impressive 
but false pedigree to induce people to enter into a contract (known as 
long-firm fraud); 
U. Pilotage fee splitting (1). 
-----00000------ 
1. P. Kapoor, Definition and Classification of Maritime Fraud, op-cit, p39. 
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